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This ethnography documents the interconnections between asylum 
narrations and emergent Nepali migrant-community in the United States within 
the context of contemporary US immigration and political asylum process.  It 
explores the social and politico-legal life of asylum narration, interpretation, 
and documentation that congeal the figure of a “suffering migrant” and/as an 
“asylum seeker” in the United States.  The multifaceted elements involved in 
the asylum process—from initial stages of interpretation and documentation, 
including filing of the I-589 asylum application to the US state, recording of 
individual asylum narratives to the preparation of affidavits and expert-witness 
reports to the effective deployment of suffering accounts in the courtroom 
hearings—frame specific chapters in this dissertation.   
This dissertation reveals that the socio-cultural work of and investment 
into asylum process extends beyond the legal realm that they are often 
consigned to.  I examine how the characteristics involved in seeking political 
	  asylum, including legal documentation and bureaucracy come to define the 
relationship, sociality, and imaginations in the formation of Nepali migrant 
communities in the United States.  For Nepali transnational migrants and/as 
asylum claimants explain and self-reflexively critique the asylum-seeking 
process through the socio-cultural concepts of kaagaz banaune (literally, “making 
paper”), or legal documentation, and the everyday practice of dukkha, or 
suffering, being inseparable from socio-legal dynamics, emphasizing the basis 
for creating a peculiar mode of sociality and negotiating familiar ones anew.  I 
ground these interests within the co-construction of what I call asylum 
“suffering narratives” by Nepalis, embedded in indeterminacy, intersubjective 
and political possibilities, which both contest and conform to their 
interlocutors’—asylum lawyers and human rights advocates—interpretation of 
the “work of compassion” as a hallmark of the US asylum system.  An analysis 
of the US asylum-seeking process as a paradigmatic case for the production of 
a “suffering narrative,” my dissertation takes into account how and in what 
specific ways asylum legal experts in turn employ, embody, and self-consciously 
reproduce rationales within the state-legitimized constraints and their 
practices—conflicting and sometimes inconsistent views, critiques, and 
beliefs—of compassion as an important extension of the everyday practice and 
performance of membership in a liberal, democratic state.   
	  Nepalis’ experiences of seeking asylum illuminate the infrequently 
explored workings of liberal subject making where individuals and migrant-
community in question do not unconsciously reproduce suffering narratives 
without incisive internal critique of the process.  Exploring the dynamics of 
suffering and victimhood as a necessary condition to the modern, subject 
making process, I argue that, contrary to the prevailing trend, the politics of 
recognition cannot be seen as an end for putative pathway toward citizenship 
in liberal democracies, empirically and theoretically.  Rather, it is the beginning 
of a more complicated relationship between private-citizens and the making 
and managing of legal non-citizens.  It shows that social and political suffering, 
both as a general phenomenon and in the context of political asylum offer a 
useful analytical site for an investigation into the relationship between 
compassion, suffering, and citizenship.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Being “located” by my inter locutors  
“Bahini, America ma baseka Nepali haru ko barema bujhna ko lagi, Nepali haru yahan 
aayera kasari afno dukkha ra peedha bechara, kehi naboli, baseka chan bhanne kura bujhna jaruri 
cha” [Sister, to know about Nepalis living in America, you have to first understand how 
Nepalis have been surviving here by selling their suffering, silently].”  So argued my 
interlocutor and a community-activist Nirmala didi,1 a charismatic and a perceptive 
woman in her late 40s, who worked with Nepali migrant workers in a Nepali 
grassroots, worker’s rights organization in Jackson Heights, Queens, ever since she 
acquired asylum in the US.   
 I first met Nirmala didi in the fall of 2007, two years before I started my 
fieldwork in the city, back when I thought my research was about migration and 
settlement of Nepalis into U.S. society, rather than the uneasy relationship between 
migrant-community formation and the everyday practices of legal integration, as 
people’s everyday experiences filled with dilemmas and contradictions.  At the time, I 
simply thought that like every Nepali I met in the city, she too was sharing her 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Didi means older sister in Nepali.  Addressing people, new acquaintances, usually a person older than you in 
kin terms is a sign of respect.  The reverse is true, as well; referring to a younger person in kin terms is both a 
sign of respect and an endearment.  I was everyone’s bahini, younger sister, at the Nepali grassroots 
organization. 
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opinion with me about who and what Nepalis2 were supposed to become in the US.  
Although I thought it somewhat odd, it was not the content of her statement that 
initially made me ponder as much as the dry, matter-of-factly way she stated it, almost 
expecting some kind of response from me without having posed a question.  Still, 
collecting ‘suffering stories’ of Nepali New Yorkers or researching about people 
“selling suffering” was certainly not what I had imagined my research, which I started 
a year later, to be about.   
One can only imagine my surprise upon repeatedly running into conversations 
with Nepalis about suffering, or dukka, that people indirectly spoke of, inevitably, in 
relation to creating and being created by a vibrant, Nepali migrant-community in New 
York City.  To the extent that I was working with migrant workers in the grassroots, 
community-based organization Adhikaar (meaning ‘rights’ in Nepali) as a volunteer-
ethnographer and accidentally inserted as an ethnographer-interpreter for political 
asylum claimants outside the greater Nepali migrant community, the multifaceted 
meanings of moral suffering materialized at different moments with people 
throughout fieldwork. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 John Whelpton’s observed two decades ago that “Being Nepali…means different things to different 
Nepalis” and insisted that scholars working among Nepalis and in the Himalaya region to constantly be wary 
of “the gap that may exist between official aspirations and the actual feelings of a population divided along 
ethnic, caste, and class lines.”  Other anthropologists like Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka and Gerard Toffin (2011) 
have followed suit. See The politics of belonging in the Himalayas: local attachments and boundary dynamics, where Pfaff-
Czarnecka and Toffi provide an analysis on the contested notion of belonging based on ethnicity and identity 
throughout the socio-political history of Nepal.  Keeping this important critique in mind, I use “Nepali” in 
this dissertation primarily as people in the Nepali Diaspora living in the U.S. who identified themselves as 
Nepalis belonging to the greater migrant community as people speaking Nepali, and not necessarily how 
individuals or groups differentiated their Nepali-ness based on categories of caste, region, ethnicity, and 
religion in the Diaspora. 
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I first started volunteering at Adhikaar in late 2007, initially to document 
practices of cultural mediation within the setting of migrant grassroots community-
organizing and mobilizing around worker’s rights issues, and more broadly, to 
understand the relationship between emergent human rights and social-justice 
oriented approaches toward addressing im/migrant-related “issues”—employment, 
health-care, and education—and new conceptions of building migrant-community 
and migrant-identities.  I was primarily interested in the work and service provided by 
‘ethnic brokers’ or ‘cultural mediators,’ like Nirmala didi, who were positioned to 
negotiate between Nepali migrants and various representatives in state-institutional 
settings.  I realized early on, however, that cultural mediation and language translation 
and interpretation were occurring in a wide-range of institutional and non-institutional 
settings throughout New York City.  Whereas hospitals, schools, post-offices, refugee 
resettlement agencies, and banks were some of the most regular and readily visible 
sites for translation and interpretation, asylum offices and courtrooms were seemingly 
distant and unlikely institutional sites where Nepalis engaged in cultural mediation.   
Over the course of two years (2009-2011) in New York City, I spent many 
hours in private law firms, human rights agencies, immigration courtrooms, asylum 
offices, sitting and speaking with and for Nepali asylum claimants as an ethnographer-
interpreter.  I became interested in the formation of a Nepali “migrant community” 
shaped by people’s everyday experiences of legalization as recently arrived migrants 
escaping political instability in Nepal (Chapter 1) and settling into US society.  I 
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learned soon enough, though, to simply explain to people that I was studying about 
Nepalis' experiences in the US.   
This strategy for addressing people's curiosity as to what I “really” wanted to 
know always produced a satisfying response and, sometimes, resulted in an intense 
engagement.  First, a straightforward answer about how long ago they migrated to the 
US, then a sigh and an awkward glance, followed by a comment about their legal 
status.  Once people learned that I was a US citizen, the comments would become 
increasingly specific to the point of being a long list of inquiries.  “So how long did it 
take you to make papers?”  My Nepali interlocutors would often ask me, “Did you 
make it by yourself or go through the lawyers?”  Or, some would bluntly say: “How 
much did you end up spending?”  When I mentioned that my uncle, a US citizen, 
sponsored my family and we migrated almost twenty years ago, many nod their heads 
and others would say, “Oh you are one of those fortunate people.”  Many 
conversations would simply end there. 
The more I revealed about the various aspects of my fieldwork in the city the 
more gratifying, if somewhat puzzling, responses I got from people.  In particular, 
upon revealing that I also provided Nepali-English interpretation for asylum seekers, 
most interesting and troubling responses were expressed.  While it managed to 
generate sarcastic laughter from close associates in the organization where I 
volunteered, most of the time my inquiries were met with dead silence and exchange 
of hesitant smiles and glances now and then.  At the grassroots organization, where I 
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volunteered and facilitated English classes, my response elicited a story.  “Dherai dukha 
khayen pahile pani (I had to suffer a lot in the beginning too)…tara America bhaneko nai 
yehi ho bhanera thaha pai sakepachi chalchan.  Kaam pani gardai garcham, tara kaagaz banauna 
ko laagi dukha garnu pareko samjhanda ajhai runa man lagcha ghar samjhera (But once you 
realize this is life in America, you just go on.  Work also keeps going, but every time 
you think about all the suffering you had to go through to make papers, I still feel like 
crying and miss home).”  Another response in the form of question was, “Tyo ta 
saubhabhik nai ho, America ma sukkha pauna ko lagi dukkha ta garnai paryo ni, hoina ra 
bahini? (It is natural, to have a good life in America one has to suffer, isn't it true 
sister?).  A man in his early 60s, who I call Ram dai, from Kathmandu, once casually 
declared: “Nepalma Maobadi ko stithile garda Nepali harulai dherai faida bhairakheko cha yo 
deshma (Because of the Maoist situation in Nepal, Nepalis are benefiting in this 
country).”  The ESL participants, who were migrant workers in the city, and with 
whom I worked closely, shared with me their experience of obtaining asylum, or 
kaagaz banaune (literally: making paper) in the US. 
In Sunnyside, Queens, where I lived, Nepalis often told me, “Tapain le dherai 
ramro kaam gardai hunu huncha.  Hami Nepali haru yaahan kasari baseka chaun bhanera thaha 
hunu paryo ni  (You are doing good work.  One has to know how we Nepalis are 
suffering here)”.  My primary interlocutors, participants in my English classes at the 
organization, were extremely polite, gracious, and hospitable to me, for I knew that 
entertaining my inquiries about their early experiences of ‘integrating’ were far less 
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important or practical for them in the midst of dealing with their everyday anxiety 
caused by economic and legal insecurities.  These seemingly unconnected comments 
and reactions made me wonder just what it was about interpreting for Nepali asylum 
claimants that demanded such measured yet lively responses and views from Nepalis. 
My Nepali interlocutors, colleagues, and random strangers communicated quite 
a lot in their few words, awkward silences, and moralizing tones.  What people initially 
said in response to my interest in learning more about asylum seeking process and 
declared involvement with Nepali asylum claimants and their legal representatives 
revealed little about whether (or not) they themselves went through the process or 
personally knew or assisted someone who had gone through the process.  Nor did 
they shed much light on how Nepalis obtained information about the asylum process, 
or if an extensive, informal social networks surrounding “making paper” existed in the 
migrant community that I had yet to learn.  For me, doing fieldwork among Nepalis 
claimants in New York City simply meant trying to understand something about their 
everyday legalization experiences and migrant social lives bounded by this concrete, 
material, activity of “making paper.”  This is turn led to a set of questions I then 
explored throughout my fieldwork, about the role of the asylum process, not only for 
the Nepali claimants but also for those—pro bono lawyers and human rights 
workers—assisting them with narrating, filing, and documenting their legal claims.   
Unlike Nepali claimants, who described and drew parallels to seeking asylum as 
a basis for their continued and sometimes exacerbated conditions of suffering in the 
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US, pro bono lawyers and human rights workers who assisted them often spoke 
fondly of their experiences assisting Nepali and non-Nepali asylum claimants.  As one 
of the pro bono lawyers I worked with on Nepali asylum case put it, “So much of 
asylum work is about compassion.  You can be the best lawyer in town but without 
having an ability to sympathize you cannot continue this work.”  Another 
collaborator, a human rights expert, explained in a similar vein, “Although we provide 
pro bono legal assistance for asylum seekers, this work requires more than just legal 
expertise.  That is the why we stay connected with private law firms even after 
transferring asylum cases for pro bono legal representation.  We see it through each 
asylum case we accept and recommend to pro bono lawyers.”  
Lawyers and human rights experts are then critical social actors, mediators, 
articulating and translating asylum law to Nepali claimants and interpreters like myself.  
They are also resourceful individuals, working not only with their own professional 
codes and legal conventions but also with their own career interests and 
compassionate rationales and practices, sometimes oppositional, and other times, 
contributing, to their professional training and credential.  Furthermore, their terms of 
engagement with and reasons for assisting asylum claimants represent a generation 
confronted with politically charged and contested debates on the contemporary US 
immigration laws and policies.  These varied, animated, and differential responses 
provided by Nepali interlocutors and pro bono lawyers and human rights 
collaborators on the topic of asylum in the US revealed two important and 
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interconnected issues that form the basis of this dissertation: if seeking asylum, or in 
the words of many Nepalis “making paper,” was a work of suffering, then assisting 
asylum claimants equally required hard-work of compassion for those intimately 
involved and invested in the asylum-assistance process. 
My argument in this dissertation is that, for various reasons, the asylum process 
in the US is one of the key sites for the production of suffering narratives among its 
claimants and, simultaneously, the materialization of compassionate practices among 
its advocates and legal collaborators.   It is certainly an institution where legal 
documents (i.e. asylum-related in this case) shape and, in turn, are shaped by social 
interaction, intense engagement through interpretation, and active imagination of 
people occupying incompatible social positions.  The incompatibility, ambivalence, 
inconsistency, and miscommunication, I show, are not obstacle to but central to 
workings of the US asylum system.  I do so through the perspectives, experiences, and 
suffering narrative accounts of Nepali asylum claimants and their legal representatives 
and human rights advocates and experts—all deeply immersed in the asylum process, 
actively engaged with one another, yet invested in quite opposing experiences and 
worldviews.   
Seeking asylum is a juridical process that entails a particular social relation to 
the state; as such, asylum claimant is a preeminently political identity.  To conduct 
research related to asylum process in the U.S. not only from the perspectives of 
claimants but also from the unexamined perspectives of their legal collaborators and 
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advocates, especially those in relatively privileged social positions, involves an 
interesting double-bind research that is, fundamentally, anthropology’s alleged aims as 
a distinctive mode of inquiry.  As a Nepali-English legal interpreter rather new to the 
asylum-seeking process who accidentally immersed herself in and drawn into intense 
conversations, fervent controversies, and quite animated debate among Nepalis on the 
one hand, and equally dynamic engagement and endless discussion on the topic of 
asylum with/among pro bono lawyers and human rights experts, on the other, I can 
confirm that there is good deal for investigating its socio-legal and cultural 
significance in the US.  A second reason to ethnographically document asylum-
seeking and assisting process, rather than focus on the asylum law or policy-oriented 
debates, in the study of the US asylum as a salient institution follows from Nicholas 
De Genova’s suggestion that insofar as policy-research on contemporary US 
immigration or undocumented migration are concerned they are only “effectively 
formulated and conducted from the standpoint of the state” which in the end 
reinforces “its [state] ideological conceits more or less conspicuously smuggled tow” 
(2002:421).  De Genova’s has particularly argued against making of “undocumented 
migrants” an “ethnographic ‘object’ of study” that unwittingly participates in the very 
production of those people’s “‘illegality’3—in effect, accomplices to the discursive 
power of immigration law” (423).  In a similar vein, Susan Coutin characterized her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The term “illegality” has been used by scholars like De Genova to denote the production and reinforcement 
of migrant legal categories, such as “illegal aliens” or “undocumented migrants,” and how these socio-legal 
categories in turn shape the everyday lives of people.  
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research on the legalization experiences among Salvadoran asylum seekers in the US 
as an attempt to do “ethnography of a legal process” rather than of a “particular 
group” (2000: 23).  Both Coutin and De Genova (2002) caution us about constructing 
individuals’ legal identities that can have damaging political consequences.  Inspired by 
these critical ethnographies of/in the United States, I trace the contemporary socio-
legal life of the asylum process and socio-cultural consequences through the 
perspectives of Nepali claimants and their legal and human rights advocates and 
collaborators.  Toward this end, I will investigate the relationship of some aspects of 
what one might call the American “asylum cultural process” to the socio-legal lives of 
differently situated people in the US at this particular political moment. 
Asylum Seeking Exper ience  o f  Nepal i s  in the  US 
 
This dissertation is as much about asylum seeking experience of Nepalis as 
their emergent socio-cultural realities intricately connected to legal-political landscapes 
of former, current, and potential claimants attempting to live through it and make 
sense of it.  I focus on the asylum seeking experience not as an interruption from but 
a crux of people’s everyday existence.  As such, I document steps involved in seeking 
asylum not as an overview of the actual process as much as subjective and collective 
experiences of Nepalis I came to know, worked closely with, and provided 
interpretation within and outside the asylum context.  In other words, seeking asylum 
for Nepalis ran parallel to their visibility as emergent migrant community in New 
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York City, where their individual lives are influenced by and shape the social life of 
seeking asylum. 
I frame my work through two overarching and interconnecting approaches.  
First, this dissertation weaves together personalized accounts of seeking asylum with 
those of ordinary, everyday lives of claimants as migrants.  I do not emphasize seeking 
asylum as the primary feature of their lives in the city.  Instead, I discuss the multitude 
(and perhaps more intensified precisely because of its reach into every aspects of the 
everyday) experiences of the asylum process that is within and goes beyond the legal 
realm that it is often consigned to.  Second, asylum-seeking process is often 
characterized within the contemporary immigration literature (Nyers 2003; Hughes 
1998; Simon 1998; Welch 2002; Willen 2010) as either a necessary pathway of 
transforming “irregular” statuses of people to ultimately obtaining citizenship, or 
represented as an quintessential case of inhuman practices leading to differential 
forms of state control and governance (in the cases of deportation, and the refugee 
and asylum detention proceedings).  Seeking asylum here is analyzed not in terms of 
the putative outcome of legal rights and socio-political belonging, but as a ground for 
examining the way of existing in the present—a form of sociality—in the US for legal 
non-citizens as always already an incomplete, conditional, and irreversible process.  
Toward these ends, I trace asylum-seeking steps experienced by Nepalis—from initial 
stages of producing “suffering narrative” during asylum interviews at human rights 
organizations to being represented by pro bono lawyers in private law firms, where 
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asylum interpretation and documentation of asylum story lead to preparation of 
witness testimony and merit hearings in the Immigration Courtrooms or Asylum 
Offices. 
The individual asylum narratives I write about in this dissertation are self-
conscious stories that span across two (or more) years of going through the asylum 
process.  As such, some narratives are situated strictly within the legal context of 
asylum process—Immigration Courtrooms, Asylum Offices, and private law firms.  
Other narratives are situated in the midst of post-asylum documentation and prior to 
obtaining asylum, which include re-submission of claims, making appeals to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to revert rejected claims to awaiting decisions 
uncertainly.  Still others are personalized reflections about and introspection into 
individualized experiences of seeking asylum or having gone through the process.  I 
take these narratives as a collective commentary and critiques of the asylum-seeking 
process, which both provide a way of understanding its socio-political reach beyond 
the question of legalization and are characterized by the encounters with the asylum 
system to produce particular stories.   
The first part of this dissertation is concerned with Nepalis’ experiences of 
seeking asylum and the emergent sociality and relation they perceive among 
themselves and the US state.   In short, the production of asylum legal narration and 
documentation feature centrally in their lives as Nepali migrants in the US.  This 
approach grounds my ethnographic questions focusing on the asylum process shaping 
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socio-cultural lives and political engagement among Nepalis in New York City.  The 
first set of ethnographic questions embark upon asylum-seeking experience through 
highlighting the emergent notions of work and suffering for people who are 
chronically positioned and in turn position themselves in the broad spectrum of legal 
ambiguities produced by the asylum system.   
Then I move on to the second approach, where I attend to locate the 
perspectives of asylum advocates, pro bono legal experts and representatives, human 
rights workers as important facilitators, collaborators, and co-producers of what one 
might call, after Kleinman (1988), the “suffering narrative” in the asylum context.  I 
explore in detail how the co-construction of “suffering narrative” works in concrete 
during asylum interpretation sessions, interviews, asylum legal documentary practices, 
and courtroom hearings and witness testimonies.  These concerns about the practical 
dimensions of making asylum claims as ‘suffering narrative’ are braided into a second 
set of questions addressing the asylum system as a template to produce ‘suffering 
narrative’ and set parameters of social engagements between claimants and their legal 
representatives, enforcing compassionate rationales.  I take this asylum template, so to 
speak, based on my own position as an ethnographer-interpreter and from the 
perspectives of those I provided asylum interpretation for—Nepali claimants and 
their pro bono lawyers, asylum officers, human rights workers, and expert witnesses.  
The final ethnographies center on the socio-cultural divergences produced by the 
asylum cultural template, rendering visible the fraught tensions with which socio-
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legally ingrained ideologies and professional practices surrounding “claimant 
credibility” and “work of compassion” come to the fore and inform encounters and 
engagements between legal non-citizens and private citizens.  It illuminates the US 
asylum system as a (socio-legal) template/process by broadly describing and assessing 
stakes of differently positioned social actors.  On one hand, it is invested in detailing 
the impact of seeking asylum among Nepali claimants as they reflect on their 
subjective experiences of suffering.  On the other, it tunes into equally vigorous and 
varied accounts of practicing compassion.  These concerns are brought together and 
discussed through categories of asylum work and legal documentation, revealing 
people’s imaginations, initiated by asylum-based lived experiences, of their present 
lives and future possibilities. 
At the same time, since my most intense fieldwork and my primary sympathies 
were with Nepali migrants and claimants for whom I provided legal interpretation, I 
have been especially concerned with how particular individuals and the migrant 
communities both have been subjected to and have responded to the asylum 
legalization process and specific stages therein.  In this dissertation I explore how they 
have enacted and made sense given their often-precarious socio-economic situations 
and legal positions and how they have internalized the process in their everyday lives 
of becoming “asylum seekers” and “migrant workers” in the United States.  These are 
lives, in the US, for which, real limits rather than possibilities define their experiences 
of becoming desirable legal non-citizens.  For these claimants whose experiences in 
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the U.S. have tended to be more through employment insecurity and exploitation, 
constant surveillance, constrained physical and social mobility than through the 
privileges of education, upward social mobility, income, I explore how the asylum-
seeking experience and continued protracted legality only exacerbate their daily 
activities and suffering.  I argue that the way claimants respond to and participate in 
the production of asylum ‘suffering narrative’ depends not only on specific claims 
based on past suffering and violence in Nepal but also their current experiences in the 
US as alternative meaning-making discourse and practices available through asylum 
seeking process. 
Ethnography o f  an asy lum process  
 There is a burgeoning interest within anthropology around asylum system as an 
object of study (see Good 2007), and I do not intend to revisit the nitty-gritty of the 
asylum legal and judicial procedures (see Kelly 2012 for a detailed analysis of the 
concept of “torture” as used in the UK asylum system).  Here my interest is firmly 
rooted in the kinds of subjective limits and social possibilities, internal dissent and 
everyday life projects through and in seeking asylum in the United States.  Asylum 
system is both an object of study only in so far as it offers a way of viewing an 
amplification of particular social process and life itself.  For people I provided asylum-
related interpretation and worked closely with, the asylum-seeking process was 
undoubtedly a different set of experiences from “pre-asylum seeking” days, for it had 
its own terms and conditions, and possibilities of distinctive sociality.  Simultaneously, 
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the asylum process did not necessarily obliterate their parallel experiences and 
preexisting socio-economic conditions as migrants in New York City.  Rather, it 
magnified and forced people to acknowledge with certainty the precariousness and the 
inherent contradictions of their existence—as migrant workers and asylum seekers.  
As such, asylum seeking experience brought to the forefront moments when social 
life was exaggerated, not necessarily by shared, collective experiences as much as 
individual’s everyday encounters and imaginaries related to asylum ‘suffering 
narrative,’ structured by circumstances immediately out of grasp of individual 
claimants.   
 Anthropology of asylum system is currently being worked out.  In an era where 
people seeking asylum and the use of legal documentation is on the rise in the United 
States as in most of the rest of the ‘West’—what “actually happens” in the asylum 
interviews at Immigration Courtrooms and Asylum Offices is not well understood.  
Recently, we have been experiencing something of an asylum ethnographic revival 
(Delouvin 2000; Blommaert 2001; Coutin 2000; Corlett 2002; Williksen 2004; Fassin 
and d’Halluin 2004 and 2005; Good 2002, 2007, 2011a; Ticktin 2011; Kelly 2012; 
Pöllabauer 2004; Nickels 2007; McKinnon 2009).  These studies are indicative of the 
significance of the asylum system in the U.S. and Europe and broader implications for 
anthropology that have opened up spaces to consider analytical concerns.  Toward 
this end, my dissertation is a contribution to this burgeoning literature on asylum legal 
process in liberal democracies and, in particular ethnographies of asylum (Good 2007; 
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Kelly 2012; Fassin 2013; Cabot 2012).  I draw on and attempt to expand 
anthropological engagement with the asylum process, albeit with a slightly different 
approach.  The two major approaches to the study of asylum law and process, and the 
concomitant shift in focus between asylum legal procedure and the production of 
‘suffering’ can be illustrated by Anthony Good’s work in Britain (2007; 2008; 2009; 
2011; 2012), and Didier Fassin (2002; 2005; 2007; 2012) and Miriam Ticktin’s (2011) 
works.  Good’s interests in the asylum system arises out of his research positionality 
as a country-condition expert, writing reports and providing witness testimonies on 
behalf of asylum seekers and working for British Immigration court system.  Didier 
Fassin focuses on the compassionate politics in the production of suffering 
narrative—not limited to the asylum context—based on his own vantage point as a 
medical practitioner and ethnographer, gathering and analyzing oral and written 
reports of suffering and trauma framed within the humanitarian logic.   
 In the case of asylum claimants in France, Miriam Ticktin (2011) has argued 
that it is a conglomeration of “humanitarian interventions” or “regimes of care” as 
part of the transnational organizations and private agencies, rather than the French 
state per se, involved in the management of undocumented migrants seeking asylum.  
An important strand to her argument is the centrality of moral imperatives driving the 
politics of immigration and governing of migrant lives in France.  She reveals the 
particularity of anti-immigrant politics and universal ethics surrounding compassion 
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and care in the everyday governing practices of the lives of sans-papiers4 (or, migrants 
without legal documents).  
 While I take inspiration from Good, Kelly, Fassin and Ticktin’s study of asylum 
system in the UK and France, respectively, there are divergences between my 
approach and theirs.  To some extent, emergent anthropological interest in the asylum 
process abandons the significance of the micro-political for understanding the asylum 
process and individualized experience of social actors positioned as potential grantees 
for asylum, facilitators in assisting with asylum claims, and finally grantors of asylum 
in liberal states.  On one hand, studies (Good 2011a and 2011b; Cabot 2013) 
expanding asylum system as a legal-bureaucratic technology placed to tackle mass 
migration of people from post-conflict societies and settling in liberal democracies 
ends up effacing any political possibilities of those invested in the asylum process.  On 
the other hand, studies (Fassin 2005; Kelly 2012) that fixate on the critique of “past-
persecution” with extensive work on understanding legal and medical construction of 
victimhood based on violence overlook the specific terms and conditions inherent in 
the very making of asylum system for imagining, co-constructing, and simultaneously 
legitimizing asylum suffering narratives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Discussing in detail what she calls “the Illness Clause,” she poses a rhetorical question: Why is it that illness 
can travel across borders while poverty cannot?” (95).   Ticktin makes a case that discussion of sana-papiers’ 
use of “the illness clause” to legalize their status need to be understood within the contemporary context of 
increasing anti-immigration sentiment against people of color coupled with myriad technologies of care 
regime and structural constraints in France.	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 In this dissertation, I make the case that closely engaging with and critically 
assessing the asylum legal practice allows us to unpack the seemingly arbitrary process 
of asylum making claims and give us insights into the cultural workings of the US 
asylum system.   I take inspiration from Pierre Bourdieu’s notions of “disposition,” 
which refers to a “way of being” or “inclination” that collectively constitute the 
habitus.   Habitus, Bourdieu writes, is “a system of dispositions,” which structures 
action and everyday practices, and creates social worlds (Bourdieu 1990, 73-87, 214).  
Specifically, in directly investigating “how” and “what” rationale underpins workings 
of the asylum process and why particular components hold such explanatory power 
and naturalizing effect, I approach asylum system through the legal-judicial habitus of 
people invested in the process and their conception of themselves as benefactors of 
compassion to suffering asylum victims—indicative of a specific worldview and socio-
political interests inseparable from their subjective positions, if somewhat elusive, 
rather than mere collection of objective facts.  Myth, as Malinowski reminded us over 
six decades ago, does not exist separate from social practice: “an intimate connection 
exists between the word, the mythos, the sacred tales of a tribe, on the one hand, and 
their ritual acts, their moral deeds, their social organization, and even their practical 
activities, on the other” (1948: 96).  I suggest that like Malinowski’s notion of “myth,” 
the contemporary US asylum system—through its established alignments with long-
standing legal history entrenched in the post-civil rights cultural norms, on one hand, 
and the ongoing changes in the US immigration laws and policies, on the other—
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evokes and reinstates victimhood as a basis for constructing a “suffering narrative” 
not separable from its liberal succession. 
 In a similar vein, to compartmentalize different aspects of the asylum process 
and document particular voices and perspectives therein, I juxtapose pro bono 
lawyers and human rights workers’ narratives of “claimant credibility’” and “work of 
compassion” in the co-construction of asylum “suffering narrative” with those of 
their clients—Nepali claimants.  Delineating the conflicts, contradictions, and 
contestations among the advocates and collaborators of asylum also provides an 
analytical space for unearthing universalizing and taken-for-granted assumptions 
informing their beliefs, behaviors, and interpretations of their actions, personal and 
professional.  By unfolding the inconsistencies and contradictions between competing 
worldviews and practices associated with asylum “claimant credibility,” I write against 
assumptions of a singular, static, all-encompassing set of ideas surrounding asylum-
suffering narrative and victimhood status assigned to people positioned as 
claimants—evoking passionate debate on truth, evidence, and compassion.  At issue is 
the task of describing and recapturing asylum process and how “suffering narrative” 
of Nepali claimants and legal representatives’ emphasis on “compassionate actions” 
function in sustaining the workings of the asylum proceedings.  It also illuminates in 
concrete how what is at stake for differently situated social actors and their 
corresponding, and starkly varied, experiences of the same socio-cultural process 
results in quite different notions of being and enacting in the same world. 
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Notes on e thnographic  engagement  
“Ethnography throws one into a world where one cannot be entirely oneself, 
where one is estranged from the ways of acting and thinking that sustain one’s 
accustomed sense of identity.  This emotional, intellectual, social, and sensory 
displacement can be so destabilizing that one has to fight the impulse to run for 
cover, to retrieve the sense of groundedness one has lost.  But it can also be a window 
of opportunity, a way of understanding oneself from the standpoint of another, or 
from elsewhere.” 
 
--Michael Jackson (“The Scope of Existential Anthropology,” 2013: 10) 
As part of my ethnographic work on asylum process—legal interpretation, 
documentation, and hearing procedures—and the production of Nepali migrant legal 
subjectivities in the United States, I conducted interviews and collected data in two 
seemingly unconnected spaces (Nepali worker’s rights grassroots organization 
Adhikaar and human-rights agencies and private law firms throughout the city) over a 
period of two years (October 2009—September 2011).  The majority of the claimants 
in these distinct sites were working-class migrants, arriving to the U.S. from anywhere 
between one to nine years ago from Nepal, either going through asylum procedure or 
awaiting asylum decision.  Those going through the process were in the midst of 
seeking asylum, which encompassed a wide-range of activities: attending initial 
screening and interview process at the human-rights agency; meeting pro bono 
lawyers once or twice a month to processing their asylum documentation—filing of I-
589 Application Form for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; going over their documented 
affidavit for accuracy and consistency and ensuring that their asylum stories match the 
written affidavit; meeting expert witnesses, including doctors, psychologists or other 
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medical professionals and regional or country-condition experts; and meeting with 
pro bono lawyers as frequently as 3 or 4 times/week for two weeks to up to a month 
for interview and prep-sessions before their merit hearings at the Immigration Court 
in Federal Plaza.  Although claimants anticipating decision on their asylum had already 
completed two-to-three yearlong asylum procedure, documentation, interview, and 
merit hearing, the waiting itself posed new and different set of challenges—intrinsic to 
protracted legal uncertainty that I discuss in some detail in the later chapters. 
I spent many hours in law firms, human rights agencies, immigration 
courtrooms, asylum offices, sitting and speaking with and for Nepali asylum claimants 
as a legal interpreter, or what I would like to call an ethnographer-interpreter.  Unlike 
many anthropologists studying asylum system in liberal democracies, I entered the 
asylum scene neither as an “expert” witness during asylum hearings nor consultant to 
legal experts for providing country condition reports on Nepal.  Rather, I was asked 
to play the part of an informant—a distant but an informed insider—to lawyers at the 
human rights organizations, private law firms and asylum offices.  The irony 
presented by this continuous switching from being a “native” ethnographer 
researching among Nepalis to becoming a sort of “native” informant translating and 
interpreting, and essentially, speaking on behalf of Nepali claimants was too viscerally 
uncomfortable and surreal to simply dismiss my own accidental insertion into a 
convoluted practices of seeking asylum in the US.  My responsibilities neither began 
nor ended with providing legal interpretation per se.  Although I primarily provided 
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Nepali-English language interpretation assistance and, at times, translated documents, 
it was often the beginning of a highly complicated, if convoluted, asylum process that 
I inadvertently became part of.  Or, rather, it became part of me. 
I never took notes during asylum interpretation sessions in various legal 
agencies, human rights organizations, and asylum offices.  As an interpreter-observer 
and participant-interpreter, notes were written after each asylum interpretation session 
on the same or following day to reflect on moments of intense engagements, language 
tone and style, and the sheer impossibility of direct translation due to conflicting 
world views, and sometimes mutually incompatible opinions embedded in irreversible 
positionalities each one of us occupied during asylum interpretation process.  
Interpretations for Nepali asylum claimants and pro bono lawyers mainly took place 
in conference rooms, lobbies, and nearby cafes and restaurants of private law firms in 
Manhattan.  More in-depth conversations and interviews with former claimants took 
place in the privacy of their homes, hospitals, parks and cafes in their neighborhoods 
in Queens.  While it was not possible for me to “loiter with intent” (Raj 2003) in the 
lobbies or conference rooms of private law firms and human rights agencies, I seemed 
to be doing nothing but simply hanging around Jackson Heights, Queens, teaching 
English classes and volunteering with different programs and workshops in the 
grassroots organization.  It was also where I lived.  There, I spent most of my time 
waiting for, and, sometimes waiting with, former and current claimants—many of 
them were my ESL students, their family members, relatives, neighbors and close 
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associates from their villages in Nepal—discussing the recent development in their 
individual asylum cases.  
I rarely met with claimants for whom I was providing asylum interpretation 
outside the law firms.  It was only after my role as an official “interpreter” and their 
position as “asylum seeker” ended with filing of their claims to the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services or the Immigration Court that I sought out to 
formally interview them about their experiences with the asylum process.  It was not 
something I had planned in advance necessarily.  Each asylum interpretation meeting 
or session was simply too long—lasting anywhere from 2 to 6 hours—and in the 
period of 6 to 24 months these sessions would be as sporadic as once or twice a 
month to as frequent as 3 or 4 times a week.  Naturally, both claimants and I would 
be exhausted after interpretation sessions to continue asylum or any conversation, for 
that matter, all over again.  In a strange way, however, these asylum interpretation 
sessions themselves became a “deep hanging out” (Geertz 2000: 107) notwithstanding 
the guided and more controlled conversation around asylum process that I could 
pursue at a given time.  After all, Geertz famously argued that legal rationale is a 
critical manner in which people make sense of and is constitutive of their world-views 
so far as the power of law can combine general concepts to specific cases.  Law, 
according to Geerts, is “part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real” (1983:184).   
Over time, there was a development of a fairly egalitarian relationship with a 
dozen Nepali claimants, with whom, more or less, I spent the full two years of 
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fieldwork, if by complete accident.  At first, these exchanges, for obvious reasons, 
were never simply a dialogue between claimants and me; rather, these were ongoing 
three-way conversations, where my role as a cultural-mediator and interpreter did not 
end.  Instead, my role as a participant would be more pronounced dominating the 
conversation and giving me very little chance to do any observation.  
 The fact that I could have been both potential (or former) asylum claimant 
from Nepal and naturalized US citizen played an interesting and strategic role in 
conducting research among Nepali claimants and their pro bono lawyers.  I was 
included in the informal, everyday conversations among Nepalis about seeking 
asylum, making or having made papers.  At the same time, many pro bono lawyers 
instructed me to strictly perform direct language translation from Nepali to English 
and back to Nepali at the beginning of each asylum assignment.  While I was allowed 
on a more equal footing to assist with research in some of the asylum cases, in most 
cases I was expected to simply perform language interpretation throughout our 
meetings and interviews over the period of 6 to 22 months.  As a result, the 
relationships I developed with pro bono lawyers and human rights experts ranged 
from being fairly egalitarian and amicable to strictly professional and distant.  Clearly, 
the varying degree of relationships with lawyers and human rights experts contributed 
to ever-changing positionalities I ended up occupying, inadvertently, throughout 
fieldwork.  
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 As a rule, when talking to both claimants and legal and human rights experts, I 
did not challenge either party on their personal, professional, or normative stances 
unless they explicitly asked for my opinion and views during interviews, which they 
sometimes did. When talking to legal experts I tried to take a non-judgmental position 
as much as possible, even though this became difficult in most cases as I gradually 
became an advocate for Nepali asylum claimants.  Similarly, when claimants told me 
about their reasons for seeking asylum or migrating to the United State in the first 
place, I simply jotted down in my notebook without preempting them to offer an 
explanation of any kind—whether that of having a ‘well-founded’ or ‘reasonable fear’ 
of future persecution in Nepal or improving their socio-economic situations in Nepal 
or desiring a different life-style and legalizing their statuses in the US.  Differently put, 
my conversations with claimants were not based on my expectation of claimants to 
provide sufficient evidence for traumatic past experiences or their continued 
suffering.  As carefully dissected in the subsequent chapters, they are expected to do 
just that as it is. 
 It is important to emphasize what I am not trying to do in this ethnography.  
The construction of this ethnography should not be understood as some kind of 
linear progression from micro to macro-level analysis of the lives, work, and 
legalization experiences of Nepalis in New York City.  It is also not a generalized 
account applicable to all Nepalis everywhere at all times or all Nepalis I came to know 
during my fieldwork in the city.  For every time I thought I had a full grasp of the 
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people I worked with, interpreted for, taught and learned from, new conversations, 
information and insights did not cease to challenge and continually inspire me, if at 
different moments.  As such, my ethnographic engagement with Nepalis in the city 
was never static.  Above all, this should not be read as a neatly categorized social fact 
of locating and obtaining information or learning about Nepali migrants’ 
homogenized experiences in the United States.  My concern is not to offer a grand 
narrative about Nepali “culture” or “community” in the United States or anywhere for 
that matter. 
 At this stage, it is only fair that I mention some of the difficulties and 
challenges that I encountered, socially and intellectually, in undertaking this research 
and with which I continued to struggle while writing.  In a metropolitan place like 
New York City where people are variously migrant workers and asylum claimants, 
there are infinite ways of knowing and self-fashioning oneself, individually and 
collectively.  While there is a unifying ethos and worldview, offering some coherence 
to diversely structured lives, the possibility of dynamic ways of aligning and 
articulating multiplicity of views and experiences equally transform everyday lives into 
meaningful lived experiences.  The city Nepalis have created and fashioned for 
themselves, the lives they continue to live, and social realities they become part of and 
imagine, all reflect, on a very basic level, unity counterpoised by a salient, if not always 
easily translatable, diversity.   
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  This posed many dilemmas for me to juggle my role as a “distant-insider” and 
an informed “outsider” simultaneously.  My approach reflects the awareness of 
diversity among Nepali migrants although grouped as a Nepali migrant-community in 
New York City.  Every migrant-community invariably contains multiple perspectives, 
a range of experiences, sometimes radically opposing dominant points of view, yet 
one also needs to emphasize the internal cohesion and the formation of a migrant 
community in the US notwithstanding its ever-changing elements even as an 
ethnographer attempts of “locate” it.  In light of this, I have incorporated narratives 
of and testimonies of Nepali migrants from different ethnic, caste, educational, 
regional, and religious backgrounds.  At the same time, however, I have run up against 
the difficulties of “representing” the points of view from those belonging to relatively 
privileged social positions in the United States.  While I have made every attempt to 
not homogenize Nepali people I came to know in the city, I have not been able to 
incorporate that which would be considered as close to the full diversity of Nepali 
community in this ethnography.  The voices not incorporated here are, paradoxically, 
the ones I am most familiar with as a result of my own socialization among 
Kathmandu Nepalis in Nepal and in the US.  It is not a biased choice; but it is a 
choice, nonetheless.  Like ethnographers working with one’s “community” (however 
narrowly construed), the dilemmas of navigating through intimate social relationships 
and familiarity was unsettling not because of supposedly biased assumptions 
underpinning one’s interpretation, which has generated quite an animated debate in 
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anthropology, particularly among feminist anthropologists, on the inescapability of 
multiple positionalities and registers in the field (Narayan 1993; Abu-Lughod 1991; 
Behar 1996; Vishweswaran 1994; Raj 2003).  Rather, it was unsettling to me because 
of two interconnected issues: a) the voices of socially influential individuals in the 
Nepali migrant community, often speaking on behalf of and giving “voice” to migrant 
workers, represent a very small percentage of Nepalis in the U.S.; while b) their social 
privilege and cultural capital allow them to remain mute publicly on some issues of 
continued marginalization and ongoing disenfranchisement of the very people in the 
“community” they would like to represent.  
Below I lay out analytical frames and ethnographic accounts alongside 
blueprints of the asylum system.  Each chapter in the dissertation stands for a 
different set of perspectives and subjective reflections on the same experience of 
going through the asylum process.  While all chapters tackle the frames mentioned 
above, some are more in congruent with particular inquiries and attuned to practical 
dimensions of seeking asylum.  Thus I discuss individual chapters in the introduction 
as they are organized by thematic coherence rather than the process of asylum seeking 
and assisting sequence.  
Chapter  Out l ine 
 “Really, are there that many Nepalis in New York City?  Have you gathered data 
that is representative of them?”  I was often asked such questions by colleagues, 
friends, and scholars in New York City curious about my work, questions I usually 
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tried to evade.  In writing this dissertation too, rather than trying to rationalize either 
the visibility or the representative-ness of Nepalis’ experiences, I depict people’s 
interpretations of their suffering stories in the present, if uneasily entangled with other 
aspects of their everyday lives as migrants and asylum claimants.  The first chapter 
particularly attempts to address this concern by providing a brief background of why 
and how Nepalis are seeking asylum in the United States at this socio-political 
moment.  Through what I call the invention of “Maoist Nepal” in Nepali asylum 
court hearings in the U.S., in particular, I use a rather unconventional method to bring 
together contemporary socio-political history of Nepal, the rise and fall of the Maoist 
civil war, and the mass migration of Nepalis to the U.S. in the last decade.  In doing 
so, I connect the seemingly restricted visibility and significance of Nepali asylum 
claims and the claimants’ “suffering narrative” with the broader questions pertaining 
to the U.S. asylum system, its contemporary political and institutional history, and the 
cultural logic of the asylum-seeking process.  From there, I move to socio-cultural 
predicaments of Nepali claimants through the lens of “the post-conflict Nepal” and 
the emergent sociality among claimants based on their outlook on and description of 
asylum-seeking experience in the US as the dual practice of kaagaz banaune, or 
“making paper,” and the work of dukkha, or “suffering.”  The other five chapters are 
organized as follows.   
The second chapter outlines and further expands on the centrality of suffering 
and/as work of “making papers” in the asylum-seeking context for and among 
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Nepalis in the U.S.  Acknowledgment and articulations of suffering are the 
preeminent ways in which Nepali asylum seekers and migrants workers imagine 
themselves and others in their social networks.  This discourse of suffering, I argue, 
serves as a powerful incitement to articulate and make sense of socio-economic 
uncertainties added, if not always exacerbated, by legal insecurities.  I describe its 
contemporary debt to an American ideal of work-integrity, one that has long 
associated desirability with the practice of becoming ‘good’ migrant-subjects.  The 
process of seeking asylum and legal documentation therein, or, in the words of my 
informants, “making paper,” is widely understood as a means of invisible work 
running parallel with and often times interrupting and even replacing their everyday 
labor activities.  This association marks Nepalis as hard-working migrants as asylum 
claimants, an attribution that is the object of self-critique but also affirmation of 
shared suffering that is centrally visible and significant.  In the context of seeking 
asylum, I suggest, suffering itself emerges as a measured contention beyond people’s 
individual experiences. 
The third chapter extends this line of reasoning—suffering as an issue of 
controversy—within and beyond the Nepali migrant communities and into the 
specific context of asylum narration, interpretation, and documentation.  I follow an 
individual’s case—Tshering—to document the numerous stages involved in seeking 
asylum: from the initial screening interviews at the human rights agency to 
interpretation sessions at a private law firm to prep-sessions prior to merit hearing.  
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While it is representative of Nepalis entangled in the asylum process, it is only one of 
the many possible combinations and outcomes of seeking asylum.  More important, 
this case is meant to show how a certain convergence between a universal victim-
subject and a culturally unique victim give way to the production of a specifically 
asylum victim, whose words, demeanor, and thought must correspond to suffering 
narrative appropriate in the asylum context.  The “asylum seeker” emerges here as an 
inclusive and powerful category in which Nepali claimants must fit their diverse 
narratives of suffering.  I show how the contradictory narration and interpretation of 
victimization is essential to legal documentation required for recognition as asylum 
claimants.  In so doing, I introduce how legal-political space is in itself an instance of 
state power at large that, in the asylum process particularly, prescribes a certain 
framework: its (legal) language for filing claims produces a peculiar form of 
subjectification that is imposed on claimants, but through which their claims and they 
themselves also become legally visible. 
Asylum interpretation and legal documentation is the subject of the fourth and 
central chapter, which juxtapose claimants’ and their legal representatives’-- human 
rights experts and pro bono lawyers—ideas of suffering as a consequence of 
participating in the asylum process.  I turn to the I-589 Form, Application for Asylum and 
for Withholding of Removal and the Instruction Manual, which are used by asylum 
lawyers to submit individual asylum claims with the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) or the U.S. Department of Justice.  I trace in some 
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detail the making of “the document” as well as extra-legal documentation, or the legal 
life of undocumented episodes and activities, to illuminate fundamentals in the co-
construction of asylum suffering narrative by lawyers, interpreters, and claimants.  In 
particular, I track down pages 5 and 6 of the I-589 Form that consist of two important 
questions related to one’s experience of “past persecution” and “well-founded fear of 
future persecution”—both grounds must be met in order to file a successful asylum 
claim.  I approach the document ethnographically to explore three major issues: 
initiation of people as potential asylum claimants and their legal representatives; 
invocation and recording of specific incidents of “past persecution” and suffering 
appropriate to make asylum claims; and seamless switching and continuous overlap 
between asylum interpretation and legal documentation.  Each of these activities lays 
bare an awkward, if not always disagreeable, ideas and imagination of asylum 
‘suffering narrative’ at play. 
The fifth chapter considers asylum process as a cultural template for producing 
“credible” asylum narratives through measured and meticulous, if as an unintended 
consequence, of active participation from those seeking asylum as well as those 
assisting asylum claimants in various legal-institutional settings.  In this chapter, 
however, I move away from the Nepali claimants’ asylum suffering narrative and 
focus instead on practitioners and professionals as part of the institutional and 
logistical aspects of the U.S. asylum system.  It is here that I look closely at the 
preparation and anticipated outcomes orchestrating both the production and the 
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longevity of the asylum as a functional system, and the micro framing of credible 
asylum claims.  The chapter confronts “claimant credibility” and “compassionate 
work” as organizing ideals and ideas that legal professionals and human rights 
advocates assisting claimants in the asylum system oftentimes employ in relation to 
what they describe and interpret as their job responsibilities of “alleviating suffering of 
asylum seekers.”  Legal experts and human rights workers assisting asylum seekers 
with constructing legal claims on the basis of past-persecution see suffering as a set of 
violent events and incidents (necessarily) experienced by claimants outside the US 
national-space and circumscribed within the legal definition of torture, mandated by 
the United Nations.  In other words, the legal professionals have a working template 
for the type of suffering narrative required to make asylum claims.  As such, 
claimants’ asylum narrative of suffering is co-constructed in the legal spaces only so 
far to fill in the descriptive, detailed, and highly personalized account of asylum 
suffering.  Tracking the concrete ways in which “claimant credibility” comes to 
materialize in everyday professional practice among lawyers assisting claimants, I also 
point toward a deep ambivalence and discrepancy between the discourse of claimant 
credibility and the practice of asylum hearing procedures.  I suggest that this 
ambivalence, rather than presenting itself as an obstacle, is the very force central to 
the working of the asylum cultural system. 
The sixth chapter, as a way of exploring, looks at the discourse and practice 
surrounding compassionate rationale and inconsistencies therein to highlight the 
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juxtaposition of the narrative of “compassionate work” with the “work of suffering” 
in contemporary production of Nepali legal subjectivity and socio-political recognition 
in the US.  While using Nepali case as a specific example, I describe how 
compassionate action has emerged as a fulcrum of potentially bestowing citizenship to 
some so that many may remain legal non-citizens in contemporary America.  Tracking 
the use of compassion as an instrument of legal practice and in turn a cultivable 
sentiment beyond the asylum process, I confronted a vibrant economy of compassion 
that is increasingly detached, although not completely disengaged, from social realities 
and material inequalities.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Un-silencing the Past: Nepali claimants and the U.S. asylum process 
 
For what history is changes with time and place or, better said, history reveals 
itself only through the production of specific narratives.  What matters most 
are the process and conditions of production of such narratives.  Only a focus on 
that process can uncover the ways in which the two sides of historicity 
intertwine in a particular context. Only through that overlap can we discover 
the differential exercise of power that makes some narratives possible and 
silences others. 
--Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past (1997: 25, emphasis mine) 
 Historicity, as Trouillot suggests, makes accessible certain narratives while 
simultaneously overlooking others at any given moment.  In particular, his critical 
reflections concerning historical “process and conditions” as rendering visible certain 
narratives and “silenc[ing] others,” I am encouraged to consider Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot’s insights for thinking through asylum “suffering narrative” as a conceptual 
framework to interrogate contemporary history of US asylum process and its 
particular consequences for Nepali claimants.  I find Trouillot’s key concern about the 
historical production of “silences” particularly instructive to ground my own 
observation of the relationship between the two.  In the same essay, Trouillot has 
eloquently argued: “silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial 
moments: the moment of fact creation [the making of sources]; the moment of fact 
assembly [the making of archives]; the moment of fact retrieval [the making of 
narratives]; and the moment of retrospective significance [the making of history in the 
final instance]” (26).  The silence that Trouillot speaks of is in a double sense.  On the 
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one hand, as historical actors, we are inescapably engaged in the everyday work of 
producing our own socio-political circumstances through narratives that serve our 
best interests, potentially silencing others that equally constitute the multi-faceted 
aspects of our social world.  On the other hand, this process of silencing to a greater 
extent is inseparable from our distinct, lived-experiences within the already deeply 
enmeshed historical routes that we have taken over, thereby reproducing and 
reinforcing the enduring silences of the past.  Throughout this dissertation, I will 
emphasize the socio-political specificity of the asylum legal process that prevailed (and 
continues to prevail) in the United States during the time of my research.  This 
moment is characterized by liberal, compassionate, pro-immigrant movements and 
politics, seemingly facilitating legalization of undocumented migrants in particular, 
which manifested itself in the countrywide legal campaigns.  I locate my own 
ethnographic work within this broader socio-political climate: I situate Nepali 
interlocutors at this decisive crossroads forming the ongoing histories—most 
prominently, the production of asylum “suffering narrative” and the reification of 
Nepalis as victim-subjects of their transnational condition as claimants from “Maoist 
Nepal” seeking refuge in the post-9/11 U.S. political context.  At the same time, I 
locate my engagements with legal advocates and human rights experts (working with 
Nepali claimants) within this emergent and highly sensitized political circumstance 
where practicing compassion is an ethical imperative not simply a choice.  In all of 
this, the global socio-political reach of the US has played a predictably influential and 
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incredibly important role.  Having intensely focused on the “ethnographic present” of 
the contemporary moment in the twenty-first century, I situate my ethnographic 
fieldwork, now, from the vantage point of present purposes as my blueprint, I turn to 
the task of exploring multiply-layered, intersecting, and perhaps somewhat 
unconventional delineation of the two overlapping historical process and conditions.  
This, I propose, may most clearly frame some of the defining characteristics of 
suffering narratives among Nepali asylum claimants and compassionate practices 
among their legal advocates, activating the US asylum legal process.  Such a 
recounting, if slightly eccentric, of contemporary Nepali migration to the United 
States and the asylum-seeking experiences of Nepalis, as will be documented in this 
chapter, is inextricable from both Nepali claimants’ socio-political relation to the US 
state, and the real and imagined conditions of all Nepalis escaping “Maoist Nepal.”  
 Through the lens of what I call “Maoist Nepal,” I want to render an 
unconventional political history and knowledge about the relation of Nepali claimants 
to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), overseeing asylum 
process, more accountable to a transnational historical process.  A distant and unsafe 
Nepal imagined and produced in the US courtrooms in relation to Nepali migration to 
the US serves as a critical pivot orient the methodological underpinnings of the study 
of US asylum process as a salient cultural template for the production of suffering 
narrative and compassionate practice.  When I invoke a “Maoist Nepal,” what I am 
addressing is something more significant than the mere descriptive construction of a 
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distant place in the US state institutions, namely Asylum Office and Immigration 
Courtrooms.   
 This chapter is decidedly not interested in fashioning a narrative of post-
conflict violence, whereby distinct transnational migration patterns and logic of “push 
and pull” are endlessly employed to distinguish between “economic migrants” and 
“displaced population.”  If the former configuration presumes mass migration of 
Nepalis as an outcome of victimhood based on political and socioeconomic statuses 
“back home,” ignoring the continued, if not exacerbated, conditions of insecurity in 
the US, the latter reinforces victimhood based on political violence de-emphasizing 
any substantive sociopolitical participation and/or integration of migrants into US 
society.  In one case, the migrants must feel grateful to an extent, as De Genova 
describes cynically, “they might as well get down on their knees to kiss the ground” 
(2005: 98).  In the other, the gratitude supposedly arises from having received safe 
haven.  As outcast victims escaping either economic insecurity or political violence, 
transnational migrants as claimants come to be represented by condition of 
displacement that merely reinforces their continued victimization while 
simultaneously re-inscribes the economic and political stability of the US nation space.  
Instead, I want to underscore the production of “Maoist Nepal” in the US 
Immigration courtrooms and Asylum Offices significantly differ from the context of 
contemporary transnational migration of Nepalis in New York City. 
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 In his seminal piece, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” cultural theorist Stuart 
Hall advocates that we need to think of “identity as a ‘production’, which is never 
complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation” (1990: 222).  This view of identity questions both the authority and 
authenticity that the term, “cultural identity” invokes (Ibid).  While the specificities of 
Hall’s arguments are derived from a particular case of the Caribbean history, his 
elaborate discussion of the two ways of thinking about “cultural identity” is valuable 
and relevant to advancing my theoretical concern in this paper.  Hall describes the 
first type of “cultural identity” as “a sort of collective one true self, hiding inside the 
many other, more superficial or artificially imposed ‘selves’, which people with a 
shared history and ancestry hold in common” (223).  In contrast, the second type of 
“cultural identity,” according to Hall, encompasses “critical points of deep and 
significant difference which constitute ‘what we have become’” (225).  The two 
definitions of “cultural identity” that Hall provides are, however, two sides of the 
same coin.  The first definition of “cultural identity” reflects on the narratives of the 
past that form “common historical experiences and shared cultural codes” that 
present us with somewhat fixed, “unchanging and continuous frames of references 
and meaning” (223).  The second one, far from being grounded on the revival of the 
past as something pure or authentic, is about “becoming and being” that takes into 
account, Hall notes, the “different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves 
within, the [specific] narratives of the past” (225).   
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 Following Hall’s proposition of the dual production of diasporic “cultural 
identity,” the argument of this chapter is not simply that the category of “Maoist 
Nepal” is a profoundly useful one that effectively serves to create and sustain legal 
vulnerability of Nepali claimants—hence reasonably interpretable and 
documentable—but also an important construction for asylum “suffering narrative.”  
The proposition of asylum victimhood as either “authentic” or “fake” and 
accompanying legal vulnerability of some and not all asylum claimants in the US is the 
one that needs careful evaluation upon extensive ethnographic research—cutting 
across asylum seekers from different nationalities, judicial hearing proceedings, and 
respective asylum decisions—which is beyond the scope of my arguments in this 
dissertation.  This is undeniably a critical insight not only into the consequences of the 
asylum production of “suffering narrative” and inquiry into degrees of victimhood, 
but it is also the fundamental origin of the juridical procedure in the asylum law itself 
that produces what I call here asylum claimants’ “protracted legality.”   
 This chapter, therefore, discerns the political specificity of contemporary 
Nepali immigration during and in the aftermath of the decade long civil war in Nepal 
as it has come to be understood in the legal process of the U.S. nation-state, and an 
object of the asylum law in the last five years.   More precisely, this chapter 
interrogates the history and ongoing changes in the making of “the US asylum 
system” through the specific lens of how these changes have had a distinct impact 
upon Nepali migration and those seeking asylum in particular.  Only in light of the 
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socio-political specificity of the US asylum law and legal process does it become 
possible to develop a critical and non-complaint perspective of the naturalization of 
Nepali claimants’ victimhood as a mere fact of life, the presumably apparent 
consequences of violence-induced outmigration of all Nepalis.  
 
How “significant” is the number of Nepali asylum claimants out of the total population of asylees in 
the US? 
 In 2012 out of 44,170 asylum applications, roughly 11,978 were granted asylum 
at the Immigration Courts in the United States (Appendix I).  The applicants ranged 
from all countries around the world.  Nepali applicants were among the top eight 
countries to have filed for and granted asylum: out of 750 asylum applicants received 
by the US Department of Justice, 403 were granted asylum.  What is significant about 
this number is that Nepal was the only country from which more that 50% of the 
applicants were granted asylum.  While asylum applicants from countries like China 
(10,985), Mexico (9,206), El Salvador (2,991), Guatemala (2,895), India (1,703), 
Honduras (1,257), Ecuador (847), superseded Nepali applicants (750), the number of 
people granted asylum from these countries were less than 50% except from China 
(5,383).   I also want to highlight for the purposes of this dissertation the intriguing, if 
not unusual, trend in the Nepali asylum applicants in the United States and the 
outcomes during the active years of my fieldwork (2009-2011).  In 2009, out of 779 
Nepali asylum applicants, only 172 were granted asylum.  In 2010, 231 (out of 829) 
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applicants received asylum, and in 2011, 323 (out of 871) claimants were granted 
asylum (Appendix II).  While the number of Nepali asylum claimants did not 
significantly change between 2009-2011, the number of applicants granted asylum 
gradually increased, resulting in more than 50% receiving asylum today.  This official 
data from the US Department of Justice alone makes us realize the importance of 
exploring the production of Nepali asylum claimants in the contemporary 
sociopolitical climate in the U.S. and sustaining its asylum legal process. 
PART I:  The cultural logic of the U.S. Asylum System 
 
Asylum system appears to be a distinctive and central feature of contemporary 
political life for many migrants as claimants in liberal, democratic states.  Currently, 
every liberal state deploys the institution of asylum as the political means by which it 
publicly identifies its potential subjects as future citizens, tests them through 
probationary period for desirability and deservingness, assigns them legal status as 
“refugees” and “asylum seekers,” and gradually disburses to them certain and not all 
rights, entitlements, and responsibilities.  In this way, a state survey particular 
population by enclosing them in a socio-legal space, bounded within its territory, and 
continue to extract labor.  Asylum seekers are thus characterized to occupy “liminal 
status” (Coutin 2003) in a liberal state.  Arguably, most states legitimize their declared 
liberal stance through act of benevolence and compassion inherent to various 
technologies of including supposed outsiders, foreigners, and non-citizens, and in 
turn, the states’ continued power over those very people rests precisely upon the 
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condition of them self-identifying as “refugees” and “asylum seekers,” comprising a 
so-called liberal state.  In short, this production of “refugees” and “asylum seekers” 
not so much disrupts the imagined coherence of the nation (Anderson 1991) as it 
continually distinguishes and redefines its ever-changing liberal values and practices.  
As such, modern liberal states continually need people to be categorized as “asylum 
seekers” and who are perpetually in a “legal limbo” (Cabot 2013) underscoring “the 
temporalization of [their] presence” (Coutin 2000) for it to justify its power over 
them. 
 If the asylum system in liberal democracies has been fashioned as a paramount 
means of defending, enacting, and verifying individual human rights on the basis of 
“past persecution” and “well founded fear of future persecution,” then it cannot be 
apprehensible as merely the incidental but compassionate rationale for preemptive 
‘illegal’ migration.  Seeking asylum tends to be profoundly intrusive and plainly 
debasing for those immediately caught up in the protracted legal process.  And yet 
there is indubitably something greater at stake in such a practice of compassion--
notably, the formulation of ethical reaffirmation of liberal values and democratic state 
itself.  
If the institution of asylum defines a kind of probationary membership to the 
state and so appears within liberal states such as the United States to be broadly 
defined toward calibrated inclusion through protracted legality, it is always also a 
condition by default of those who occupy the status of neither “foreigners” nor 
	  45	  
“natives,” and thus “suspicious” not-yet-citizens.  It is no surprise that asylum process 
and allegedly “fake” asylum claimants has widely become the central and often 
constitutive preoccupation of contemporary immigration politics and policy debates 
in liberal democratic states.  The practical effect of asylum policy-making has not only 
meant that “asylum seekers” are increasingly mistrusted (E. Valentine Daniel 1998; 
Malkii 1996; Mahmood 1996; Fassin 2012), but also that the specific deployments of 
asylum law enforcement have rendered narrowly defined frames and ever more highly 
particular procedures for establishing “credibility” and claimants’ “truth claims” based 
on victimhood, ultimately producing protracted legality.  But the asylum system—the 
containing of those subjected to repeated and indefinite legal insecurity—is seldom 
recognized to be a distinct option with its own sociopolitical logic often with far-
reaching effects.  Whereas asylum system is considered, and reasonably so, as merely 
one conceivable response to protecting or defending human rights of qualified 
claimants, it has come to stand in as the apparently singular and presumably proper 
retribution on the part of liberal states to distinguishing “innocent victims” from the 
alleged “fake” claimants.  Furthermore, it is presumed to provide anti-dote to the 
apparent problem of mass detention and deportation.  Yet individual applicants and 
claimants living and most commonly working “illegally” never present a state with 
such a severe crisis or pose such a dire threat that immediate granting or sudden 
denial of asylum is seen as a logical response.  How precisely does the asylum system 
in the United States come to be ubiquitously regarded as a self-evident recourse of 
	  46	  
liberal democracies and immigration law enforcement?  How, indeed, has asylum-
seeking become effectively distinct, enforced, and lived as a more or less legal 
vulnerability for those engaged in the process in the US?   The section below 
addresses these concerns. 
The U.S. asylum system 
The United States was a signatory of the 1967 Protocol, and not the original 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  Between 1967 and 1980, asylum 
as a system did not exist and the ad hoc system was primarily a political instrument 
during Cold War, granting asylum to people fleeing from communist regimes around 
the world.  It was the Refugee Act of 1980, codified by the U.N. Refugee Protocol’s 
definition of the refugee, including provisions for asylum, that the US finally adopted.  
Under §208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) law, a refugee is defined as 
an “alien displaced abroad who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  The law 
also defined “asylees” as people in the United States or at a port of entry who meet 
the definition of a refugee.  Thus, this was the first legislative determination to grant 
asylum in the United States, and in effect, the first official recognition of certain 
population as “refugees” and “asylees.”  Revealingly, it passed with little debate or 
dissenting views at the time and the asylum system mostly accommodate “the 
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affirmative asylum”5 claims and it managed by a confederacy of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) district representatives.  In 1991, the Asylum Corps 
expanded to professionalize the field of asylum with trained employees on the human 
rights and political conditions of states from which refugees and asylum claimants 
fled.  Interestingly, the “defensive asylum”6 frame emerged in mid-1990s that was 
established because of the dissatisfactions and accusations that the INS decisions were 
too “arbitrary,” and the defensive structure established thereafter allowed for the 
appeal process in the case of asylum denials by immigration inspectors.  This meant 
the denied cases were reviewed and handled by immigration judges, providing 
opportunity for potential reversal of the denied asylum cases and even re-appeal in 
some cases at the level of the Board of Immigration (BIA). 
For the past decade or so, expansion of the deportation system, and, detention7 
in particular, has worked hand-in-glove with asylum system in the mission to manage 
and discipline unwanted migrants/foreigners within the U.S. territory.  Indeed, the 
post-9/11 policies and the institutionalization of the Department of Homeland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  “Affirmative asylum process” refers to asylum seekers who directly file for asylum—submit Form I-589, 
Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal—with the USCIS without legal representation.  
Individual asylum officers evaluate applicants’ claims and oral testimonies and look for “credibility of their 
claims.” The outline of seven steps for this process is outlined under the heading of “The Affirmative Asylum 
Process” on the following website: www.USCIS.gov	  6	  “The Defensive Asylum Process” refers to claimants, already in the removal proceedings, and are seeking 
asylum from an immigration judge.  An immigration judge hears both an applicant’s claim and concerns and 
claims raised by the DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorney—representative of the U.S. 
government in the courtroom hearings.  7	  There seems a difference between asylum decisions among detained vs. non-detained claimants (see CITE 
for an extensive ethnographic account).  However, most Nepali asylum claimants (for whom I provided legal 
interpretation and with whom I closely worked and interviewed) were not detained, I do not speculate here 
the specific differences between the two, both qualitatively and quantitatively.  	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Security has planted many entirely new (legal and judicial) features in the socio-
political landscape of the United States—ranging from restrictive immigration laws 
and increase in everyday policing of migrants to the general increase in the anti-
immigrant sentiments, resulting in the heightened sense of “national security” to 
determine “citizens” from “non-citizens” (Maira 2010; Coutin 2010; Talavera et. al 
2010).  It had a direct effect in the disbanding of the INS on March 1, 2003 by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
Customs and Border Protection started handling the asylum cases.  In short, the 
indiscriminate detention of migrants, under conditions that seem to flagrantly violate 
some of the very values that supposedly underpin liberal democracies, is somehow 
neutralized through systematic practices of asylum system. 
First, although conventionally considered a compassionate and ethical response 
on part of the liberal states exercising their benevolence, and not necessarily an 
obligation, to providing safe haven and regulating “refugees” and “asylum seekers” 
based on “authentic” claims, asylum is in fact the expression of a complex 
sociopolitical regime inextricable from the manifestation of dominant notions of 
citizenship, national identity, and cultural homogeneity.  Second, the practice of 
asylum in liberal states and the socio-legal production of asylum claimant populations 
must be comprehended as a necessary, and an effective, response and anti-dote to any 
and all issues related to contemporary immigration law enforcement.  In the United 
States, for instance, all procedures regarding migrant eligibility for legal residence, 
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asylum, and citizenship arise out of the imperatives of counterterrorism and 
Homeland Security.  It should not come as a surprise that the booming U.S. national 
security complex (De Genova and Puetz 2010) with the advent of the post-September 
11, 2001, provided fertile ground for reconfiguration and diversification of political 
subjectivities, including “economic migrants,” “illegal aliens,” “refugees,” and “asylum 
seekers.” 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) oversees asylum documentation 
and juridical procedures since 2003.8  Asylum claims constitute across degrees of 
victimhood measured according to the Article 1A(2) of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defines refugee as a person 
suffering from a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (UNHCR 
[1967] 2010: 14).  The socio-political condition of asylum claimants, therefore, must 
be understood as a preeminently victimized one, in which the victimhood as a result 
of “past persecution” produced and sustained by liberal state (the US in this case) is 
reproduced in the specific socio-legal statuses ascribed to “refugees” and “citizens,” 
or “natives” and “migrants.”  As such, focusing on the asylum system as a cultural 
process—for the production and reinforcement of ‘suffering narrative’ and 
compassionate practices—has a broader implication for expanding the scholarly 
debate on contemporary US immigration and migrant-integration processes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It used to come under the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)	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particular (Levitt 2001; Levitt and Waters 2002; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Basch et al. 
1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Glick Schiller 2003; Jones-Correa 1998).  Rather than 
follow a conventional theoretical and methodological divides between the socio-
political conditions of “host” versus “home” countries, however, I focus on parallel 
and interconnecting sociopolitical histories of the U.S. and Nepali nation-states at this 
particular moment.  
In particular, I draw on an unorthodox connection between, or an overlap of, 
the contemporary, albeit elusive and convoluted, socio-political processes and 
historical specificities of the post-Maoist Nepal and the post-9/11 United States.  My 
primary interest here is to situate “suffering narrative” and self-identification of 
victimhood as an individualized and collective Nepali claimants’ experiences and 
accounts within the context of seeking asylum in the U.S. in the post-9/11 political 
climate.  While I exclusively focus on the particularities of suffering narrative that 
Nepalis associate with fellow Nepalis in the migrant-community (I document the 
detailed and extensive ethnographic analysis in chapter 2) as a basis of their emergent 
sociality, what I want to highlight in this chapter is that self-identification of 
victimhood and creation of “suffering narrative” both have a much longer and quite 
convoluted socio-political history for Nepalis in Nepal and in the U.S.   
As such, I locate the asylum “suffering narrative”—while specifically co-
constructed with the aide of legal and human rights collaborators and advocates—
simultaneously interrupting, dislocating, reinventing, and sometimes simply expanding 
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the already assumed experience of suffering among Nepalis given the last two decades 
of socio-political uncertainties in Nepal.  Highlighting this interconnection, I suggest, 
is one of the primary reasons why Nepali claimants seem to fit the profile of an ideal 
“asylum seeker” in the U.S. at this particular sociopolitical moment.  The imposition 
and translation of the “suffering narrative” into asylum legal narrative, likewise, is the 
condition for smooth functioning of the contemporary US asylum process and its 
regeneration as a set of culturally specific codes for informing behaviors, attitudes, 
and wide-ranging practices for both claimants and their legal representatives and 
human rights advocates.   
PART II:  Why (and how) are Nepalis seeking asylum in the U.S.? 
 “Why are Nepalis seeing asylum in the US?” many have asked me, and those 
particularly familiar with the country’s history and contemporary socio-political 
conditions have inquired, “How is it that the end of the Maoist civil war resulted in 
more Nepalis seeking political asylum in the US?”  To some degree the answer lies in 
the question itself: Nepalis are increasingly becoming “asylum seekers” since their entry 
into the US, escaping decade long (1996-2006) civil war between the Maoists guerilla 
group and the Nepali state that involved the destruction of physical and human 
infrastructures, longstanding socio-economic insecurity and political instability, and 
displacement of thousands of people.  Rendering this paradox is a necessary starting 
point for this dissertation.  How does the anthropologist navigate the difficulties of 
representing Nepalis’ stories and experiences of seeking asylum without reinforcing 
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static socio-political conditions in Nepal and of all Nepalis living in the United States?  
Can one discuss the problems of interpersonal dilemmas and hardships of continued 
displacement, inseparable from, but not solely exclusive to, past political violence and 
present insecurity affecting people’s choice to migrate and settle?  These concerns, 
while providing a necessary backdrop, are not central to the arguments I make in this 
dissertation.  Firstly, it is not ethnography of “political violence” in Nepal or even the 
accounts of “past persecution” or violence experienced by Nepalis in the United 
States per se.  It is as much about Nepalis’ individualized and collective experiences of 
seeking asylum as it is about becoming ‘a migrant community’ in the United States.  
Second, ethnography at such a scale would have required an extensive fieldwork and 
sustained engagement with Nepalis not only in the US but also in Nepal.  A 
transnational research was, thus, beyond the scope of my dissertation project.  Below 
I provide a brief account of the contemporary political history of the Nepali civil war 
that resulted in internal displacement and mass migration of Nepalis overseas, 
including the US. 
Civil War, Displacement, and Movements of Nepalis  
  What began as rural uprisings against the Nepali state in the Western districts 
(Rolpa and Rukum) of Nepal in 1996, the Maoist guerrilla war quickly spread 
throughout the country and resulted in a nationwide civil war claiming thousands of 
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lives (see Thapa and Sijapati 2004;9 Thapa 2003; and Hutt 2004 for a comprehensive 
study of the political and social history of the growth of the Maoist armed conflict).  
The protracted civil war and political instability in Nepal had decisive and irreversible 
infrastructural and human damages.  The spread of the Maoist movement from rural 
to hill areas made the capital of Kathmandu valley increasingly porous and 
interconnected with the rest of the country.  Constant movement, rather than 
settlement or integration, became the norm for Nepalis.  First, the increased 
movement as a consequence of militarization of locals and aggressive recruitment of 
young people by both the Nepal army and the Maoist rebels (ICG 2004, 2005; Kumar 
2003; Bhattarai 2003) transformed patterns of sociality and contributed to new ways 
of relating among people and places.  The oppositional categories of people as either 
“Maoists” or “civilians” increasingly became part of the mainstream political and 
academic discourse and a powerful state instrument throughout the civil war years.  
Second, movement due to internal displacement was reported to be around 200,000 
across the country and 100,000 in the capital of Kathmandu alone (Global IDP 2003), 
resulting in yet another categorization of people as “internally displaced people” 
(IDPs).  Third, and equally important, the collapse and co-optation of local and rural 
grievances—a consequence of historically marginalized and structural inequalities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This study offers an analysis of the Maoist insurgency and argues that a combination of the weak centralized 
Nepali government, mutually incompatible political ideologies and factions, and the strength of the radical left 
politics provided a formidable terrain for the Maoists agendas to quickly materialize and spread throughout 
the countryside. 
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based on class, caste, and ethnicity—into the Maoist armed conflict (Sharma 2002; 
Murshed and Gates 2003; Tamang 2006) took hold, reigniting and mobilizing 
indigenous and ethnic political movements that began in the early 1990s (Gellner et al. 
1997).  Fourth, overseas migration by Nepalis increasingly matched internal 
displacement.  Since 1997, Nepalis have been seeking asylum in not only in the United 
States, but also in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands (UNHCR 2010).  Significantly, the increasing diaspora 
meant the conflict became globalized. 
The Rise and fall of the Maoists and the building of “new” Nepal 
 The Nepali civil war reached its peak of brutality in 2001-2002, coinciding with 
the aftermath of September 2001 events, which brought Nepal into the limelight of 
international media (Metz 2003).  Ironically, along with it came together international 
military and humanitarian assistances for initiating co-lateral and multi-lateral dialogue 
between the Nepali government and the Maoist rebels, who were then listed as 
“terrorists”10 (Mage 2007).  The events leading up to numerous ceasefires in 2002, 
2003, and 2006 and the establishment of the interim government in 2007 brought the 
United Nations (UN) supported peace accords and in particular, the United Nations 
Missions in Nepal (UNMIN), to draft a new constitution.  In collaboration with 
several local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In his report, Mage provides a good overview of the significant sequence of events leading to the US 
security officials’ arrival in Nepal in 2004 and the emergence of US-India military assistance to manage 
“counter-terrorism.”  There existed formidable US military presence until general election in 2008.  
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International Crisis Group (ICG), Nepal had its parliamentary, Constituent Assembly, 
election in 2008.  The peace process facilitated the Maoist Party to enter into the 
Nepali government through democratic, electoral process.   The victory of the Maoist 
Party in the Constituent Assembly election and their entry into the mainstream 
politics initiated debates over social justice and human rights juxtaposed with 
continued economic stagnation and question of political violence.  The continued 
power struggle between the Nepali Army and the Maoists led to the withdrawal of the 
Maoist Party from the government in May 2009 leading to more political uncertainty.  
In August 2009, the ICG published a sensationalized report titled “Nepal’s Future: In 
whose hands?” as part of the UN-sponsored peace accords and exactly two years 
later, in August 2011, Nepali state found its “future” in the hands of the Maoist Party 
under the leadership of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai from the Unified-Communist Party of 
Nepal- Maoist Party.   
 The reentry of the Maoist Party in the mainstream political scene, controlling 
the Nepali state government, has spawned a difficult ‘reconstruction’ and post-war 
period.  In no time did this led to national and international collaborative projects, 
initiated by a number of Human Rights NGOs, including the International 
Commission for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) addressing issues of ‘reintegrating’ war 
‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ and promoting local notions of justice and healing (USIP 
Briefing 2007).  The emergent social and political spaces in the construction of “new” 
Nepali society—framed within the globalized language of national development, 
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economic policies, ethnic identity politics and human rights—have increasingly made 
possible new forms of sociality and afforded once again opportunities for many, but 
not all, Nepalis.  In particular, it has once again facilitated in outmigration of Nepalis 
to the Middle East, Australia, the UK and the US.  It is within this much longer, 
contested history of political development, and the continued process of building 
‘new Nepal’ with the assistance of both international framing that I situate the 
contemporary migration of Nepalis to the US and integration into US society.  For 
the question of who or what Nepalis ought to become in the US is then intrinsically 
linked to what place Nepali state and ‘Nepali people’ occupy in the contemporary 
socio-political imagination of the US state.   
 The Maoist conflict, followed by the ambivalent post-conflict context (2006-
present) continues to introduce and redefine social and political landscape—ranging 
from talks on national “peace and security” to “reintegration” of army and the Maoist 
cadres into Nepali society, from rewriting a national constitution to debating ethnic 
vs. non-ethnic federalism, from instituting Truth Commission to building a unified 
Nepali nation.  An urgent need to build a national society dominates most popular 
and political debates in Nepal.  This is in no way to undermine the significance of 
ongoing reconstruction and reintegration work and relatively peaceful period in 
Nepal, nor do I question the intentions and motivations of national and international 
efforts to offering more or less promising alternatives to coming to terms with the 
recent violent history, and to understanding, evaluating, and effectively engaging 
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Nepalis in the context current socio-political realities in Nepal.  Rather, it is to 
emphasize what Stacy Pigg (1992) argued two decades ago concerning the 
“unintended consequences” of national and international political agendas and 
policies exacerbating existing, if not creating new, structure of inequalities and 
sustaining unequal institutional relations within people in Nepal.  “For Nepal,” Pigg 
has argued, “development—rather than the residues and scars of imperialism—is the 
overt link between it and the West” (1992).  Drawing on her study of development 
institutions and its ideological impact in particular, she writes, 
Development is an industry in its own right in Nepal.  It requires bureaucrats, 
foreign advisers, office staff, professionals, extension workers, program 
directors, project coordinators, trainers, trainees, interviewers, and survey 
enumerators, secretaries, drivers, and tea fetchers, both within His Majesty's 
Government and in international aid organizations.  The middle-class that has 
emerged in the last four decades sustains itself in large part from development-
related employment (172). 
 Similarly, public discourses and practices, such as “Right to Truth is Not a 
Political Issue,” surrounding reconstruction of a post-conflict nation dominate the 
international language, aide scene, and contemporary politics in Nepal.  There has 
been a joint proposal to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
a Commission of Inquiry on the Disappearance of Persons (COID) (ICTJ briefing 
2012).  However, the interconnection between international aid language and everyday 
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politics in building a “new” Nepali society is far from being “new.”  If being Nepali 
meant “seeing [oneself] as a citizen of an underdeveloped country” (Ibid) two decades 
ago, it increasingly means seeing oneself as a suffering subject of an uncertain state 
whose national identity has been in halt since the end of the civil war.  Most people 
over the age of 30 recall quite vividly the change in the socio-political climate and the 
experience of realizing the precariousness of their lives if they are unable to leave the 
country.  This is not to suggest, in any way, that out-migration from Nepal is solely 
dependent on unstable political or degrading economic situations.  But in popular 
consciousness among Nepalis in the US “suffering asylum seeker” best describes the 
current status of all Nepalis who have left home, perpetually displaced, and are 
claiming political asylum in the U.S.  Becoming asylum seeker, for Nepalis in the U.S., 
is about occupying a position of legal-victimhood from which they are expected (and 
even instructed in some cases) to speak and, in turn, to be recognized for suffering 
immaterial to specific asylum claims.   
The predicament of “post-conflict Nepal” for claimants in the US 
 For Nepali asylum claimants in the US, post-conflict Nepal is not simply a 
distant political reality at home.  It is a powerful process to reorient one’s belonging 
anew and render meaningful emergent social positions, individual and collective, in 
concrete through everyday engagement in the contemporary political practices of 
recognition in the US.  More precisely, the paradox of the “suffering narrative” in the 
recognition of Nepalis as asylum seekers is simply inescapable: the idea of “Maoist 
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Nepal” holds a powerful social imagination for Nepalis seeking political asylum in the 
U.S. at the same time the institutional forms and reconstruction work in the post-
conflict period are shaping the Nepali society itself.  There are, of course, many 
interrelated socio-political and transnational histories behind this seeming 
contradiction depending on which part of history and social memory one focuses on 
and to what end.  For my purposes here, I have highlighted the contemporary 
“suffering narrative” among Nepalis in the context of the last two decades of Nepali 
social history and political struggle, which in turn have allowed them to align and re-
appropriate their asylum ‘suffering narrative’ as per the U.S. asylum process.   
If war disrupted social lives among Nepalis then the post-conflict or transition 
period modified it and constructed its own unique sociality among Nepalis in and 
outside the Nepali state.  This new sociality is quite inseparable from the construction 
of a conceptual space for both “First World and “Third World.”  Especially in 
categorizing and defining people arriving from the former and settling in the latter as 
in the case of Nepali migrants in the US.  Now that the war is officially over in Nepal, 
whether or not Nepalis can still appeal for political asylum in the US based on their 
experiences of past-persecution and suffering remains unanswerable.  For Nepali New 
Yorkers I worked with and interpreted for, it has become a source of constant 
anxiety.  They are forever caught in the moral web of having to wish for political 
instability in Nepal to stabilize their legal statuses by appealing asylum in the U.S.   
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 As one of the current asylum claimants Tshering succinctly put it to me, “Khai 
ke garne, bahini?  Hamro desh ko haalat ramro bhako bhaye yahaan aunu parne thiyena.  Aba 
yahaan ayera teen barsa pariwaar bina basisake ani dukkha paunu paisake pachi....tyahaan 
rajneeti byawastha ramro bhayeko khabar sunda kushi pani lagcha tara yahaan afno kaagaz 
bandaina bhanne daar pani cha (“Well, what to do, Sister?  If our country's situation had 
been better I would not have come here.  Now that I have been here for three years 
without my family and have already suffered so much...I am happy to hear things are 
getting better there politically but I am fearful that my papers may not be made here 
anymore.”  This moral dilemma shared by Tshering is typical of many asylum 
claimants currently awaiting their asylum verdict while toiling away everyday without a 
sense of direction or secure future.  The post-conflict period and the changing 
political situation in Nepal, paradoxically, is also producing uncertainty for Nepali 
claimants that migrating to the US was supposed to have resolved.    
The practice of kaam-work and kaagaz banaune-making paper 
 
 For Nepali asylum claimants and migrants in New York City, a distinct concept 
of dukkha, suffering, in relation to their active participation in the asylum process 
through kaagaz banaune (literally: “making paper” but in this context legal and, 
particularly, asylum documents) delineate a poignant experience and engagement of 
their everyday social activities.  Nepalis seeking asylum continue to show anxiety 
toward living and working in the US.  While those who have gone through the 
process and obtained asylum communicate ambivalence in terms of what was gained 
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and lost during the process, those anticipating asylum decision express sheer 
frustration created by protracted legality.  People reinvented themselves in the manner 
suitable to claim asylum in order to continue living and working in the US.  There 
exist internal critiques among Nepalis in the migrant community.  On one end of the 
spectrum, people debated endlessly about whose asylum claims were valid and who 
presented “good” asylum stories.  On the other end of the spectrum, people refuse to 
engage in any kind of conversation around asylum seeking process; only silence 
prevailed.   
This is not to simply list an empirical description of people’s experience upon seeking 
asylum.  By asserting that those I worked closely with, interpreted for, and interviewed 
saw asylum seeking experience as a thing in itself, I want to pay close attention to their 
stories and accounts of how individualized asylum narration and documentation 
process inform this collective socio-cultural assessment of kaagaz banaune, “making 
paper,” which in turn made them as certain kind of individuals in contemporary 
America. 
Among Nepalis in the U.S. then discussion about what one does for living— 
kaam or work—and how one legalizes his/her status—kaagaz banaune or making 
paper-–are intricately connected and a contentious issue.  In contextualizing the 
emergent Nepali migrant community in New York City, I foreground the dual aspects 
of becoming migrant workers and simultaneously self-identifying as asylum seekers: the 
interrelated notions of kaam (work) and kaagaz banaune (making paper/legal 
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documentation).  On meeting Nepalis in the city, questions related to work or legal 
status are seldom (directly) asked, at least in the first few meetings.  It is only upon 
being well acquainted, as I learned, that Nepalis ask each other: “kaagaz ko kaam 
bhayeko ho tapaile?” (“you have already done the work of paper or legal documentation, 
yes?”).  Kaagaz, which literally means paper, is often referred to legal 
document/paperwork, and by extension, the legalization process to obtaining a valid 
(read: legal) status.  As such, Nepalis talk about the act of making paper (kaagaz 
banaune).  To ask someone if they had already made paper, as I gradually learned, is 
more an affirmative statement than a direct question, seldom exchanged among 
strangers or newly acquainted Nepalis.  As a distant-insider, I was intrigued not by the 
apparent silence surrounding the issue of legal status, or kaagaz, for more than fifty 
percent of Nepalis (or any marginalized migrant community) living and working in 
New York City is undocumented.  What convinced me to pursue this issue further 
was how and in what specific ways kaagaz banaune, or making (legal document) paper, 
had become a basis for sociality—a topic for unity and of contention—among people 
with whom I worked closely.   
I, thus, write about the emergent construction of a Nepali ‘migrant’ 
personhood and legal subjectivity, whose sociality is contingent and continually 
mediated, (re)created and negotiated anew by knowing, first and foremost, what not to 
know and subsequently, maintaining silence about the kaazaz banaune kaam, the work 
of ‘making paper.’  In fact, work and paper existed separate but in parallel terms for 
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those I facilitated English classes, worked closely with, and provided Nepali-English 
legal interpretation.  The ideas about kaam and kaagaz were entangled in their lives, 
invoking an acute sense of the self and the community.  One of the early ESL 
classroom conversations that I had with the workers illuminates this entanglement 
most lucidly.  The topic of discussion for one of the ESL sessions was learning about 
different household cleaning supplies and the daily chores that workers were 
responsible for.  The answers varied from doing dishes and laundry to cleaning 
bathrooms and kitchen floors.  The conversation gradually transformed into serious 
issues about hardship and struggle they faced on a daily basis.  Then one of the ESL 
female participants in her early-50s Pelki didi broke the rhythm of our discussion and 
casually declared that she did not work as hard as she had to when she first arrived in 
the US.  I automatically assumed that she was referring to her work situation, so I 
inquired if she had to work long hours or received inadequate11 payment previously.  
For I had known that the Nepali migrant workers taking ESL classes at the grassroots 
organization, where I taught English, were receiving information on minimum wage 
requirement in the US and, particularly, exposed to workers’ rights issues.   
However, I was left utterly confused when Pelki didi responded in the 
following way: “No.  I still do the same work and get paid the same as I did five years 
ago.  But I had to work very hard to make papers.”  At the time, I understood her to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11.  I use inadequate here to delineate wage that is under New York City’s minimum-wage requirement 
although I am not sure what would be an “adequate” pay or the logic behind adequacy in general.  
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referring to various paperwork—from applying for a social security number to filing 
out a W-2 forms for work—that all newly arrived migrants were engaged in during the 
early stages of ‘integrating’ in the city.  I was quite aware of the anxiety among people 
in the migrant ‘community’ who did not speak/understand English and/or had 
received little or no formal education prior to coming to the US.  As I started to steer 
the ESL conversation to related topics about filing out papers and forms, she 
mumbled under her breath, “Kaagaz banauna 2 barsa lagyo mero ta. Dherai kaam garnu 
pareko thiyo.  Dherai dukkha pani khayen.” (“It took 2 years to make my paper.  I had to 
work so hard.  I suffered a lot.”).  Her remark that generated complete silence and 
abruptly ended my class that day was one of the many early incidents in the field that 
compelled me to ‘observe’ and further inquire into this peculiar interconnected 
activity of kaam and kaagaz.   
 Making paper, or kaagaz banaune, is a type of activity, so to speak, strictly 
enforced upon (and often prior to) migration and integration into US society, 
occupying a parallel imaginative and practical ground as that of ideas about kaam, or 
work.  Nepali claimants with whom I worked with spoke of them together, or in 
relation to each other.  Thus, I suggest, kaam and kaagaz banaune function as an 
“articulated discourse” (Hall 1980)12.  General inquiries about work, or kaam, alone 
has the possibility to be used across different ethnicity, class, caste, and gender, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 According to Hall (1980) “articulated discourse” reveals the relationship between two concepts that work 
together, never quite interchangeable or irreplaceable, to express and emphasize certain images, assumptions, 
and ideologies attached to the core of each formulation. 
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although it will be naïve to posit that questions related to one’s kaam in social terms, 
revealing structured, hierarchical, relationships among Nepalis in the US have no real 
consequences to how one may be perceived, treated, judged, or even excluded from 
social activities. 
The second chapter documents how and what specific ideas about work 
and/of “making paper,” spoken of in relation to each other, structure and 
subsequently inform individual and collective lives and experiences of Nepali 
claimants in New York City.  I focus on the specific concerns and experiences related 
to integration that people participated in the field, which in turn shaped their ideas 
about kaam and kaagaz banaune.  More important, the way language of kaam and 
kaagaz came to concentrate within it varied, poignant, narratives of who they were 
supposed to be, who they were becoming in the US, and how that becoming is shaped 
by suffering individuals forming a migrant-community.  All those I talked to, taught 
English, worked with, and interpreted for imagined that every adult Nepali goes 
through some kind of kaagaz banaune ritual within the first couple of years of their stay 
in the US.  It is during and upon learning and having gone through the ritual of making 
paper that one becomes somewhat ‘integrated’ into US society.  This activity that 
leads people from obtaining jobs to having greater participation in social and cultural 
activities in the migrant-communities to uniting with their families in Nepal and/or 
India was also an initiator of many conflicts, controversies, and contradictions in their 
lives.   
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Depending on varying level of intimacy I developed with individuals in the 
field, many interlocutors, but not all, shared with me their own experience about the 
process.   
People I had known for a long time (prior to conducting fieldwork in New York 
City), and especially those with whom I shared similar social and educational 
experience, often spoke of the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ way of making paper.  Many 
newly arrived Nepali migrant workers in the city were often seen by those who 
boasted about having acquired documentation the ‘right’ way as participating in an 
unethical or illegitimate ways of making paper.  The potency with which people often 
discussed the two interrelated issues revealed to me, early on, the precariousness that 
accompanied the silence surrounding kaam and kaagaz, generating contradiction 
among Nepalis in the migrant ‘community.’  Rather than placing the interconnected 
issue as an expected outcome and a consequence of migration and integration, this 
chapter points to the specific ways that Nepalis integrate into US society is by learning 
about the rather arbitrary process of making paper for work and working hard to make 
paper for continued sustenance.  It is through the process of seeking asylum that 
individuals constantly sought to make sense of their be(com)ing migrants and asylum 
seekers and belonging to the greater Nepali migrant-community.  
The discourse on dukkha—suffering 
  
The Nepali word dukkha or suffering has several connotations.  It can convey 
pain, sorrow, hardship, grief, sadness, or misfortune when used colloquially about 
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one's state of mind and/or body.  In a conversation between people, it can also 
convey feeling sorry for or sympathizing with another person's suffering.   Another 
meaning, and most interesting for my argument here, is the intersubjective experience 
that the word dukkha conveys—sharing one's dukkha, suffering, with another person 
can potentially open up an intimate space—for establishing social relationship based 
on moral obligation.  In this sense, sharing one's dukkha is then intricately linked to 
conveying moral conviction in another person. The person who acts as a witness or 
listens to another's suffering is morally accountable.  In sum, dukkha as a shared social 
practice and a moral responsibility, in concrete, rather than adherence to abstract, 
existential, question is of particular interest to me here.  To the extent that I was 
working with migrant workers and accidentally inserted as an interpreter for Nepali 
asylum seekers in the city, the multifaceted meanings of suffering materialized at 
different moments with people during fieldwork.  Like most social phenomenon, they 
reflect a collective experience of people as a consequence of a historically specific 
position and sociality while contingent on ever-changing present context and the lives 
of individuals.  In the following chapters, I describe and explore some of the many 
ways people engaged with me and reflected on the question of suffering and asylum 
seeking experiences—former as a condition of Nepalis living in the US and latter as 
everyday practice that structured their lives in the city—depending on the diverse 
contexts I interacted and the varying level of intimacy I developed with individuals in 
the field. 
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 People use the word dukkha in many different senses as well.  Community 
organizers and volunteers at the grassroots organization often say that migrant 
workers have lots of dukkha in addition to being away from home and family 
members.  They do not know English and do not have legal documentation so they 
can seldom defend themselves at work.  “Our dukkha,” Pelki didi once said to me 
during our ESL session, “will never go away even if we speak ‘good’ English well.”  
The context of our conversation was negotiating at their workplaces and with 
potential employers and I was teaching people about minimum wage requirement and 
negotiating for wages.  What she meant was that learning to speak ‘good’ English does 
not guarantee better pay as a live-in maid.  She went on and explained that as 
undocumented workers she and others in the ESL class had very few options and was 
destined to suffer at work everyday.  Suffering in this context meant actual, physical, 
labor that cannot be reversed, as she related to me.  In yet another ESL classroom 
session, Sanju didi declared in distress, “Kahan ko time cha dukkha liyera basna hamilai?  
Hamro dukkha kasle bujhlan ra?  Hami ta khali chup laagera dukkha matra sahana sakchaun  
(When is there time for us to be sad?  Who will listen to/understand our suffering?  
We can only suffer in silence.)”  Then she ended with laughter, “that is why we talk a 
lot in your class, Miss.”  In this context, the usage of dukkha was to articulate 
emotional pain and suffering.  Further, posing a rhetorical question about having no 
one to listen/understand ‘our suffering’ and suffering in silence meant that they could 
not share their dukkha with anyone but among themselves.  In all their conversations, 
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suffering was used to express and emphasize their individual and collective victim-
subject status.  More importantly, it was employed as their fate in relation to their 
everyday living and working conditions as migrant workers in the US. 
I cannot claim that such appropriation of suffering is widespread among all 
Nepalis at all times in the migrant communities in the U.S.  Even if this usage is not 
commonly shared among Nepalis from different social strata, it is crucial to think 
about the rationale that makes this appropriation of suffering possible and meaningful 
for the speakers.  As I learned to cue in with the way those around me used the word 
dukkha alerted me to the connection between work and making paper and, in 
particular, Nepali’ relation to and understanding of ‘suffering.’   But it also drew me 
closer toward voices I had seldom heard or allowed to exist in their own terms in the 
Nepali migrant community.   
One can only be a suffering Nepali if one hides his/her suffering, hesitant to 
share their ‘real’ suffering publicly, and even if they are positioned to do so, voicing 
one’s suffering entails ambiguity about one’s agentive position.  To understand the 
varied meaning associated with suffering-victim and its usage in different social 
contexts among Nepalis, one must turn to the meaning of dukkha in Nepali and its 
relation to the English word “suffering.”  I noted at the beginning that Nepali word 
dukkha can mean misfortune—caused by something that is beyond one’s control—
and also pain or grief resulted by concrete material conditions and life choices.  The 
notion of suffering is also ambiguous in other ways as well.  Assertions of ‘suffering’ 
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stake out speaking positions in a dialogical context.  It is quite impossible not to 
relativize the meaning of ‘suffering’ even if one asserts it to put forth certain 
convictions.  It is also true so far as the development of anthropological usage of 
suffering goes in relation to competing notions of agency.  The concept of suffering 
arranges competing notions of agency in a relativistic framework.  Suffering-victim 
marks individuals by positioning them in opposition to those others with “capacity to 
act.”   
I combine two established trends in anthropology of suffering as a subjective 
experience with a basis to understanding sociality (Kleinman 1988; Kleinman, Das & 
Young 1997; Mattingly and Garro 2000; Biehl 2005) and for interpreting life-
experiences and representations of our interlocutors’ world-views particularly through 
phenomenological approaches (Throop 2010; Desjarlis 1992, 2003).  Following these 
two lines of thinking of suffering—as sociality and as a cultivated individual virtue—I 
ground my argument of suffering to document its materialistic concerns among 
Nepali migrants, who treat dukkha, or suffering as an attribute that connected their 
individuals’ lives to those of others with similar experiences of seeking asylum and as 
a way to creatively construct and, in turn, collectively identify as Nepali migrants and 
asylum seekers in the United States.  Dukkha then connotes individual’s fate as much 
as collective or shared experience both a consequence of and the very condition to 
social relationships and not set of ideas.  While the Nepali word dukkha, also extends 
across the ambiguities as the word suffering, it encompasses both agentive and 
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victimhood roles that people play as social actors.  However, Nepali language itself 
inflects the word in distinct and differently situated ambiguity.  It allows speakers to 
indicate degrees of suffering along seemingly opposing ends of agency and 
victimhood.  Dukkha communicates one’s social position, more or less permanent and 
yet amenable to change.  Articulations of one’s dukkha, more often than not, tend to 
position people and simultaneously their recognition as suffering-victims.  Any 
statement of suffering then shows that the speaker has made a conscious and 
discriminating choice among other possibilities to do so and to be acknowledged as a 
victim notwithstanding physical or metaphysical understanding of suffering.  In other 
words, dukkha is a measured and thought-through response, pointing inevitably, by its 
assertion, to not the ambiguous slot between agentive or victimhood status.  
Depending on specific social and dialogical contexts it can mean one or the other.  It 
is only in elite discourse that suffering/dukkha is often used to categorize people as 
solely victims. 
As I document (Chapter 2) extensively, in the context of asylum seeking 
process, people often referred to inaccurate representation of the real suffering of 
Nepalis and giving voice to suffering victims.  Nepali asylum claimants, former and 
current, did not blur the performative aspects of their suffering but went through 
great lengths to convince their suffering-victim positions as a form of victimhood and 
not agency.  It is suffering that is not in question.  In one sense, being a suffering-
victim is having too much dukkha that requires recognition by others in the social 
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networks to be seen credible.  In another sense, being recognized as a suffering-agent 
can be potentially seen as a suspicious asylum claimant, learning to negotiate or, in 
Nirmala didi’s words, “selling suffering.”  One learns to position oneself as, and 
become, a suffering-victim and/or a suffering-agent depending on a given context and 
ever-changing moment.  The suffering that Nepalis value, interpret, represent are 
based on this cautious judgment.  To be a suffering person is to be conscious of one’s 
victimhood as much as being a thoughtful agent.  In sum, recognizing one’s “capacity 
to act” is not outside but within one’s capacity to suffer.    
There may be people misappropriating suffering to make papers but not me, 
you know my story, asylum seekers for whom I provided interpretation often say, if I 
appear or show signs of being skeptical, inadvertently.  Positioning oneself as a 
suffering-victim for asylum seekers signified their ability to legitimately claim political 
asylum and make papers in the U.S.  The point is not whether Nepali asylum seekers 
are credible victims or agents of suffering.  Neither position is inherent to being an 
asylum seeker or experiencing real suffering.  The suffering is real only in the sense 
that an individual is expected to justify his/her position as an asylum seeker if and 
reveal his/her suffering of seeking asylum in the U.S.   
Discussion about suffering in this context is as much about the ambivalence of 
individual’s social position as it is about collective experience of protracted legality in 
the U.S.  In the accounts of upwardly mobile social elites and political leaders, 
suffering Nepali is used as a frozen category that is perceived to being disrupted due 
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to emerging political claims made by asylum seekers.  In these circumstances, they 
position themselves as asylum seekers and community organizers who choose to 
empathize with migrant workers as suffering-victims of economic injustices in Nepal 
and the US while resisting to identify people seeking asylum as credible victims of 
political injustices.  Whereas community organizers and activists working closely with 
un/documented migrant workers are concerned their assertions of suffering Nepalis 
indicate acute sensitivity toward socio-economic conditions of people as both migrant 
workers and political asylum seekers.  Their refusal to engage publicly and silence 
surrounding people’s experience seeking asylum signify acknowledgment of 
irremediable dilemma of belonging to Nepali migrant community.  Yet among 
migrant workers and asylum seekers, former or potential, some fear being identified as 
asylum seekers and others are very much vocal about their uncertain legal status.  
Those who are ambivalent of being recognized as an asylum seeker insist on 
(re)counting their suffering as ‘real’ and correspond to the general suffering of Nepalis 
making papers.   Still those unafraid to self-identify as asylum seekers emphasize their 
actual suffering to make papers and unchanging social positions even after having 
repeatedly shared their dukkha with strangers.  Among Nepalis, narrative of suffering 
and asylum experiences are being reformulated as much as the narrative itself is 
refashioning them in various ways that serve larger socio-economic and legal 
purposes. 
	  74	  
   Intense engagement and conversation about suffering is then an activity that 
enables people to construct local meaning attached to be(com)ing migrants and/or 
asylum seekers.  The suspicion around the figure of asylum seeker, for instance, is 
built into the very relationship informing migrant collective ambiguity toward 
articulation of suffering.  No one is questioning whether an individual is or is not a 
suffering Nepali migrant.  The moral discourse surrounding suffering and, in 
particular, representation of oneself as suffering-victim and/or suffering-agent is 
about productive ambiguity.  It is also about emergent sociality among Nepalis—signs 
and spaces of cultural intimacy, shared silences, constructive social meanings and 
interconnections.  Socially privileged speakers, each with their own outlooks and 
opinions about others as suffering Nepalis, are not in complete opposition to those 
less likely to voice their opinions in public or be dismissive of others’ suffering all 
speak the same language and become deeply enmeshed through active socialization.  
The complex realities and miscommunications create the very conditions to the 
migrant ‘community’ formation.  It is to non-Nepalis then this complex social reality 
is packaged and translated into simple, coherent, and agreeable rationale.  What is 
gained in return?  
 As a way of addressing this question, I do propose under the rubric of 
dukkha—suffering—expressed, interpreted, and enacted by and among Nepalis in 
relation to seeking asylum in the U.S. is not an argument for Nepali “culture,” 
diasporic or otherwise, in the conventional sense of a stable and coherent symbolic 
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norm or moral code.  Nor do I mean to suggest a uniquely socio-cultural attribute—
grounded in shared social system, worldview, belief, and everyday practice—imported 
from “homeland” into host society in an axiomatic manner.  With suffering I gesture 
instead toward a language of shared experience of anxiety, uncertainty, and protracted 
legal insecurity having gone through and/or anticipating going through a type of 
invisible labor of “making paper” in the US required of people without legal 
documentation.  It is then about a language of powerful and persuasive means of 
articulating and representing the condition of il/legality itself using familiar socio-
cultural idioms and categories, one that casts the suffering of being in “legal limbo” 
(Cabot 2012) or “permanent temporariness” (Mountz et al 2002) as an organic process 
aided by piles of legal documents and non-remunerated work.  The next chapter 
closely engages with the two concepts, discussed and debated among Nepali migrants 
and claimants, specifically emanating from the context of their asylum seeking 
process.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
“Making paper, selling suffering”: The hard-work of seeking asylum 
 
“The narrative forms known to humanity are finite and ubiquitous.  Yet in the ways 
we adopt and engage with these master narratives, we communicate experiences that 
we feel are singularly our own.  As for other human beings, we see them simply as 
faces in a crowd, as an anonymous mass, until we enter into dialogue with them.  
Forthwith a stranger suddenly possesses a voice, a history, a name—and what 
transpires between us may change our lives forever.” 
--Michael Jackson (Lifeworlds:  Essays in Existential Anthropology, 2013: xiv) 
 
“Truth i s  s imple ,  my s tory  i s  not” 
At the time of the interview recorded below, Maya didi had been granted 
asylum a year ago.  She was recounting to me her asylum experience: narrating 
multiple asylum stories as well as multiple ways of narrating a given traumatic story.  
She seemed still visibly disturbed by the asylum seeking experience despite favorable 
outcome.   
“Truth?” Mina didi said in a measured tone.  “No one wants to hear it but 
everyone knows it already,” she continued, “everyone wants to hear a good story in 
this country.”  After a long pause, she said, “We work hard in people’s houses, 
cleaning bathrooms, cooking, and taking care of other’s children.  That is the truth.  It 
is very simple.  If you do not have papers or know English in this country you 
continue doing the work because you need the money.  Even if you make paper and 
learn some English you still do the same work.  Maybe you get lucky and find a good 
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boss who treats you well, but you will not get good money.  If you get lucky and get 
more money the boss will not be nice.” 
 I first met Mina didi almost three years ago at the grassroots organization, where I taught 
English as a Second Language (ESL) classes on weekends.  She was the first ESL 
participant whose incisive remark during one of the sessions made me question and reflect on 
my own social position as an ethnographer, an ESL teacher/volunteer, and a member of the 
growing Nepali Diasporic community in New York City.  As a teacher herself in her 
hometown in Manang, Western Nepal, she had taught different subjects to young and old 
people in her village for ten years.  Indeed, she often compared the ESL class in Queens with 
proudh-sikchya, or adult education/literacy, in her village that was part of the development 
programs and policies,13 in the late 80s and late-90s until she migrated to Kathmandu and 
started processing paperwork to come to the US in 2005.  “This English teaching you do,” 
she would often tell me, “is like what I used to do in my village.  Teaching Nepali to elderly 
people in our village who only spoke Manange or Tibetan. At least in our village the old 
people did not have to work.  It was only to kill time in their old age.  Here, we work like 
donkeys for 6 days and take English classes to feel more dumb.”   
In relating how and in what specific ways she narrated her asylum story, Mina 
didi broke several of the unwritten codes of the asylum seeking process: 
I had to work so hard.  I spent so much money to make Nepali passport and 
obtain Nepali citizenship in Kathmandu before coming to the US.  I am still 
sending money home to my brother to pay the middleman.  I thought the days 
of hardship and difficulty was over and I had bought happiness when I came to 
the US. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Began in the late 60s as government promulgated projects, under the rule of King Mahendra during the 
Panchayat era and went well into the 90s, created an important space for the establishment of various 
international agencies and non-governmental organizations, including USAID, to transform, educate, and 
'integrate' 'villagers' into Nepali nation.  Implementation of adult literacy programs, information about 
education and preventative health in the rural areas were some of the key features not unconnected to 
representing a unified, 'modern,' Nepali nation (see Stacy Pigg for a comprehensive study and expanded 
discussion on the “unintended consequences” of the development ideology in Nepal). 
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Our conversation takes place in a cafe located halfway between her apartment in 
Woodside and mine in Sunnyside.  It is interrupted every couple of minutes by the 7 subway 
line tracks running directly above the restaurant, as in every Nepali neighborhoods in 
Queens—Sunnyside, Woodside, Elmhurst, Northern Blvd. and Jackson Heights. It is an 
interesting art that one picks up in this part of the city, as I eventually did, when the train 
interrupts your train of thought constantly.  There is no point trying to compete with the loud 
noise of the train; it only sucks energy and leaves your throat dry. You simply cannot win.  
Rather than follow your train of thought, you learn to follow the train's schedule. You start a 
conversation and stop, quite naturally, every time you hear the train.  Then (try to) utter a 
sentence or two, while people are getting on and off the train.  Once you hear the train doors 
shut or the announcement--“Please don't hold the doors.  There is another train right behind 
us”-- you wait a few seconds for it to leave the station.  Then you continue your conversation 
from where you left off.  The way one learns to discipline his/her thoughts to follow the rhythm 
of the track is a particular skill that city-dwellers can distinctly relate to.  Not to mention, it 
gives conversation a unique character.  
Doing interviews in Nepali neighborhoods in Queens, I either appreciated the 
interruption or became increasingly impatient and annoyed depending on the context and the 
topic of conversation with my interlocutors.  Noisy trains can be a welcome disruption to divert 
unwanted silences and awkward moments in the field, but, at the same time, it can be a 
nuisance when you are deeply immersed in a conversation with someone and especially learning 
new information about your interlocutors, colleagues, and collaborators.  This also means that 
the person sitting in front of you can change his/her mind in that split second—between the 
arrival and the departure of the train—whether or not to continue discussing what they were 
talking to you about right before the train arrived.  Or worse, they may decide to simply cut 
off the conversation and not dwell on the subject matter further.  Having conversations in local 
parks, cafes and restaurants, in the Queens neighborhood, you always had to factor in this 
possibility. 
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I was getting anxious as to what direction Mina didi's story was taking.  Would 
she decide to cut it short as she had done on a number of occasions in the past or 
would she continue with her story.  Luckily, for me, that day Mina didi had come 
prepared to tell me her story of making papers, which she began almost a year ago but 
never completed it.   
She took a deep breath and looked outside the cafe window.  After few 
seconds, she continued, “Kahan ko sukkha paunu ni ho hamiharu jasta lai ta? (Is happiness 
ever possible for people like us?).”  Mina didi raised her eyebrows and her right 
hand—a gesture not untypical for Nepalis to make when asking a rhetorical question 
or simply making a general statement.  She was, however, speaking of her particular 
experience.  Her sharp and biting remark held me hostage, unable to respond in time.  
She continued without waiting for my response, 
I was already home sick and working hard as a live-in domestic worker with an 
Indian family in Connecticut.  It had not even been a year when I was asked to 
get my Tibetan citizenship card and papers from Chinese government to make 
another paper to stay here.  For that my brother (in Nepal) and I had to go 
through so much trouble and hard-work to keep paying so many people to get 
all the right papers.  And the most difficult part here is that you have to say your 
story in front of the immigration officer.  I went to Jamaica office first with the 
lawyer that the Chinatown people got me.  After working so hard and 
memorizing everything for almost a year, I did not get asylum!  I had to tell my 
asylum story twice…can you believe that?   
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The more she shared the details of her story the more confused I became.  
Mina didi applied for asylum as a Tibetan refugee.  When asked if she knew what she 
had to do to apply for asylum, she responded, “No, I was just told by my cousin that I 
will have to work hard for the next couple of months to learn the story to make 
papers to live here.  But I did not know what kind of story was needed from me.  I 
did not know the system here.  My cousin took me to the woman in Chinatown and 
she recommended that I could make papers because I am Buddhists like Tibetans.  
But the woman asked me if I could read and write Tibetan.  I was worried because I 
could only speak Tibetan language.  All those years of studying and leaning Nepali in 
the government school and passing SLC was useless here.  I was sad at first.  Then the 
Chinatown woman told me that she would make me a tape of my story in Tibetan 
that I needed to listen to everyday at work.” 
I was completely immersed in her story and became quite entangled in it 
myself.  Upon asking what kind of story she ended up telling, she said, “The same 
story that everyone knows.  I was born in Tibet and all my family members had to 
leave and come to Nepal because of the Chinese government.  We lived in Nepal as 
refugees and suffered a lot in the hands of the Nepali government.  You know they 
want all the proofs of us being Tibetan and the upper Manang is near Tibet.  But it is 
not really Tibet and Mustange Tibetan is similar to Tibetan culture and language.  I 
got all the photos of my Tibetan dress, my house, and the area we lived in Manang.  I 
asked my brother to send me everything.”   
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Mina didi showed me some photos of herself in Tibetan outfit, her house, and 
the photographs from Loshar celebration with her family.  While showing the 
photographs, Mina didi took a deep breath and continued, “You know all these 
photographs and papers of my Tibetan citizenship were not enough to make papers 
here?” 
I nodded, not entirely sure what she meant.   
“You see my new story was that my cousin and I were carrying a Tibetan flag 
during a protest in Kathmandu.  The woman in Chinatown said that Tibetan flag was 
now allowed to be carried in Nepal, so the Nepali officials arrested us after one of the 
protest marches we attended and they put us in jail for a week.”  She went into details 
about where and when she was carrying the Tibetan flag—near Bouddha14 one time 
and another time near the palace, she explained.  “I spent days and nights listening to 
the Tibetan tape that Chinatown woman made for me.  She said I will have to 
describe the prison life, how it looked from outside, inside, and how many people 
were arrested in that protest.  I also had to remember how many people were put into 
our cell and what they did to us—all the beatings, scolding, and torture.  It was not 
enough that I had to ask my brother to get more papers from the prison.  The date I 
was arrested, the name of the prison, the photo of the jail…everything.  I kept calling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is one of the important pilgrimage sites for Tibetan and Nepali Buddhist Monks.  There is a 
famous Buddhist monastery—the name of the place Bouddha comes from that. 
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my brother in Kathmandu to send me all the photos of the jail nearby and the papers 
from the Nepali government officials.” 
“And that is how you got the asylum,” I asked Mina didi. 
 “Asylum?  Oh yes, I finally made papers,” she said, and continued with her 
story, “I had no idea that I would also have to remember the images of the jail, the 
color of my cell, for example, and other detail description of the officers who arrested 
us in Kathmandu.  The Chinatown woman recorded everything for me in a tape.  I 
don’t think I worked so hard like that in my entire life.  But it was still not enough.” 
I thought the story was over; she had gotten asylum.  Obviously, I was 
mistaken. 
Mina didi’s voice got louder in the café and people started staring at us.  She 
did not seem to care.  “After I studied and listened to the tape that the Chinatown 
woman gave me for almost three months, she told me that I would have to practice 
answering questions of my story on the tape.  But you see I had to learn again not to 
remember the story exactly the way I had listened and memorized.  Can you imagine 
my surprise?”  
I was beyond disbelief but the initial shock and confusion was slowly giving in 
to my anticipation of more twists and turns in Mina didi’s story—to a point where I 
could no longer imagine anything. 
“Yes, I had to learn to forget that story after four months of practicing so 
hard,” Mina didi said softly. 
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“Forget that story?” I asked utterly confused. 
“You see the Chinatown woman said that I couldn’t answer lawyers’ questions 
directly because it would look like I had rehearsed my story.  But that was the truth: I 
had rehearsed that story and quit my job for two months to memorize that tape.  I did 
not have any money left with me.  If only I knew English I probably would have 
gotten asylum the first time.”  She fell silent. 
“And that is how you got asylum,” I tried to continue our conversation 
although there was no need to pretend to fill the silence. 
“I did exactly what the Chinatown woman told me.  I worked hard to forget--
not my story but how I had remembered it the first time.  I finally learned another 
different ways to tell the same story and answer different questions.  The Tibetan 
interpreter at the courtroom translated my story well.  She understood what I had 
said.  She helped me.”  Mina didi said. 
“What about the Chinatown woman?,” I asked her. 
“She made me work hard.  She was strict but she helped me and other Nepalis 
make papers.  I paid her money, too.  Bahini, no one understands your dukkha 
(suffering) for free in this country,” she said sarcastically.  “See I told you the truth is 
simple.  My story is not,” she teasingly added. 
There are several elements in Mina didi’s convoluted asylum narrative which 
taken as a whole reveal a peculiar connection between ‘making paper’ and ‘working 
hard.’  Indeed, work was the central component of her asylum experience.  She told a 
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story about an initial asylum interview gone wrong even after “working hard for a 
year;” about having to learn a completely new story and being able to recite it in 
Tibetan—language that is close to her mother tongue but not the one she necessarily 
felt comfortable speaking because of all those years learning Nepali; about working 
hard to memorize every single detail of the story which she had to then “learn to 
forget” so the story would appear believable.  Throughout recounting her asylum 
narration and experience narrating the story at different moments as “work hard.”  
Her realization of “working hard” in the US is directly informed by her asylum 
seeking experience.  Interestingly, she did not explicitly relate to me her frustration 
about the absolute absurdity of learning ‘the asylum story’ in different languages and 
the logic behind remembering-and-forgetting the same story.  
Mina didi’s story is then about a particular experience with the asylum process 
that ultimately made her realize the ‘truth’ about living and working in the US: the fact 
that working hard, learning to narrate her ‘story’ in different ways that finally granted 
her asylum afterward did not substantially change her life.  Having to “work hard,” as 
she pointed out, for making paper is the simple truth.  The point is not to establish that 
the Nepali migrant is not an ‘authentic’ asylum seeker and an unruly migrant-worker, 
but to examine how she has come to occupy this particular (social) position within the 
space of the US nation-state, and even positions herself, alternately as one and the 
other. 
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This kind of candid discussion of the relationship between working hard and/for 
making paper among Nepalis, particularly former asylum claimants, is common in my 
data.  Still what makes this relationship comprehensible is the opposite (and 
standardized) rationale that must be simultaneously upheld by current asylum 
claimants: making paper would result in obtaining better work and life in the US.  While 
knowledge and public acceptance of this relationship is hardly new for claimants I 
worked with and interviewed, one-on-one conversation with claimants often revealed 
convoluted and complicated views and dilemmas.  Take, for instance, my 
conversation with Kumar dai for whom I provided asylum interpretation for a year 
and half.  Contrary to my expectations, Kumar dai’s reflection on asylum seeking 
experience is a mixture of haunted relief and anxiety. 
Working hard to  make papers  
“Bahini (sister), I passed finally,” I could hear excitement in Kumar dai’s voice 
when he called me on the phone after his merit hearing, “I have spent so much energy 
and sleepless nights to make papers, you know.”  I had assisted Kumar dai on his 
asylum case as an interpreter for the last two years, but I was unable to attend his 
merit hearing that morning.  Since the court often had their appointed interpreter I 
would not have been allowed to interpret for him and his legal representatives.  
 I asked him to recount for me his courtroom experience.  Kumar dai 
responded eagerly with a long, comic story about how the judge did not seem to care 
how much he had suffered in Nepal but whether he was paying taxes for the last 
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seven years he had been in the country.  “The last time I was this nervous was when I 
took the SLC examination15 in Nepal more than 30 years ago!”  He was panting and 
talking at the same time.  It was as though his words lagged behind his thoughts, 
running in different directions.  “Yo asylum bhaneko (This asylum thing),” he would 
often say to me, “SLC dinu bhanda kehi kaam hoina, bujhayou (is not less difficult than 
sitting for the SLC exam, you understand?).  You have to forget about everyone and 
everything for a year or so to prepare for the exam and still there is no guarantee that 
you will pass.”  I was overjoyed that he had passed the examination with flying colors, 
indeed. 
Later that evening, I went to the Indian restaurant near NYU where Kumar dai 
worked.  He had insisted, on several occasions, to pay for my dinner to show his 
gratitude for interpreting, or, as he would say, “lamo samaya samma saath dinu bhayeko 
ma” (for providing support for a long time), during his entire asylum process.  In the 
past, I had made excuses and refused to take him up on his offer.  I was, like Kumar 
dai and other Nepali asylum claimants for whom I provided interpretation, ambivalent 
whether it would be “okay” to meet and discuss their cases while they were still 
ongoing.  Many times that we had spoken about the case, it created, more often than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  SLC, School Leaving Certificate, is a national examination that people take after finishing 10th grade or 
high school in Nepal.  Without passing SLC exam, one cannot get admission to colleges.  Having passed SLC 
is also a symbolic marker of a person leaving his/her sheltered familial life and on his/her way to entering the 
civil life and assuming civil responsibilities—by joining college or getting a job, settling down and getting 
married.  One can often hear people, beyond the age of 30 in Kathmandu, often speak of their ‘SCL time’ 
and waiting for their results to be published in the newspaper as a period of both nervousness and heightened 
excitement and an important turning point of their youth.  The metaphor used by Kumar dai is to express the 
similar anxiety and the arrested sense of time and social life that people refer to when discussing their days of 
preparing for and taking the exam, and waiting for the result.	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not, a rather distressing environment.  It was not surprising that I did not particularly 
remind Kumar dai and other claimants of their joyful moments, since our structured, 
disciplined, and mediated meetings and conversations surrounded by lawyers 
frequently made them anxious and frustrated.  I was becoming acutely aware that I 
did not particularly help ameliorate their frustrations.  Quite the contrary, I added to, 
if not necessarily became the very reason for, their frustration altogether during 
interpretation sessions.   
But that evening was different.  Kumar dai had been granted asylum and I was 
no longer his interpreter.  I accepted his offer to meet him at the restaurant.  As per 
his instruction, I arrived right after the lunch traffic ended and before he had to 
prepare for dinner.  He seemed thrilled to see me.  The restaurant was quite empty 
except for one or two customers.  Regular ones from NYU according to Kumar dai.  
As we sat in a booth near the kitchen, I initiated the conversation, “Dherai dherai badhai 
dai tapainlai, dai (Many congratulations to you, older brother).”  
“Thank you.  To you, too!” he said in English.  “Aba ke?! (Now what?!)” He 
took a long, deep breath.   
“I do not understand,” I was unsure how else to respond to his habit of asking 
a rhetorical question, followed by a sigh.  
“I taught English in Siraha for twenty years before I had to leave my hometown 
for Kathmandu in 1998.  There also I taught English until I came here in 2002.  Now 
in the name of English, this is all I do.”  He shook his head up and toward the 
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direction of the open dining room space.  His hand followed his head almost 
involuntarily.  “Sir, would you like to sit by the window, I say to customers everyday.” 
The customers in the restaurant must have overheard him, for they turned 
around and smiled at us.  Kumar dai got up, “Check?” he raised his right hand and as 
though holding a pen with his index finger and thumb, he made a scribbling gesture in 
the air.  “Ekai chin la (Just a minute okay),” he said to me and walked toward the front 
of the restaurant to attend to his regular customers. 
As soon as he came back, I asked him, “So how did the hearing go this 
morning?  What questions did the judge ask?”  
“The hearing?” he rolled his eyes and continued, shaking his head, “It is such a 
big show….two years of running around and going to the law firms, retelling my story 
to seven different lawyers, and the last month of preparing for all those questions and 
answers during prep sessions…the number of times I received death threats…was it 
over the phone or letters in the mail sent by the Maoists… the detail description of 
the physical attack I suffered twice when I refused to donate money to the Maoist 
political party in our village…”  He said it all in one breath.  It was as though the 
events from ten years ago in his life were flashing in front of him and he was trying to 
capture every bit of it in words.  Then shaking his head gently, he continued, “You 
know that the judge asked me nothing.” 
“Nothing?”  I repeated.  
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“Well, the judge did ask me a lot of questions.  He wanted to know whether or 
not I was filing taxes all these years that I have been living and working in this 
country,” he said sarcastically and continued,  “You know all this time I had to take 
off from work to run around the law offices for the last two years, I could have made 
more money and sent it home to my wife and children.”  He started talking about his 
family in Nepal. 
“Next year, I will be 50.  My life is not going to change for better in this 
country just because I will have made papers tomorrow.  All I hope is to bring my 
family here and give my children a better future.  My son is in middle school and 
daughter is almost 21.  Hamro dukkha ta asylum payera pani sakindaina, bahini (Our 
suffering does not end even after getting asylum, sister).  Yo kaagaz ko kaam bhaneko ta 
jeevan bharko bandhan ho… niskina nai nasakine…. (This paper-making work is like a life-
long bondage…difficult to escape from….).”   
It is impossible to know whether Kumar dai was particularly referring to his 
experience of suffering in Nepal, or he was making a general commentary about 
‘suffering Nepalis’ in the US, with which I was becoming increasingly familiar.  The 
word “our” is used here precisely to communicate this ambivalence.  What is clear is 
that Kumar dai, like Mina didi and many other former and current Nepali claimants I 
worked with, is articulating the “truth that everyone knows already.”  The total 
amount of suffering and anxiety caused by seeking asylum is only related to me after 
being granted asylum.  Given that he received a favorable decision, his asylum 
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narration does not matter anymore.  But Kumar dai seemed particularly disappointed 
with the merit hearing—the judge was not interested in his asylum narration which he 
had learned, memorized, and worked hard for over a year.  It was, like he said, “not 
less difficult than sitting for the SLC examination.”  Even for those who recently 
obtained asylum like him, the actual asylum-seeking process leave them with a feeling 
of void to cope with or remind them of more paperwork to be done in the future.   
Both Mina didi and Kumar dai above reflected on their experiences of seeking 
asylum for/as making paper always in relation to work, albeit in different ways.  They 
both spoke of constant anxiety and fear of uncertainty as the very condition to working 
hard for paper when they recounted their everyday practice and performance in 
narrating their asylum stories.  Narrating asylum story in itself was hard work that they 
both encountered.  For Mina didi, the process of learning different asylum stories and 
multiple ways of recalling and retelling the experience of persecution encompassed 
hard work.  On the other hand, Kumar dai’s frustration resulted from not being asked 
questions related to his asylum claims and persecution that he had worked hard and 
memorized over the period of two years.  For both, hard work entailed learning about 
the asylum process—what and how to narrate an asylum story—from learning the 
language of asylum to memorizing minute details of ‘past persecution’ to practicing 
and ultimately performing oral delivery of their story with precision and coherence.  
Still there is no way of knowing if and when this hard work will actually pay off.  For 
both Mina didi and Kumar dai, their hard work to make paper did pay off in terms of 
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legalizing their status but it did not necessarily end their anxiety about both—making 
paper and working hard.  According to Kumar dai, the end of making paper is only a 
beginning of being trapped in the endless cycle of making papers, as he said once in a 
passing, “Ke farak parthyo ra jasto lagcha kahile kahin. Yetikai baseko bhaye pani.  Yehi kaam 
garinthyo  (I sometimes wonder what difference would it have made had I chosen to 
remain undocumented.  I would have lived just like this.  I would be doing the same 
work).” Mina didi, too, continue to grapple with the real purpose of all the hard work, 
time, and money she invested in making paper that ultimately did change very little in 
terms of employment opportunity or socio-economic mobility.   
Social life of suffering claims and claimants within and beyond the legal realm 
of seeking asylum becomes the very site of necessary labor.  The separation between 
‘working to make paper’ and ‘making paper to work’ completely disappears.  The 
activities of the everyday outside of making paper or legalizing one’s status are not just 
about conditions to living in the US and supporting families in Nepal; everyday work 
itself becomes increasingly about learning and performing innovatively that will have 
direct and useful consequences on their life as asylum seekers and suffering workers.  
This is not simply category confusion.  It is the condition of late modernity and late 
liberalism, in which one learns to productively deploy identities that are not only 
contingent but also frequently contradictory and absurd.   
In my material, this kind of asylum narration that interchangeably slipped 
between one’s story about his/her ‘past persecution’ and articulation about making 
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paper as hard work is not uncommon.  Indeed, the narrative switch is so smooth and 
seamless that it is often the distinction between the two that seems somewhat forced 
and unnatural rather than the other way around.  Take Maya’s outburst during a train 
ride after we had completed one of the numerous asylum interpretation sessions: 
When is this going to end? How many more people do I need to talk to before 
they finally believe me?  It has been more than two years since I have been 
telling my asylum story…to asylum officers, interpreters, human rights lawyers, 
psychiatrists, and now these lawyers [pro bono lawyers representing Maya].  All 
I talk to people, my family, friends, and neighbors is about my case [asylum].  I 
had to quit my baby-sitting job because I needed to come prepared to lawyers 
to tell my story at least twice a week during the first few months of asylum 
interviews.  You know it.  I never told you but that boss fired me last year.  I 
was upset with her but I now understand her problem.  Who will want to hire a 
nanny who needs days off on short notice?  Of course, people see you as 
unreliable.  Now I work for another family and I have already asked for so 
many days off.  My current employer is nice but this time I did not mention 
anything about my case.  But it is only a matter of time.  I am waiting for her to 
say something to me.  It is difficult to do your job well, especially looking after 
small children, when your mind is somewhere else and all you are thinking 
about is your case.  I cannot concentrate on anything.  I don’t even feel like 
calling my parents and kids in boarding school in Kathmandu.  Before I 
worried about not having a job and now I am complaining about this work.  I 
am tired. 
 
[…] 
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My life story has become a piece of amusement for people.  I have become an 
amusement for everyone...for my own relatives and lawyers…and perhaps to 
you too.   
 
Before I could say anything, she added with what seemed like a forced and an 
awkward laugher, “I am an amusement even to myself these days.”  
When asked if her current employer knew about her ongoing asylum case, she 
looked at me with a mixture of shock and disbelief.  She said, “Are you crazy?  If the 
employer knew about my case I would not have had this job.”  Maya explained how 
her frequent visit to doctors and lawyers is better kept a secret from her employer.  
“She will not want me to take care of her child anymore.  She will think I’m crazy if I 
say I’m seeing a psychiatrist.  And if she finds out that I’m making paper through 
asylum she will definitely fire me.  You know both my employer and her husband are 
lawyers.  Kasto dubidha ma chu bhane.  Aba tapain nai bhannus la, kaam garne ki yo kaagaz 
banaane kaam garne? (I am trapped in such a dilemma.  Now you tell me, should I work 
or do this work of making paper?)” 
 In Maya’s narrative, she casts herself as a hard-working individual who is 
disgruntled about not being able to concentrate on her job and perform it well 
because of the ‘work of making paper’ she needs to focus on.  Recall Kumar dai’s 
similar avowal of having to ‘forget everyone and everything’ to make paper, and, in 
particular, his analogy of working to make papers with preparing for an exam with 
uncertainty of passing.  While Kumar dai and Mina didi’s narratives of their asylum 
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experiences highlight their continued anxiety and suffering post-paper making work, 
Maya’s frustration and anxiety arise out of her declared inability to focus on her paid-
work as a nanny.  In discussing her job and the work of making paper, she collapses 
the two into one and reasons how focusing on one is taking her time and keeping her 
from performing well on the other.  At the same time, her declaration of being ‘tired’ 
should be contextualized beyond the realm of physical or mental exhaustion.  For she 
self-reflexively draws on her current dilemma as that of being ‘an amusement’ to 
people—to whom she has been narrating her asylum story—and to herself.  To be 
not able to concentrate on work and, instead, be invested in the work of making paper 
is then akin to be not taken seriously.  It is then a matter of practical concern that is 
not simply preventing her from be(com)ing a good worker but also creating anxiety 
about how she may be perceived as an amusement.  Toward these ends, her question 
to me—‘Now you tell me, should I work or do this work of making paper’—is also a 
form of self-affirmation, used in this particular context, as a justification to herself and 
to me, her interpreter and interlocutor, about the actual hard work she has been 
engaged in for over 2 years.  
 
Hard-work of waiting indefinitely 
 
Hard work of making paper can extend anywhere from before, during, and after 
making paper.  If Maya’s account is primarily about the work she is currently doing 
for paper, Mina didi and Kumar dai’s reflections illuminate the work they had done 
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before and during the entire process of making paper.  There exist another type of 
work, which is done for all practical purposes to make paper, but it has not been paid 
off.  This is the period of waiting indefinitely to actual obtain paper.   This example can 
also be found in Kesang’s narrative, where he begins with an asylum hearing gone 
awry: 
Nothing went right that time.  I could not even remember my apartment 
address in Queens and my telephone number.  I almost forgot my English date 
of birth that I had memorized for 3 years.  I kept repeating my address in 
Mustang and in Kathmandu.  I even gave my Nepali year of birth.  When I said 
31 March 2033, my lawyers looked at me with confusion.  Still I had no idea 
what I had done wrong.  I just could not remember right answers.  I had 
worked one of the longest shifts at the grocery store the night before and had 3 
hours of sleep the night before.  I could not pay attention to what was being 
asked in the court.  The court interpreter felt bad for me too, I think.  So many 
people helped me make papers in Kathmandu to come here.   
 
Kesang’s story is about anxiety experienced during and after the asylum merit 
hearing—to make paper—because his case did not result in immediate granting of 
asylum like Kumar dai.  While Kesang’s case is similar to Mina didi’s experience of a 
first asylum interview gone wrong, his was merit hearing in the Immigration Court, 
which means that if he does not receive a favorable decision on his case he will not be 
summoned for another hearing.  Depending on his legal representatives, he can 
appeal his case to the Board of Immigration Appeal (BIA) and wait several months 
before the BIA either approves or denies his appeal.  If the appeal is denied, chances 
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are Kesang will be deported.  If the appeal is approved, one of the three things can 
happen, according to his lawyers: 1) the BIA can overturn the judge’s verdict, which is 
extremely unlikely; or 2) the BIA finds fault with judge’s assessment of the evidence 
presented on the case and appoint a different judge to reschedule another merit 
hearing, which is somewhat likely; or 3) the BIA appoints the judge to schedule 
another hearing but will not be allowed to ask questions outside his/her judicial 
expertise, which primarily includes the critical evaluation of medical experts’ report in 
Kesang’s case. 
Kesang was waiting to hear from his lawyers on the appeal that had been 
submitted.  One day, I met him after his morning shift of delivering bakery from 
Brooklyn to Upper East Side, Manhattan and talked about the appeal.  Unlike the last 
time we met in the law firm to interpret and discuss the important date and details 
about his upcoming appeal, there was no date approaching for Kesang.  However, he 
was more nervous about the absence of a specific date to learn.  He talked about the 
date in question, and how he would feel much better had he known when to expect 
the news.  After a while, the absence of a particular date and his everyday waiting itself 
framed our entire conversation without ever explicitly talking about it.  A bit 
awkwardly, I tried to initiate the conversation in the direction of the asylum appeal 
process: 
TS: As the lawyers said last month…there is still a chance that the BIA could 
overturn the judge’s verdict…and if they do not, the judge will not be allowed 
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to ask questions that is outside his expertise…like your medical reports or 
questions about the first asylum decision… 
 
Kesang: Before I only had one problem: I was worried that I did not have 
paper.  I thought I would not be able to give a better future to my daughter, 
you know.  But now I can neither tell my family that I am coming back home 
nor explain why it is taking so long to make paper to bring them here.  I am 
stuck in the middle.  I work more hours now than I did before because I do 
not know when I will have to stop working and will not be able to send money 
home…well, it is also because I cannot sleep peacefully.  Every minute that I 
am not working, I am worrying about my paper and talking about it 
everyone…see what I mean.  Today is my day off and here we are…talking 
about my asylum.  This papermaking work is so much harder than what I do 
everyday.  At my work, I do not have to think or worry.  I just do it.  I have a 
work schedule and I know when to get there and what time I will get off.  Not 
like making paper.  I don’t know what have I really gained from all this?  The 
funny thing is I am still unsure if I can provide a better life for my family with 
or without paper. 
 
TS: So going through the asylum process does not really make a difference? 
 
Kesang: It does.  It makes you more anxious and your worries multiply.  Like I 
said, not having paper is only one problem…going through the asylum process, 
working hard to make paper, and living everyday with the anxiety of not knowing 
whether and when you will actually have paper in hand is a source of multiple 
problems.  
 
TS: multiple problems like what?  
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Kesang:  Well, I cannot promise my family that I can bring them here.  But at 
the same time I cannot explain in a way they understand what I am going 
through here.  They do not know my worries.  Until I have paper I cannot go to 
Nepal and see my family.  Sometimes I try not to worry too much and just 
think to myself that life is uncertain so as long as I am alive I will work here 
and send money home to my family.  If they [the US state] do not give me 
paper and I am sent back, maybe that will be a blessing…it will be an end of all 
this hassle.  But when I try not to worry or care so much, I think of my family 
and feel sad for them…for us.   My family in Nepal and I have suffered so 
much to send me here to work and make paper. After living here and working 
everyday like a donkey for almost 7 years what will I do if I go back?  Still this 
waiting for paper makes you feel miserable one minute, happy next 
minute….nervous one day and fearless the day after…it is like you are on a 
swing moving forward and backward, flying high and falling low constantly.  
Then you start wondering if your life will be drastically different even if you 
have paper.  This business of making paper has taught me a lot about life in 
America and suffering.   
 
Kesang and I had discussed his asylum claims—from the very beginning we met at 
the human rights agency, where I interpreted for him, and then periodically afterward 
in the private law firm for numerous interviews, documentation, and interpretation of 
his account of political persecution in Nepal to intense prep-sessions before his merit 
hearing at the Immigration Court.  This was the first time he admitted to me that 
making paper was hard work, and to make things even worse, he increasingly became 
doubtful of having a better life for himself and his family despite being close to 
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obtaining paper.  Technically, I had stopped interpreting for him and his lawyers once 
his merit hearing in the Immigration Court ended in unfavorable decision several 
weeks ago.  Never before did he share either his skepticism about the outcome of his 
asylum decision or his grievance of having worked hard throughout the process.  
Kesang clearly felt that he did not have much control over the direction of his life 
while making paper.  He did not want to burden his family with his uncertain status or 
explain to others in his social network.  His solution to the problem was to work 
more hours to escape from the mental work he was putting into making paper, which 
now hangs in a limbo.  
Similar explanation was given by many asylum seekers.  Take, for instance, how 
Pema related Sarita’s case to me during one of our interviews: 
Pema:  You see Sarita here has suffered a lot.  She has not been back home for 
almost 10 years.  She has not seen her husband or kids all this time.  Her boss 
promised to make paper for her for last six years but she never did.  Then after 
her cousin came to the US, he made asylum paper and promised to help her 
make paper.  She worked with the lawyer for two years and took another 
housekeeping job on weekends on top of her full-time nanny job to pay his 
relative and the lawyer.  That is okay, we all have to suffer to get something.  
But you know what happened?  They tried to help but all her money is gone 
now and she did not get paper.  After two years, the lawyer just told her that 
she was already here for 7 years and her case was not like her cousin’s.  Why 
promise her for two years, no?  So I am telling her to go to the lawyers in 
human rights who helped me make my paper.  She does not want to do it. 
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TS:  You do not want to make paper anymore? [I asked Sarita] 
 
Sarita: You see, Tina bahini, Pema is telling me that I have to quit my part-time 
job to make paper.  But what if I do not get paper after working hard like last 
time?  If I quit my house-keeping job to work for paper and have to wait like 
last time?  I am tired.  I keep making promises to my children in Nepal that I 
will see them soon.  I left them when they were 5 and 7 years old, now they are 
15 and 17… sometimes I think maybe this is my luck but other times I do want 
to do something about it…for my children. 
 
Pema: That is why I am telling you to make paper again [addressing to Sarita].  
You have nothing to lose if she do not get it [asylum] but if you do then your 
kids can come here. 
 
Sarita: I am no longer worried about not making paper but waiting without 
knowing.  At least now I am making money and sending it to my family.  My 
kids are both in good school in Kathmandu.  I have heard that many people 
who tried making paper that way [through human rights agencies] are called in 
front of the judge.  And if you do not speak good English in front of the judge 
you are either sent back to Nepal, or worse, wait in this country forever.  You 
cannot live here and work peacefully because you do not know when you will 
be required to leave.  
 
Pema:  But you are waiting here without having paper, without any hope.  
Better wait and hope that you will make paper.  And for that you need to take 
risk, is it not true Tina bahini?  
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TS:  I don’t know.  What will you do Sarita? [I did not think I had any answer 
to Pema’s question, so I tried re-directing our conversation to Sarita’s 
dilemma]. 
 
Sarita:  I don’t know what to do either.  I just know that I do not want to wait 
and suffer for another 10 years.     
 
Pema casts Sarita as someone whose life in America has been about waiting and 
suffering to make paper.  While Pema is optimistic about making paper and 
encouraging Sarita to consider trying it again, Sarita seems more ambivalent.  Sarita’s 
ambivalence arises not simply out of fear of remaining paper-less but it also has to do 
with waiting indefinitely and not knowing whether one will or not have make paper.  
What makes hard work associated with making paper unbearable for many then is the 
uncertainty of the wait itself.  Waiting becomes a peculiar zone of isolation—a source 
of constant fear and anxiety on its own for potential and current asylum claimants.  
Kesang’s and Sarita’s stories is responding to the implicit the question:  how long 
should and could one wait in a limbo even after going through the asylum process?  
If, for Kesang, waiting is the only available option given that he is already deeply 
enmeshed in the asylum process, Sarita, on the other hand, is contemplating whether 
getting involved in the asylum process that would lead to indefinite waiting and 
suffering worth the hard work.  Ironically, both Kesang’s and Sarita’s narrations of 
their dilemmas and hard-work associated with waiting are co-articulated with their job 
situations.  Kesang took up the second job to not have to constantly worry about the 
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source of his anxiety—the indefinite wait to hear from his lawyers regarding his 
appeal, and ultimately to make paper.  Sarita, drawing on her 10 years of experience 
waiting in America, is unsure if quitting her second job to begin working on her 
paper, waiting indefinitely once again, and suffering for another 10 years with the 
same uncertainty worth the risk. 
Reconstruc t ing the  “hard-working asy lum seeker” 
 
When Kesang narratively switched from speaking about his merit hearing, 
denied by the Immigration judge, to the actual waiting for the BIA decision on his 
appeal, it may appear like a ‘normal’ case of asylum claimants’ technique of making 
sense of their uncertain legal status or ‘legal limbo’ (Cabot 2012) and as an expression 
of their need to respond to the moral dilemma they are under qua ‘asylum seekers’ or 
reconstruct themselves as suffering and traumatic subjects in the context of seeking 
asylum.  Without denying that strategies of narrating suffering have an important part 
to play in the lives of asylum claimants awaiting upon processing their claims, court 
hearing dates, and ultimate decision on their claims, I argue here that they might at 
least also be seen in another perspective, as a much needed critique of the asylum 
process and the system that requires, even depends, on the hard work of claimants’ 
grievances and everyday suffering.  To go through asylum process and become a 
claimant is to be placed in an ambivalent social position (Coutin 2003; Ticktin 2011) 
that goes beyond the realm of legal insecurity.  As detailed above, this experience of 
going through asylum has many dimensions and effects people on different levels.   
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Put differently, suffering is a question of context with drastically different 
interpretations, socio-cultural explanations, and legal rationale.  The suffering-work 
described in this chapter is analytically seen as created in and intimately tied to the 
particular context, namely Nepali asylum claimants navigating the US immigration 
system in New York City.  Being claimant-made, they are narratives of suffering 
and/as hard work associated with making paper that make sense in the asylum seeking 
context as interpreted and made meaningful for and by Nepali claimants.  Also 
Nepalis become asylum seekers through their active participation and internal critique 
of the process.  They can therefore be used to say something about not simply the 
asylum context or the explanation of certain socio-cultural behaviors, experiences, 
habits that Nepali asylum seekers must cultivate.  The narratives are not asylum 
specific, however, in the sense of being completely unique to individual asylum claims 
or legal procedure.  The kind of stories charted here and described above can also be 
found outside the legal framework.  While they are shaped by claimants and by being 
spoken in relation to asylum experiences or making paper through asylum, but they 
reflect an ever-changing sociality among people and rationalizing and making 
unfamiliar social practices comprehensible, even somewhat meaningful, through the 
lens of familiar socio-cultural categories.  
What is important here is not just that Nepali claimants, in relating their 
experiences with the asylum processes, commonly express their fear, frustration, 
anxiety and waiting associated with making paper as hard work.  Even more disturbing is 
	  104	  
that the different modes of work should become qualitatively similar for former, 
current, and potential asylum seekers.  In other words, the structural logic at work in 
the asylum legal context of the US is increasingly one of making claimants’ asylum 
stories available through whatever legal labor is required of them: recalling and 
narrating specific events from the past, delivering them coherently within a focused 
and directed legal framework, memorizing them under circumscribed form, and 
ultimately performing them for the interested parties.  
The asylum narrations as well as narrative interpretations and analyses of 
asylum stories described above, in circulation among diverse Nepali migrant 
communities in New York City, are stories of people who make paper with no 
conception of how (and if) that work will ever be compensated.  They have no 
resources to evaluate or to calculate, in advance, the worth of their hard work, not 
because they do not already have a clear idea of what ought to count as a fair return.  
Quite the contrary; it is ultimately obtaining legal residency that should be the reward of 
all the hard work associated with making paper.  The problem then lies in the extraction 
of their labor without making it seem as one.  It is only upon going through everyday, 
tedious experience of working for paper, as explained painstakingly by every 
interlocutor, that the invisible forces of legal labor become apparent for many 
claimants.  As a result, the actual material or non-material return is greatly 
disproportionate to the initial investment into and expectations from the work of 
making paper.   The work-like characteristics are completely eclipsed precisely because 
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it is not exactly ‘work’ in the sense of ‘normal’ employment or enumeration.  Its legal 
work only becomes evident upon claimants’ complete immersion and investment into 
it.  Further, articulating disappointments from such a work become difficult, though 
not impossible, questioning the distinction not so much between compensated and 
non-compensated work.  Rather, it is the combination of the old distinction between 
compensated and non-compensated work and the intricate relationship between 
everyday life and the economy of emotional work, or what Rachel Parrenas and 
Eileen Boris (2010) have accurately called “intimate labors.”  This has resulted into 
vague distinction, if not complete indistinction, between life and non-compensated 
work. 
There exists two important outcomes of rethinking asylum narrations, and, in 
particular, suffering narratives recounted by Nepali claimants seeking asylum in terms 
of work and production, outweighing a somewhat long-drawn-out theoretical claim.  
First, this framing allows us to rethink of suffering within but also beyond the realm 
of subjective and social, more specifically beyond the binary constructions of a victim 
or an agent.  This is not the driving force among Nepali claimants seeking for and 
processing their asylum paperwork.  Those claimants with whom I worked, for whom 
I interpreted, and others I came across through the community-based, Nepali 
grassroots organization, show remarkably little interest in setting the record right by 
reflecting on the suffering that was particularly the subject of their asylum claims.  If 
anything they are conscious of having to draw on and elaborate on their conditions of 
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socio-economic suffering through “paper-making” work and largely ambivalent of the 
consequences that could have in their actual legal status in the US.  The seemingly 
immaterial work of making paper was constantly interrupted by their constant 
preoccupation with material needs and attention to their paid-work and labor. 
The second consequence of thinking of suffering narrative as a certain type of 
work is that it allows us to begin investigating the utter dependence of suffering on 
relations, subjective and political.  Unlike the common associations of the suffering 
narratives with subjectivity and self-making, or the association of suffering as building 
block of social relations that creates intimacy and simultaneously external boundaries, 
understanding suffering as a concrete mode of work in itself allows us to reevaluate 
the performance of suffering to make papers and its increasing demand in the asylum 
industry.  And just how this performance of suffering materializes within the context 
of seeking asylum—legal narration, interpretation, and documentary practice—is what 
I explore in the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Mis-interpreting victimhood and asylum suffering narration  
 
An Opening Scene :  Asylum tes t imonial  and the l i f e  o f  “ irre l evant” deta i l s  
 
Tshering sits on (judge’s) left end of a raised platform, behind a long wooden table and turned 
at an angle so the audience (interpreters like myself and expert witnesses) can see him.  Seated 
to his left are the court-appointed interpreter and pro bono lawyers representing him.  They 
each have a microphone attached to the table.  He has known about his merit hearing date for 
at least 8 months if not over a year.  His lawyers, through an interpreter, told him the 
absolute importance of this day.   He was made aware that asylum interpretation meetings 
over the past two years and the intense prep-sessions that followed would all culminate in 
establishing his credibility based on asylum documentation submitted to the court—
evidence—and his oral testimony in the court today.  He was repeatedly told consistency and 
coherence in his asylum narration need to be reflected in his superior performance contributing, 
ironically, to judge’s imagination of his traumatic past. 
 
He travelled during the early hours of this morning from his apartment in Jackson Heights, 
Queens in an overcrowded 7 train and transferred to 6 train to attend this hearing and is 
dressed in his best—neither as a shrewd banker nor his regular self, as instructed by his 
lawyers.  While waiting outside the courtroom for his hearing time, he spoke to his lawyers 
who told him to expect the process to be delayed.  He was assured that the lawyers and his 
interpreter would all be there to help him through it and he simply needed to answer as best as 
he can just like the way he had done during the prep-sessions. 
  
Seated across from him at the opposite end of the platform (and turned halfway towards the 
audience) is the public prosecutor representing the U.S. state.  Like the man testifying, the 
court interpreter and the pro bono lawyers, the prosecutor is also seated behind a microphone.  
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Rising between these two tables, at the front wall of the platform, is the judge’s table on a 
raised stage.  The setting is similar to those we see on TV shows like Judge Judy or Law & 
Order. Yes, really.  Depending on the particular subject matter being pursued the performance 
can just as easily turn into Judge Judy’s show, where the judge can simply interrupt anytime 
and reprimand the speaker for not listening closely or following instructions, as it can quickly 
create a tense environment through cross-examination like the ones shown on Law & Order, 
transforming the asylum hearing into a criminal court hearing.  It is precisely this seamless 
ability to transform from one type of hearing into another at a moment’s notice that the 
asylum hearing process takes up something of a theatrical performance and the participants 
enacting various roles thrust upon them accordingly. 
 
One of the pro bono lawyers turns to the claimant and proceeds with background questions.  
Where was he born and grew up in Nepal?  What did he do for living and support his family 
in Nepal?  How would be describe his life in Nepal before the Maoists waged people’s war 
against the Nepali state?  Having been thoroughly prepared for several hours a week or two 
in the law firm, going over these questions and answers during witness preparation, the 
claimant responds with confidence.  He has been instructed not to divert from the subject 
matter and answer questions directly and succinctly.  The pro bono lawyers had repeatedly 
emphasized during witness preparation that he was to appear confident but “natural” and 
that his responses should not look “too rehearsed” despite having rehearsed during the prep-
session the last two weeks.   
 
When asked about his family the claimant is not to discuss his father’s occupation or siblings’ 
lives but only his immediate family in Nepal—wife and two children—regardless of the fact 
that he continues to send money home and financially supports them.  Similarly, when asked 
to describe his life before the Maoists conflict in Nepal, he starts out giving general atmosphere 
in his neighborhood, community, town, elaborating on his specific personal experiences and 
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political activism.  He worked as a religious teacher and a monastic painter in a small village 
in Solukhumbu and everyone knew of his family’s reverence of the Royal families and later 
his political affiliation to the Nepali Congress Party after the successful institution of multi-
party democracy in Nepal in 1994.  He had been instructed by his lawyers to reveal only 
those activities of his political past, which, according to the lawyers, were relevant to the specific 
events leading up to the Maoist attack. 
 
The direct examination, however, takes longer than regular inquiry mainly because of the 
presence of the four-way mediation:  The counselor asks the question, the interpreter translates 
from English into Nepali, the claimant responds in Nepali, and the interpreter translates 
back into English to the judge.  After about half-an-hour of the direct examination, the judge 
grows impatient.  He interrupts and says that he can read all this background information, 
explained in detail in the witness affidavit.  The judge tells the counselor if he can simply 
jump to the part why his claimant is seeking asylum in the US so not to waste court’s time.  
The lawyer sifts through his file and his co-counselor assists him.  As per judge’s instruction, 
the lawyer shifts to the topic of his client’s asylum claims: experience of past persecution, 
repeated death threats from the Maoists that culminated into a life-threatening physical attack 
from which he narrowly escaped.  
 
The lawyer starts asking open-ended questions, jumping 10 years later into his client’s past—
the claimant’s initial encounter with the Maoists in 2004.  Could he describe what happened 
to him the fateful night of December 2004 when he was home with his family?  He closes his 
eyes and nods his head.  There is a complete silence except for the court clerk, seated to the 
judge’s right, typing away on her laptop.  The audience waits.  The claimant starts telling his 
story of the violent encounter with the Maoists, who, after forcefully entering his house, hit him 
in his legs and head, and dragged him outside his house at a gunpoint.  They abducted him 
and made him walk 2 hours through the back-alley of his neighborhood and on a 
	  110	  
mountainous road, finally arriving at a desolate area in a forest.  He could only see a small 
teahouse from afar.  For the next twenty minutes he narrates the physical violence in a 
chronological order that it happened: the Maoists brought him to the forest, kept hitting him 
and kicking him, then they asked him to include the Maoists material in his artwork and 
when he refused they stomped him on his leg and hit him with a gun in the back of his head 
that made him lose consciousness for two hours.  The Maoists left him with a warning that 
they would kill him if he did not agree to incorporate their materials.  He spends another ten 
minutes speaking of the leg and the head injury he sustains as a result of the particular 
attack.  
 
He finishes the story and the judge asks the federal prosecutor to begin cross-examination.  
The prosecutor is not interested in his traumatic story as much as concerned with finding 
discrepancies in the oral account.  He begins by asking the client if he could see a teahouse 
from where the Maoists allegedly took him then the area was not completely desolate?  If he 
could see the teahouse then that meant people in that teahouse could have also seen him being 
attacked.  Why did he not shout for help?  Why did he say that there was nobody around 
that could have seen him or rescued him? 
 
The pro bono lawyer objects the public prosecutor’s method of cross-examination that 
progressively becomes aggressive toward his client.  He interjects that his claimant already 
mentioned the teahouse was only visible from “afar.”  The judge, who had seemed somewhat 
disengaged, leans forward and overrules the objection and allows the prosecutor to proceed.  
The prosecutor, on the other hand, continues finding problem with the order in which the 
claimant recounted the physical attack by the Maoists.  He asks the client whether the 
Maoists physically attacked him before or after he refused to follow and include the Maoist’s 
teaching material in his school.  The claimant hesitates but confirms that it was, indeed, after 
he refused to obey them that the Maoists started hitting him.  The prosecutor turn to his notes 
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in front of him and points out that there is no mention of struggle or physical attack until 
after the claimant was asked to include the Maoists’ teachings according to the witness 
affidavit but he hesitated in his oral testimony.  Another forty minutes or more is spent in the 
cross- examination. 
 
The prosecutor rests his case and before the pro bono lawyers can continue and redirect those 
questions the judge interrupts.  He sifts through the documents in front of him and directs his 
questions to the claimant’s lawyer.  How, the judge asks, the claimant’s appeal for asylum 
was any different now from two years ago when he had been denied asylum at the USCIS? 
 
By this time the judge expresses his annoyance and becomes distracted for he keeps looking at 
the time.  He announces that this has taken half-a-day that was unplanned and he has to 
attend to two other hearings, one of which was supposed to have taken place an hour ago.  He 
calls counselors from both parties to approach his desk and asks them if they could reach a 
settlement.  The prosecutor refuses to settle the case with the granting of the “withholding of 
removal” status and not necessarily asylum.16  The judge reschedules the rest of the hearing for 
another date and time.   
 
The pro bono lawyers appear somewhat flustered and exhausted.  The claimant, however, 
seems calm with utter disbelief and confusion about what had just happened.  How, after two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The requirement for Withholding of Removal is higher than the requirement for 
asylum. Withholding also requires “a well-founded fear of persecution” on the five 
grounds that asylum covers, but whereas asylum requires that one demonstrates the possibility of 
further persecution, Withholding requires the probability not certainty of further persecution, which is 
more difficult to establish.  However, Withholding of Removal status does not have one-year 
deadline, nor does certain ‘serious crimes’ make claimant ineligible for the status.  Such crimes, 
however, render claimants ineligible for asylum status. Those granted with the “withholding of 
removal” status can remain in the U.S. and work legally but unlike asylees, they cannot apply for 
legal permanent residency or green card.  More importantly, people with the withholding status have 
deportation order against them—they will not be permitted to return to the U.S. if they leave the 
country. 
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years of (re)narrating the same story over and over again during asylum interview meetings 
and in particular 2 weeks long prep-sessions in the firm, the only “fact” that got the federal 
prosecutor and the judge excited was the description of a teahouse and theatrical scenario that 
ensued.  Could he see the teahouse from where he was taken by the Maoists?  Could he not 
see people there and shouted for help? Surely someone in the teahouse would have come to his 
rescue.  The seemingly irrelevant fact about “teahouse” had nonetheless become a turning point 
in his asylum hearing—somehow it had managed to become larger than his traumatic story.  
Or rather, the teahouse was the most crucial string to which his asylum decision hung. 
****************** 
 
I begin here near the end of a Nepali asylum case that is still unfolding in the 
Immigration Court as a way to introduce several steps involved in the asylum seeking 
process for claimants of political violence in the United States.  In this chapter, I 
follow one Nepali asylum claimant—Tshering—through the processes of asylum 
narration, interpretation, and documentation: initial asylum interview at the human 
rights organization where he filed asylum claims; asylum documentation, including I-
589 form and affidavit at the private law firm; and witness testimony or merit hearing 
at the Immigration Courtroom in front of the asylum judge.  As anthropologist Joao 
Biehl points out, “Following the plot of a single person can help one to identify the 
many networks and relations…in which regimes of normalcy and ways of being are 
fashioned and, thus, to capture both the densities and the rawness of uniqueness” 
(2004: 478).  In following this line of style in ethnographic writing, I approach asylum 
narration, interpretation, and legal documentation of an individual’s story as a 
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collective reflection, and not necessarily the unique expression, of experiences that are 
inscribed in, produced within, and productive of a larger asylum context in the U.S. 
Toward these ends, I am not interested in highlighting if and how claimants’ 
accounts of past persecution and violent events match “what they say happened” with 
“what really happened,” nor is it to represent the ‘truth’ about Nepali asylum seekers.  
Rather, it is to highlight the victim-subject position that Nepali claimants, like 
Tshering, once marked as “asylum seeker” within the U.S. state, must occupy and the 
asylum stories they produce to reconstitute themselves in a particular socio-cultural 
and legal settings (private law firms, humanitarian agencies, immigration courts and 
asylum offices).  Judging the ‘authenticity’ of claimants’ account and subsequently, 
distinguishing ‘real’ victims of political violence from allegedly ‘fake’ ones is then 
irrelevant.  The emphasis is on understanding the logic and the dynamics of 
privileging a specific type of “victim narrative” generated within the asylum context 
that has broader socio-political consequences in contemporary US.  The individual 
case I follow is part of a larger research on asylum narration, interpretation, and 
documentation experiences of Nepali claimants and/as migrants: the production of 
depoliticized victim-subject is not an unintended consequence of but the very 
foundation to legal recognition as asylum seekers and the broader politics of 
citizenship in the US, where manageable non-citizens and deportable workers emerge. 
************************** 
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The non-profit, domestic organization of Human Rights First in New York 
City, through their “Refugee Protection Program,” offers assistance to asylum seekers, 
like Tshering, to attain legal status in the United States.  The program started in 197817 
to protect “the rights of refugees, including the right to seek asylum.”18  It primarily 
supported cases of torture survivors, providing pro bono legal representation—from 
initial writing of affidavits to asylum proceedings and courtroom hearings.  Since the 
political events following September 11, 2001, the program has seen significant increase 
in the number of asylum applications.  As a result, the organization has expanded and 
branched out into various subsidiary programs, including the “Asylum Legal 
Representation Program.”  The organization now works closely with some of the 
most prestigious private law firms in the city offering pro bono legal representation 
and language interpretation to asylum claimants.  I spoke with Cynthia,19 a human 
rights lawyer, who has been overseeing the program for almost a decade.  Cynthia 
explained that she had spent a number of years screening and interviewing potential 
asylum claimants before admitting them to the program and locating pro bono legal 
representation.  She also said that most cases that came through the organization were 
not voluntary but that she regularly visited detention centers in Manhattan and New 
Jersey to identify potential asylum claimants, who were detained and/or under 
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  Two years before the United States adopted the Refugee Act of 1980 codified by the U.N. Refugee 
Protocol’s definition of the refugee, including provisions for asylum (Chapter 1).	  18	  Human Rights First: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org	  19	  This is a pseudonym 
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deportation proceedings.  She said years of evaluating individuals as potential asylum 
claimants had allowed her to combine her legal expertise and interests in human rights 
law, in particular.  
Cynthia has worked on hundreds of asylum claimants and the agency has 99% 
success rate in winning asylum claims.  When asked what factors contributed or 
determined success rates of the asylum cases under her supervision, she mentioned 
the importance of providing detailed, vivid, and descriptive images of violent 
incidents from the past that ultimately facilitated in the writing of a moving affidavit.  
“Two things matter most once the case is in front of the judge: one is luck—some 
judges are compassionate and known to grant asylum and others are not—and the 
other is claimant credibility—it is okay to forget specific date and details due to stress 
or pressure in front of the judge but one should not provide conflicting information,” 
Cynthia quickly added.  Claimant’s own words, she elaborated, established his/her 
credibility:   
The story has to be told in claimant’s own words in whatever language they 
speak.  You see, I can write their stories but the words and the voices have to 
be theirs [claimants’].  Everyone knows that asylum seekers won’t be using big 
words or adjectives…they do not speak English.  Their native language and 
authentic voice will be very different from legal terminology or phrases and 
sentences we write.  And it is not always easy for asylum clients to discuss their 
violent past with strangers.  But we have to obtain detailed descriptions before 
we can make the story coherent and put it all together in the affidavit. 
 [….] 
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Crafting an “authentic” asylum story, according to Cynthia, depended on 
making claimants’ words visible and voices audible in the affidavit.  Having attended a 
workshop on “Asylum Law” and several follow-up conversations with human rights 
and legal experts, I know that she, like other human rights and immigration lawyers, is 
trained to look for signs of sheer vulnerability of potential claimants, delineated by 
messy and inconsistent stories of past persecution, and to consider “culturally-specific” 
and untranslatable elements in their accounts.  She looks for incoherence and 
hesitancy in their asylum stories, fragmented thoughts and disjointed words, trembling 
voices, disconnection--signs of fear and anxiety.  The training sessions also educate pro 
bono lawyers, human rights experts and caseworkers to be receptive to other’s 
suffering—to assess victimhood as a site of authentication, one that, while it may not 
necessarily tell the whole truth, has nonetheless power to build trust between claimant 
and lawyer, ultimately resulting in the construction of asylum narrative and 
documentation to be filed with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS).  
 
******************* 
Protrac ted l ega l  uncer ta inty  
 
For a person seeking political asylum under the UN Convention Against 
Torture, the first step is locating lawyers, non-profit and human rights agencies to 
assist in the filing, documentation, and submission of asylum claims, including the 
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form I-589 Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal20 (I-589 form, hereafter) 
and affidavit, a 200-300-page witness statement, to the USCIS.  This legal 
documentation requires claimants to gather information easily verifiable evidence of 
specific incidents of past persecution and individualized account of political violence 
in the country from which the claimant is seeking asylum.  This information is then 
corroborated by country-condition experts, including anthropologists, policy makers, 
and professionals considered experts of political violence on the ground and familiar 
with socio-cultural realities in those countries (Good 2004; McGranahan 2012a and 
2012b).  Other steps for claimants involve being interrogated periodically by medical 
experts and psychiatrists, who can substantiate claimant’s poor physical, emotional, or 
mental health as a result of the said violence in the past.  These interviews result in the 
writing of the medical reports and testimonies (Good 2007, 2008; Fassin and 
d’Halluin 2005) that accompany claimant’s affidavit.  Legal experts and practitioners, 
human rights workers, interpreters, cultural experts all collaborate in the asylum 
process, often sharing important component of a claimant’s individualized account of 
past persecution that each is able to gather in an effort to contribute to the legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The I-589 form, available online, is endorsed jointly by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
under U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Justice, which is one 
of the first legal papers introduced to asylum claimants by lawyers. While all legal documents related to 
asylum claims are important, Form I-589 and client's affidavit, among other witness affidavits and expert 
reports, are perhaps most critical for the asylum case to be read closely and considered by the 
immigration judge.  In chapter four, I consider in some detail asylum documentation practice and 
interpretation sessions associated with filing of I-589 application form along with visual and interpretive 
aspects of certain pages.  I do so to illuminate the process—actual participation of lawyers and claimants--
through which the form I-589 transforms into “the document.”	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context of asylum claims and not necessarily understanding of the larger context of 
their current lives in the United States. 
Taking each component of the asylum seeking process as a different strategy 
for transforming individual claimants into “asylum seekers” and legal non-citizens, 
this chapter examines the intersection between practices of language and legal 
interpretation and liberal forms of citizenship.  Claimants must go through several 
institutional (and non-institutional) settings to be considered “credible” victims and 
their asylum claims legitimate.  By analyzing how the institutional language and legal 
understanding of “victims” of persecution frame asylum narrations, I unfold the 
respective assumptions about obtaining asylum in liberal democracies.  In 
contemporary U.S., the different practices of (protracted) citizen-subject making are 
inscribed in complex processes of interpretation, and that the figure of the “asylum 
seeker” has a purpose—what Wendy Brown (1995) has called an “injury-forming 
identity”—of revealing the contradictory, and often silenced, aspect of the very 
institution of citizenship.  
In her seminal work States of Injury, Brown has forcefully argued that the 
proliferation of citizenships and the political processes of identity making in liberal 
democracies is ultimately based on “social hurt” or “woundedness” of legal-subjects.  
For Brown, this liberal logic ultimately leaves intact and even reinforces the actual 
measures of victimization through which liberal states maintain their control.  She 
writes, 
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While the effort to replace liberalism’s abstract formulation of equality with 
legal recognition of injurious social stratifications is understandable, what such 
arguments do not query is whether legal ‘protection’ for a certain injury-
forming identity discursively entrenches the injury-identity connection it 
denounces.  Might such protection codify within the law the very 
powerlessness it aims to redress?  Might it discursively collude with the 
conversion of attribute into identity, of a historical effect of power into a 
presumed cause of victimization? (21).  
Brown’s critique primarily rests on the non-emancipatory framework of the rights-
based debate that is already “always historically and culturally circumscribed” 
operating on, what she sees as, “an ahistorical, acultural, acontextual idiom: they claim 
distance from specific political contexts and historical vicissitudes, and they 
necessarily participate in a discourse of enduring universality rather than provisionality 
or partiality” (97).  Brown’s otherwise incisive critique of liberal citizenship has 
generated most interesting debates for anthropologists.  Engaging with Brown’s 
incisive critique, for instance, anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1994) proposed 
“cultural citizenship” as “the right to be different” in terms of ethnicity, race, or native 
language with regards to the norm of the dominant national community.  Rosaldo’s 
proposition of “cultural citizenship” in turn generated interesting and intense debates 
among anthropologists [see Aihwa Ong’s (1996) piece and comments/responses from 
Virginia Dominquez, Jonathan Friedman, Glick-Schiller, Stolcke, Wu, and Ying).  
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Ong (2003) argued that the analytical category of “culture” remains “insufficiently 
problematized” and under-theorized in both sides of the debate on liberal forms of 
citizenship, whether conceptualized in terms of rights-based, political membership or 
socio-cultural belonging.   
This chapter, thus, has two theoretical strands.  I show that the process of 
seeking asylum-- narration and documentation—reveals similar contradiction based 
on the concept of victimhood and its intricate connection to the contemporary 
practices of US citizenship.  When it comes to claiming asylum on the basis of 
political violence, legal subjectivity is configured within the legal and social institutions 
that emphasize the condition of victimhood.  On the one hand, asylum narration and 
documentation of victimhood are not only critical for judicial procedures informing 
the work of asylum lawyers, officers, and judges, but they have increasingly become 
the core of il/legalization patterns and practices for “non-citizens” in the U.S.  In this 
sense, the citizen-making practice that I observed (and participated therein) emerging 
from the asylum context is highly contingent on legal production of what Christina 
Giordano (2008) has called a “victim narrative.”21  Legal recognition of political 
asylum claimants in the U.S. is granted on the condition that individuals provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  In the Italian context, Giordano has argued that seeking residency permit in Italy for female migrants 
involve recognition by the state as “victims of trafficking” through “the production of a victim narrative [the 
act of denuncia, filing criminal charges against their traffickers], and the commitment to being socialized in 
what is recognized as the ‘Italian way of being’ of the female citizen” (2008: 589)	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evidence for “past persecution” and “well-founded fear of future persecution.”22  This 
will begin legal paperwork for the asylum process.  
On the other hand, legal production of a “victim narrative” is not without 
intermittent interruption, misinterpretation, and constant renegotiation between 
claimant and his/her respective legal representative or human rights expert of what 
actually counts as persecution, violence, and suffering.  As a result, a different 
understanding of victimhood simultaneously emerges out of the actual encounters 
between claimants and lawyers during asylum interview, interpretation, and 
documentation processes.  Here, reactivating claimant’s own “cultural” (read: 
authentic) narration and understanding of “past persecution” and victimhood is 
emphasized, even desired.  Rather than converting a claimant into a universally 
acknowledged “victim of political violence,” it is about maintaining a fine balance 
between a universal victim-subject and culturally inscribed victim through his/her 
own voice and words. 
Reexamining Louis Althusser’s concept of interpellation (1974) and Judith 
Butler’s notion of subjectification (1997), Didier Fassin (2008) has proposed a vivid 
perspective on the contemporary, humanitarian logics governing refugees and asylum 
seekers within the context of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and more specifically on the 
dual process of “political subjectification.”  The questions he wants to address are the 
following: “What does it mean to bear witness to violence using the language of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  UNHCR (1992)	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trauma?...What is the significance of a politics of testimony that substitutes its own 
truth for the truth of those in whose name it is deployed?”  Fassin is interested in the 
intersection of compassion and politics, or “compassionate politics,” that drives the 
works of humanitarian agencies and organizations that collect, witness, and assess 
testimonies of violence.  He writes,  
What counts is not that the facts be stated, but that they be experienced.  It is 
not the event itself that constitutes the proof, but the trace it leaves in the 
psyche or the mark it makes in the telling.  In the testimony brought to the 
worlds consciousness, affect is present both as that which testifies (the 
suffering of the people) and that which is produced by the testimony (the 
public’s compassion).  The truth sought is not the objective truth of the events 
themselves, but the subjective truth of the experience of them (2008: 539, 
emphasis mine). 
Exploring a distinct but complementary method of gathering witness testimonial in 
the asylum process, my purpose is to unfold the everyday practices in the US 
institutional spaces when it comes to narration, assessment, and subsequent 
victimization of asylum claimants.  This assessment is not simply about recognizing 
“subjective truth” of asylum claimant’s experience of suffering and violence, but it is 
one that is full of mediation (linguistic and legal) from all parties involved, of intense 
engagements and critical interaction throughout the process.  Strong opinions, beliefs, 
and values are expressed and debated in the process of legitimizing asylum claims and 
screening for credibility—claimants are repeatedly questioned about their past, 
speculative present, and their future, and about their obligations as legal non-citizens.”  
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At the same time, grave silences and complete breakdown of communication occur 
halting or redirecting asylum interview procedures.  The question I want to consider 
then is more general:  what purpose does extracting asylum testimony based on 
claimant’s own voice and words —in a language that is seldom understood by lawyers, 
judges, and human rights experts—serve if granting of asylum is arbitrary and 
depends on judge’s discretionary power, as Cynthia and other private lawyers 
unanimously agreed?  Second, how does the legal space provide the condition of 
possibility for producing not only an asylum “victim narrative” but also for 
rationalizing the coherence of such logic?  To foreground my ethnographic research 
analysis of the asylum seeking process, I too take inspiration from Butler’s notion of 
“subjection.”  The crux of Judith Butler’s argument in her seminal piece The Psychic 
Life of Power is that power not only formulates the subject but it is also, paradoxically, 
what “we depend on for our existence” (1997: 2).  Butler elaborates on Foucauldian 
“subjectification” to show that a subject is never simply fixed in place but it “is the 
occasion for a further making” (99) through constant reiteration, which far from 
enabling stability and coherence, comes to constantly reinstate incoherence.   From 
this perspective, legal-political space is itself an instance of state power at large that, in 
the asylum process particularly, prescribes a certain framework: its (legal) language for 
filing claims produces a peculiar form of subjectification that is imposed on claimants, 
but through which their claims and they themselves also become visible legally.   
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 Toward this end, the chapter is situated within the long-standing view on the 
significance of law as “‘visible symbol’ of social solidarity” (Durkheim’s The Division off 
Labour in Society cited in Fuller 1994) and extensive legal ethnographies (Schapera 
1938; Gluckman 1955; Bohannan 1957; Hamnett 1977) and, in particular, 
contemporary discourses23 in legal anthropology (Starr and Collier 1989; Starr 1992; 
Conley and O’ Barr 1988, 1990; Merry 1990; 2012; Moore 1978).  I document and 
expand what Sally Engle Merry (1990) has identified as “therapeutic discourse” in the 
legal institutional settings in the United States that organize legal narratives and in turn 
justify practices of various discursive strategies employed by legal mediators during 
court hearings.  While Merry’s argument has to do with shifting discourses—from 
legal to moral to therapeutic—that ultimately contribute to “the power of naming” in 
the context of legal-judicial setting, her emphasis on social, practical aspect of 
“therapeutic discourse,” something like a discursive habitus, is applicable in the co-
construction and interpretation of “suffering narrative” and asylum-victimhood on 
the ground.  In particular, the process of framing and reframing a particular asylum-
suffering account through application of different discursive techniques as resources 
available to human rights workers and legal experts in constructing a asylum suffering 
narrative. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Discourse, after Foucault (1970), is explained by Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) as one of the vital 
components through which social practices and techniques are organized, which in turn gives rise to and 
conditions terms of discourse at particular historical moment.  Following Foucault and, in particular, 
Rabinow’s interpretation (1987) of his work on, my understanding and use of the concept—discourse--here is 
not so much to articulate its situated-ness in the asylum “legal system” per se; rather, it is to emphasize its 
validity through a set of organized and organizing asylum legal practices.  
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I make my second, and related, point in the paper by commencing with a 
detailed discussion of the interconnection between subjectification and legal 
institutional practices of making (and unmaking) legal non-citizen in liberal 
democracies.  In so doing, I contextualize my claim that the asylum system is at once 
central to the debate on liberal forms of citizenship that advocates for protection of 
minority legal-subjects (claimants of political violence in this case) only so far to 
reinforce the victimhood-status of “asylum seekers” and the production of asylum 
claims as part of what I call protracted legality.  Here, I examine the literature on liberal 
forms of citizenship and show that the asylum process and citizenship are related in 
two critical ways.  First, I argue that the asylum system—the alleged aim to protect 
“victims of political violence”—emerges as machinery by which liberal state manages 
its non-citizen subjects through legal subjectification.  It is not merely a strategy, if 
completely accidental, by which the state reproduces its legal non-citizens as victims 
and simultaneously an ideal type of probable citizens.  The conditions of the 
contemporary asylum seeking process that manage, discipline, and govern claimants is 
what I am referring to as “protracted legality.”  This notion intersects and interacts 
with the similar but distinct notion of “deportability,” developed by Nicholas de 
Genova.24  As such, it can be seen in the opposite direction: the condition of 
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  Nicholas De Genova (2002, 2005) writes, “it is deportability, and not deportation as such, that ensures that 
some are deported in order than most may remain (undeported)—as workers, whose pronounced and protracted legal 
vulnerability may thus be sustained indefinitely.”  
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possibility for a few to obtain US citizenship so that many may ultimately remain legal 
non-citizens, say, as “asylum seekers.”  
Second, and consequently, it is increasingly private citizens in liberal states —
human rights workers, lawyers, judges, and asylum officers—acting as gatekeepers to 
determine the eligibility for asylum claimants to be on a putative path to obtaining 
legal status as non-citizens.  It is, thus, “protracted legality,” and not actual citizenship 
per se, that has rendered perceived legal non-citizens of all kinds as distinctly 
vulnerable commodity.  The possibility for social (and political) membership and 
belonging cannot be separated from the everyday production of this “protracted 
legality.”  Expanding the understanding of legality from its conventional basis on 
political membership risks creating a surplus of characteristics tied to legal statuses 
that in the end may leave the term without its analytical and explicative power.  With 
this critique in mind, I situate this chapter within the contemporary asylum process 
unfolding in the US.  
Part  Ia .  Asylum narrat ion:  The v i c t im-subje c t  verbal ized 
I am sitting in Cynthia’s office at the human rights agency in mid-town Manhattan.  I am 
here to provide Nepali-English interpretation for Tshering, a Nepali man in his late 30s who is 
filing asylum claims for the second time, upon being rejected by the Asylum Offices in New Jersey.   
In the spring of 2009, Tshering applied for asylum within four months of his 
arrival to New York City.  He came on a religious visa, otherwise known as R-1, and 
supposed to have landed in California for teaching Buddhist art and painting at a 
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Buddhist monastery in San Francisco.  Describing himself as a Buddhist monk and a 
religious person, Tshering said he had been a target of Maoist violence in Nepal 
during the peak (2001-2004)25 of the decade long (1996-2006) civil war between 
Nepali state and the Maoist rebels.  He filed asylum claims on the ground that he was 
targeted because of his religious opinions, activities, and refusal to support the Maoist 
party, politically and financially.  He submitted I-589 asylum application with the 
assistance of a friend.  Tshering was given a screening interview and the asylum 
officer who interviewed him did not ask him any questions related to the Maoist 
violence Tshering had suffered in Nepal.  Instead, the officer focused on a set of 
questions related to his religious life and work prior to leaving Nepal, giving no space 
to address, let alone explain, what is generally thought to be most relevant questions 
for making political asylum claims—“past persecution” and “well-founded fear of 
future persecution.”  He received a letter two weeks after his interview from USCIS.  
Tshering was denied asylum on the basis that he was not a Buddhist monk that he 
claimed to be.  However, I would only learn about his religious background and 
reasons for denial of his asylum claims at the private law firm, months later our 
meeting at the human rights agency.   Tshering’s case is still unfolding and there has 
been a quick turnover of lawyers working on it.   The ones with whom Tshering first 
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  The years coincided with the post-September 11, 2001 event, primarily bringing Nepal into the limelight of 
international media and international human rights and humanitarian assistance for initiating co-lateral and 
multi-lateral dialogue between the Nepali government and the Maoist rebels. 	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discussed his case is no longer representing him but different ones assigned by the 
firm. 
After being denied for asylum the first time, people in his social network in New York City 
recommended that he resubmit his asylum claims with the assistance of human rights lawyers.  
Cynthia has a reputation for “being sympathetic to asylum claimants and knowledgeable about 
Nepali claims, in particular,” which I came to know after assisting with several asylum interpretation 
cases at the agency.  She has earned this reputation upon assisting with several Nepali asylum cases 
over the years mainly because of her keen interest in overseeing each case through its completion even 
after being transferred to pro bono litigators in private firms and until the final hearing either in the 
Immigration Courtrooms or Asylum Offices.  Cynthia believes that Tshering qualifies as a “victim of 
political violence”—which will eventually put him in the path toward legal procedures for resubmitting 
his asylum claims.  However, Tshering looks flustered and disoriented.  Neither he nor I have met 
each other before this asylum interview.  We both look somewhat confused and attempt to find out if 
either of us knows exactly how the interview will proceed.  
I am there neither to act as an advocate for Tshering nor an assistant to Cynthia.  I am 
asked by Cynthia to sit next to Tshering.  Cynthia also has a legal intern next to her taking notes.  
Cynthia asks questions in English, I translate questions into Nepali, Tshering answers in Nepali, 
which is then translated back to Cynthia, while the intern silently takes notes.   
“You have to recall two or three incidents of your encounters with the Maoists in Nepal.  
Remember to describe in vivid details, so the judge can imagine and picture what happened to you. 
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You see no one remembers their past, especially a traumatic incident or torture coherently or 
chronologically,” Cynthia says. 
Cynthia forms her questions very broadly, presumably to give Tshering space to respond and 
expand on his testimony. The most common types of questions are ones beginning with “who”, 
“what”, “when”, “where”, “why”, and “how”, giving Tshering maximum space to elaborate.   
She asks series of questions almost without interruption: very particular questions related to 
Tshering’s journey to the US; home addresses in Nepal; reasons for seeking asylum; specific dates of 
the Maoist encounters in his village in Solukhumbu, followed by repeated death threats, phone calls 
resulting in his abduction, and narrow escape to Kathmandu and then to the US.  Cynthia asks no 
questions related to Tshering’s religious life as a monk in Nepal.  She asks questions that are very 
specific to the details of the events that led Tshering to fear for his and his family’s lives. The questions 
eventually manage to elicit the following asylum narration, which I paraphrase here: 
Tshering is a 38-year old male, monastic painter, citizen of Nepal. He should be granted 
asylum in the United States because the Nepali Maoists persecuted him on account of the 
following : a) his anti-Maoist political opinions; and b) his membership in the particular 
group of Buddhist monastic artists.  Before his escape to the United States, Mr. Tsheing 
endured repeated persecution and intimidation from the Young Communist League (YCL), 
the subsidiary political group under the Maoist political party.  Mr. Tshering is entitled to 
asylum in the United States because he has a well-founded fear of further persecution, in the 
form of physical violence, brutal assaults, abduction, and extortion, if returned to Nepal. The 
Nepali state authorities were and remain unwilling to protect Mr. Tshering, as the Maoists 
play a significant role in Nepali government today and the police turn a blind eye to the 
Maoists violence and continued use of torture, extortion, and murder. Since his escape from 
Kathmandu, Nepal, Mr. Tshering has been living in New York City and holds a steady job 
at a local grocery store.  
 
[….] 
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The initial interrogation and the writing of the asylum narration lasted six 
hours.  Tshering’s hesitance to speak of his past experiences of persecution in the 
hands of the Maoist in Nepal or his stuttering and off-tangent statements or questions 
were not included in the notes taken by Cynthia’s intern.  I did not have access to the 
document that resulted from this initial interrogation.  However, it was clear from 
Cynthia’s declaration of the acceptance of Tshering’s case for further asylum 
assistance that Tshering had just performed the very act of being interpreted as a 
“credible victim of political violence,” granting him access to legal assistance and 
allowing him to become a visible legal subject in the United States.  
What this initial interrogation for potential asylum claimant and the institutional 
interpretation of a claimant into a “victim of political violence” demonstrates is the 
limit and the possibilities of legal institutional language pertaining to the asylum 
system: the visibility of a claimant as an “asylum seeker” rests in the production of a 
“victim narrative.”  Asylum narration itself is an act of interpretation in which 
claimants learn to discipline themselves as “victim subjects” as they ceaselessly 
attempt to navigate the legal bureaucracy related to asylum procedures.  This is a 
process better shown than explained. 
************************* 
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Asylum interpre tat ion on the ground,  March 2011 
As we entered through the large, tinted, glass doors in the law office, one of the three 
pro bono lawyers working on Tshering’s asylum greeted us.  “How are you doing 
Tshering?” she inquired, as always, before beginning the asylum interview session. 
 
“Bahini, dherai gaharo po hundo rahecha.  Ghar chodeko jhandai teen barsa bhaisakyo.  Budhi ra 
nani ko ta dherai samjhana aunchan”  [“Younger sister, things are quite difficult.  It has 
been almost three years since I left home.  I miss my wife and daughter a lot.”]  
Tshering responded in a muffled voice to what was obviously a polite greeting 
indicating formality that is not intended to evoke a detail, let alone emotional, 
response.  
 
“I am doing fine,” I interpreted rather plainly. 
 
The three lawyers exchanged silent glances; then all of them turned toward me, 
indicating their apparent dissatisfaction with my short, abrupt, and inadequate 
translation of Tshering’s rather lengthy response.   
 
“What Tshering said has nothing to do with either his asylum claims or his well-being,” 
I clarified with annoyance.  For the last two years I had been interpreting for Tshering 
I was repeatedly instructed (by the lawyers) not to let Tshering wander off and discuss 
what would be considered “irrelevant” details to his political asylum claims.  Naturally, 
I had come to assume the role of an interpretation police.  I had also become a 
“professional” legal interpreter: I was now trained to do what I could not make myself 
do just two years ago--to remove the so-called “irrelevant,” and ultimately 
unnecessary, details and descriptions from the asylum claims.  
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The three lawyers seemed quite content with my added explanation, which still had 
nothing to do with Tshering’s actual response.  Yet somehow it did not matter.  The 
lawyers went on to explain to me, to be interpreted to Tshering, current progress 
regarding the case and their continued effort in contacting and ultimately gathering 
supporting documents, including medical experts and country experts’ reports and 
testimonies. 
 
Sitting next to me, Tshering had a vacant look on his face.  Both he and I had been 
sitting in the law office on the 34th Floor in midtown Manhattan for almost an hour.  
While waiting in the building lobby earlier, Tshering had shared with me his long and 
difficult work schedule that started every morning at 3 am and ended around noon.  
He worked as a deliveryman, driving truck and delivering bakery goods for whole 
food grocery stores in Upper West Side and midtown, not very far from the law office 
we were having our meeting.   
 
He had described to me how the buildings and the neighborhood looked starkly 
different during his work hours.  He also worked in an Indian restaurant nearby in the 
evenings, and had mentioned to me, on several occasion, how difficult it was to take 
days off from the restaurant on short notice to come to the law firm for the asylum 
interpretation meetings.  He was worried that he would get fired any day.  
 
I wondered if the lawyers noticed the vacuous look that Tshering had the entire time; 
but at the same time, I worried that they would interpret his expressionless face as 
him not taking the interview “seriously.”  
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Then one of the lawyers announced:  “Okay then, let’s just move on to our asylum 
topic for today, shall we?  Now tell us again what happened to you Tshering in the fall 
of 1999.”  
 
Trying my best to imitate the lawyer's solemn voice, I interpreted for Tshering.   
He looked at me, paused for few seconds, and responded:  “I think I started painting 
for the Gumba26 in Bouddha, Kathmandu,” he said cheerfully, reclining back in his 
chair. 
 
The lawyer seemed surprise by Tshering’s response.  She looked at her senior 
colleagues, seated adjacent from her, who exchanged silent glances.  Judging from 
their facial expressions, I elaborated the question in Nepali for Tshering: “Hoina dai, 
1999 ma Maobadi tapain ko buwa-aama ko ghar ma pahilo choti aayeko hoina ra?”  [“No older 
brother, didn’t the Maoist visit your parents’ house for the first time in 1999?”].  
Obviously, I was way too familiar with his story.  All of us were.  The latest version of 
(the draft of) the affidavit was circulated few weeks before the meeting. 
 
"Ohh tyo…ho ta ni!  Maobadi gharma aye ani aama-buwa lai dhamki diye," ["Oh that…yes 
that's true! Maoists came to my parents house and threatened them"] Tshering 
admitted, as though it was some kind of trick question, when all along it was his story 
from which the lawyers had been asking questions for almost two years.  They were 
simply trying to fill in the gaps with detailed descriptions and vivid images, ensuring 
consistency and flow of the narrative before filing the complete, refined, and final 
version of the affidavit to the Immigration court in a couple of weeks. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Gumba means a Buddhist monastery in Nepali. 
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I looked at Tshering, simply raising my eyebrows, indicating that the lawyers were 
expecting him to say more in response to that question.  After two years of 
interpreting for Tshering, he and I had obviously developed, what Michael Herzfeld 
has called, “cultural intimacy.” 
 
"Aama-buwa ko man ma dar pasyo ni tyas pachi ta…"  (Literally: "Fear entered into my 
mom and dad's hearts after that...")  As he spoke these words, his face turned red as 
though he was somehow being transported back into Solukhumbhu village in Nepal.  
I was, however, relieved to see that Tshering had finally caught up with (the game of) 
invoking right kind of emotion demanded by that specific question during the interview.  
Yet his eyes failed to express the mixture of moderate shock and excitement that his 
voice seemed to be communicating; they simply remained dazed refusing to further 
collaborate.   
 
Tshering’s non-verbal cues somehow managed to create what could be interpreted as 
an emotionally detached ambiance in the conference room.  The severity of the 
subject matter—Maoist’s first visit to Tshering’s parents’ house—seemed to be 
undermined, if temporarily, by the way Tshering was (and not) communicating.  
 
It was a Friday afternoon, and all of us in the conference room were tired.  Noticing 
that Tshering and I, his interpreter, seemed disengaged from the serious matter being 
raised and discussed, the senior counselor and the primary appointee for the case 
Elizabeth leaned forward.  
 
Clearing her throat, Elizabeth interjected: “Okay, perhaps we should move on to the 
part where you suffered violence in the hands of Maoists in Kathmandu then.”  
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I interpreted for Tshering, trying to replicate her stern voice to translate the perceived 
urgency of the matter at hand.  Tshering suddenly fixed his composure, sat upright, 
and tried to stay alert. 
 
“Can you please describe in detail the pain you suffered and continue to suffer as a 
result of the Maoist attack in November 2004?”  Elizabeth asked. 
 
This time I interpreted for Tshering, without adding my own explanation or providing 
any context.  For I knew that he knew it was the most important part of his asylum 
claim—the part with which he was most familiar.  He had not only learned to describe 
the violence and pain he suffered in such vivid detail, but he had also mastered the art 
of successfully framing his experience within the larger context of his asylum 
narrative.  
 
Tshering began (re)telling his story, starting with the Maoist’s initial visit to his 
parents’ house in Solukhumbu in 1999, followed by his first physical encounter with 
Maoists in Kathmandu in 2001 that ultimately led to the attack in 2004.  He provided 
background with vivid images and description, and even offered a nice chronological 
order to every incident leading up to the actual attack: starting with the Maoist visit to 
the parents’ home, the repeated (verbal) threats he received on the phone and in the 
letters, the final warning letter from the YCL, followed by their last visit to his place in 
Boudha, Kathmandu.  He painstakingly described the beatings he received from the 
Maoists: the pain he suffered in his back, chest, arms and right hand as a result of this 
“life threatening” attack.  He unbuttoned his shirt and started pointing to all the scars 
(and injuries) in his chest and leg, where Maoists allegedly stomped on him, repeatedly 
beat him, and hit him with the bottom of the gun.  Two years ago, he would hardly 
speak of his injuries.  He showed signs of discomfort in having to undress in front of 
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the people in the room.  And here he was.  Two years later into the asylum interview 
process, he had trained himself to become familiar (and comfortable) not only talking 
about his pain but also voluntarily showing all the physical signs (or evidence, as 
lawyers kept telling us) of “past persecution” and suffering.   
 
While buttoning his shirt, he started talking, or rather complaining, about a severe, 
ongoing pain in his knee and left foot.  “Maile katti doctor lai dekhai saken yahan, tara 
ghooda dukne ta kaam hoina jhan badhto po rahecha.  Maile pain killer haru pani liyen, bengay 
lagaayen dukheko thaaunma, ra ani aru dherai aushadi haru pani liyen doctor le diyeko.  Khoi kehi 
asar bhayena tara…”  He talked for almost 20 minutes about his knee pain and fell 
silent in the middle of his sentence.   
 
I interpreted for the lawyers, word for word, and in the same manner Tshering 
described his intense pain to me:  “I have gone to doctors many times, but instead of 
diminishing, the pain in my knee keeps intensifying.  I have taken painkillers, applied 
ointments to the sore parts of my leg, and have also taken many other medications 
prescribed by the doctors here.  Well, nothing seems to have any affect…” As I was 
uttering these sentences, I realized this was new information that he had decided to 
give us after two years into the asylum process. 
 
The lawyers looked at me, just as surprised by this unsolicited information as I was.  
One of the lawyers asked for clarification, “So all this pain is from the Maoist attack in 
November 2004 in Nepal?”  
 
I had barely finished interpreting it in back into Nepali when Tshering started to 
laugh.  “Oh no, not the severe knee pain that I have had for so long.  It is from 
working at the Indian restaurant here for last three years, having to stand on my feet 
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everyday for six days a week,” he and I both nonchalantly responded.  I joined 
Tshering in his laughter until we both realized that our laughter was completely out of 
place; for the lawyers started to sift through their notes and papers, looking utterly 
concerned and annoyed at the same time. 
 
Tshering, on the other hand, seemed wistful, lost in his own thought.  Instead of 
talking about his past experiences of persecution and the Maoist attack—the subject 
matter of his asylum interview—he started telling me how he seemed to be 
understanding less English than he did in Nepal.  “Khai ke garne bahini, ma ta America 
aayera laato jastai bhayen.  Yeti dherai barsa America basi saken, English ta birsen jastai lagcha 
jhan.  Baru Kathmandu mai English bolin thiyo school maa padaaun da.  Yahan ta English ko 
naam ma bolne nai ‘Sir, would you like chicken tikka masala or chicken korma?’…ani kaahan ko 
English bolnu ya practice hunu ho America ma?!” 
[Translation: “It is really strange, but I feel like I have become dumber now that I 
have lived in the US for this long.  I thought I used to understand some English back 
home when I used to teach in a government school in Kathmandu.  I speak less and 
less English here.  All I have to say now is ‘Sir, would you like chicken tikka masala or 
chicken korma?’…how (or when) do I get to practice or speak English in America?”]  
 
By this point, I had stopped obsessing about following (hidden) rules of 
interpretation.  I just let him talk.  In a way, I failed to redirect Tshering from 
“wandering” off and prevent him from volunteering “irrelevant” information during 
the interview.  In retrospect, I wonder if I could have possibly changed anything.  He 
had decided to change the subject matter abruptly and for no particular reason.  
Perhaps, for Tshering, the story about his past experiences in Nepal and his current 
situation in America were not disconnected.  Or perhaps, he deliberately decided to 
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stop talking about the past and focus on the present.  Or he was simply exhausted.  
One could only speculate.   
 
As soon as he stopped talking about his past experiences of persecution, I, too, 
stopped being his interpreter.  The interview/meeting ended early that day.  The 
lawyers asked me to instruct Tshering to do his homework, study the Nepali version 
of his legal statement, particularly those sections that discussed the Maoist attack and 
the pain specifically related to particular incidents that he continued to suffer for our 
next interview session.  They also mentioned that the interview did not go as well as 
they had hoped for and that they would need to (re)visit some of the questions not 
adequately answered by Tshering that day.   
 
I communicated lawyers’ dissatisfaction to Tshering, who simply looked relieved that 
the meeting had come to an end for the day.  We were given a new date and time to 
come back for follow-up interview.  Tshering and I left the law office to get coffee 
and continued talking about things irrelevant to his asylum claims.  
***************************** 
Part  Ib .   Asylum documentat ion:  v i c t im-subje c t  interpre ted  
The story about Tshering reveals the encounter between lawyer and asylum 
claimant as a space shaped by anticipation and negotiation of what counts as 
“persecution”—the basis of claiming political asylum.27  Such a space then forces us 
to look beyond the question of what counts as “truth” claims from allegedly “fake” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Two grounds of seeking political asylum are evidence for “past persecution” and “well-founded fear of 
future persecution”: “Foreign nationals seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned 
home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”	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ones and, instead, focus on the actual interaction and intense encounter between 
lawyer and claimant throughout the asylum process.  Indeed, focusing exclusively as 
an issue of authenticity or truth claims that claimants produce leaves intact the 
parochial and, rather unimaginative logic, reinvigorating the debate about “authentic” 
vs. “suspicious” victims through the discursive lens of problematic dichotomies, 
namely victim-agent, subjugated-liberated, and vulnerable-resistant.  As such, I want 
to suggest looking at the way the claimant’s voice and “own words” become the main 
source of establishing victimhood throughout the legal production of asylum narrative 
for claimants like Tshering.  Many people have participated in producing and 
reproducing this “victim narrative,” Tshering and his lawyers just a few among them.  
In this logic, while Tshering may be not able to produce a legal account of his 
experience of past persecution, his words and voice remain the origin of and the 
necessary component for asylum narrative—it is what makes his account legitimate, 
after all.28   
Within matter of months, Tshering was, in a way, dispossessed by his version 
of fragmented past experience and moments of silence that accompanied in 
remembering a story that, for the most part, he did not want to remember, let alone 
share.  The practice of filing asylum claims takes place by means of language 
interpretation and legal mediation, and it represents the moment in which claimants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  For other work on how the voice and words function as a site of truth claims, particularly in the case of 
asylum claimants or refugees see Peter Loizos (1981) and Williksen (2004).  
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enter into a pact with the state through assistance of private law firms and human 
rights agencies for legal recognition.  Although the asylum document silences many 
aspects of the claimants’ lives, their stories constitute the content of actual “words” 
and claimants’ “own” understanding of their experiences of “past persecution” before 
it can successfully become the official asylum story.  In this process, Tshering 
occupied the position of credible victim, through language interpretation that I 
provided, and ultimate legal interpretation that lawyers crafted in the smooth writing 
of the affidavit.  Most of these statements sound similar, devoid of any confusions or 
complexities that the claimants often show when interrogated repeatedly for same 
detail, vivid, information to file asylum claims.  More accurately, it is not simply about 
claimants’ own words, but those that specifically refer to his account of persecution; 
account that is inconsistent, interrupted repeatedly, irrelevant details added, although 
not entirely anticipated.  The legal space, therefore, allowed Tshering to perform a 
speech act that enabled him to become a legal subject of the US state.  Although his 
voice seemed “lost in translation,” his position as a legal subject was already pre-
figured and constituted within the process of interpreting his verbal account into a 
coherent asylum narrative about victimhood and into the legal text of the asylum 
document. 
Looking at Tamil Asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka in Norway, Oivind Fuglerud 
has argued that the concept of “asylum seeker” connotes “illegitimate protection 
needs” (2005: 301).  Following Fuglerud, the legal category of “asylum seeker” then 
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requires a person to narrate, with appropriate emotion, the circumstances of the 
violence that he experienced several years prior to one’s arrival to the US.  This 
narrative is reproduced again and again with sufficient detail of pain and suffering to 
be considered effective.  This victim narrative of an “asylum seeker” is not without a 
projected temporal logic.  The necessary repetition of the same story, as we saw in 
Tshering’s case, must always be about a very specific event in the past – the event that 
enables one to claim political asylum.   But when the present intervened—as it did in 
Tshering's 20-minute digression about his intense knee pain made worse due to 
working in the Indian restaurant or his current memory of his family left behind in 
Nepal at the beginning of the interview—the lawyers quickly (re)directed him to focus 
on the factual (read: “real”) reason for seeking political asylum.  Still his momentary 
outburst, soliloquies, and abrupt silences related to the everyday experiences of living 
and working in the city became a useful way to identify him as a “migrant worker.”  
The narrative of the present then did not replace his narrative of the past.  Instead, 
they ran parallel for Tshering.  If under the legal category of asylum, the past loomed 
large, the present, though at times receded to the background, never completely 
disappeared.   
Tshering got caught in the messy space between the legal production of asylum 
narration based on “political violence” in a distant place and the everyday lived 
realities of “deportability” (De Genova 2002, 2005) in the U.S.   However, it is unclear 
when Tshering’s victim narrative of “political violence” renders the “economic 
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violence” and, essentially, his migrant identity irrelevant, and when they bleed into each 
other.  To be sure, asylum narration and documentation are resource that must be 
used strategically in this messy space; Tshering assumed on the popular knowledge 
that his legal status—as an asylum seeker—was also his locus of ultimate reality as a 
non-citizen worker.  The point here is not to establish whether the Nepali claimant is 
an “authentic asylum seeker” or an unruly migrant worker, but to acknowledge how 
he is assumed to occupy a particular (social) position within the space of the US nation-
state, and even positions himself, alternately as one and the other.  Legal experts, 
human rights workers, and interpreters are then not simply observers in this matter, 
but they are also active participants and interpreters of the very institution of U.S. 
citizenship.  In other words, if for asylum claimants, (performance of) victimhood is 
desirable and even central in the recognition of economical worth as legal non-
citizens, the human rights experts, lawyers, and judges are key players and co-
constructors of this reality.   
The paradox o f  l ega l  subje c t i f i ca t ion  
 
In exploring the legal production of contradictory conception of victimhood 
within the asylum context, I show its potential usefulness in expanding the debate 
about liberal forms of US citizenship and redirecting questions previously unexplored.  
Analyzing ambivalent stories of claimants’ past punctuated by their present conditions 
of suffering, as well as spaces of encounters where and how the stories are evoked, 
narrated, and performed may contribute less to the scholarly debate about social 
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memory, political violence, and the tragedy of victimization rhetoric—themes central 
to scholarly analyses of asylum seekers and refugee—than to the real and practical 
questions about structural continuities and discontinuities where private citizens play 
active role in the everyday making and unmaking of legal non-citizens.  Seen this way, 
asylum system is then at once an expression of liberal benevolence bestowed upon the 
most wretched population and simultaneously a part of a whole array of mechanisms 
that promise to identify and discipline those marked as “vulnerable” population into 
rightful, individual, legal subjects fit to be properly governed indefinitely by the liberal 
state.   
My ethnographic engagement and data in this chapter show that the asylum 
system is one of the many sites where the management of social relations, or rather 
behaviors of legal subjects, and the everyday practices of US citizenship occur.  First, 
the practices rely less on subject’s technique of self-governance but on the indefinite 
reiteration of their non-citizen subject position.  In this sense, emphasis on asylum 
claimants’ own words and voices to retell their stories—filled with disjointed thoughts 
and fragmented memories—occupy an important realm in the very identification and 
reiteration of “victim narrative” for subjectification.  To be sure, this legal 
subjectification, based on “injury-forming identity” (Brown 1995) at large, is neither 
fixed nor pre-determined in advance.  The contradictory conceptions of 
victimhood—as a universally recognizable and simultaneously a culturally “authentic” 
victim—at work in the legal institutional space would suggest that victimization 
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cannot be seen a putative goal to obtaining citizenship whether in terms of rights-
based claims or socio-cultural membership and belonging.  Instead, I have been 
arguing throughout the chapter that the process of legal subjectification is an 
important dimension to renegotiating the legal status as non-citizen and participating 
in the protracted citizenship. 
Second, both the state and non-state institutional spaces of encounter and 
enmeshment—in the legal practices directed at asylum claimants and their 
interpreters, and the mutual, if awkward and measured, interactions among all 
parties—is where everyday meaning and exercise of citizenship take shape in concrete.  
I follow Ong’s proposal of radical interrogation of what she calls “everyday 
citizenship in America,” based on material “effects of the multiple rationalities [state 
and non-state institutional bureaucratic procedures] that directly and indirectly 
prescribe techniques for living for independent [neoliberal] subjects who learn to 
govern themselves” (15).  From this perspective, citizenship has as much to do with 
engagement, interaction, and management of social relations among people as with 
legal relations with the state.  As such, the local authorities and private 
professionals—asylum officers, immigration lawyers, litigators, judges, human rights 
workers, medical doctors, and country condition experts—who interpret the workings 
of the US state into everyday encounters and operations of citizenship exist.  Nicholas 
Rose has called these “experts of subjectivity,” or professionals “who transfigure 
existentialist questions…and the meaning of suffering into technical problems about 
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the most effective ways of managing malfunction and improving ‘the quality of 
life’”(1999:142).  The role of these professionals, as discussed in some detail in the 
encounter between claimant and human rights officer and private lawyers above, is to 
discipline claimants to be subjective beings who develop new ways of thinking about 
their asylum stories, narrative of suffering and victimhood, and in a particular 
performance of their asylum victimhood that can help them become legally visible.   
Latour has identified an array of power dynamics intrinsic to a command that 
“results from the actions of a chain of agents each of who ‘translates’ it in accordance 
with his/her own projects” (1986: 284).  Legal and local authorities are in positions in 
which they not only mediate relations but also translate and interpret dominant 
ideologies and debates that forms the basis of seemingly mundane, bureaucratic 
practices that allocate, classify, and reify categories to fit people perceived as non-
citizens—refugees, undocumented, asylum seekers, alien.  Categories make things 
happen.  In particular, when categories are employed in the contemporary US political 
context of “the Homeland Security State” (De Genova 2007), it can have real and 
devastating consequences for those enmeshed in legal procedures indefinitely.  Far 
from being the product of abstract and overarching state institutionalized and non-
governmental programs, the asylum seeking process in the US is deeply tied to the 
everyday making and unmaking of legal non-citizens.  
I am not suggesting that asylum seeking-process as a whole is politically and 
legally bankrupt, or that the asylum bureaucratic procedures necessarily (re)traumatize 
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individual claimants as legal non-citizens.  Quite the contrary; my contention arises 
out of the fact that people categorized as “asylum seekers” and, as such, expected to 
behave, perform, and imagine according to the shifting and prevailing understanding 
of violence, persecution, and suffering, individuals and collective, to establish their 
“credibility” through their own words and voices need critical rethinking and self-
reflexive approaches more generally.  Tshering’s story is still unfolding.  After four 
years of navigating the asylum bureaucracy, his future is still uncertain.  Apparently, 
the immigration judge found him not a “credible” claimant—not necessarily 
illegitimate “victim-subject”—on the basis that his was a case that resembled that of 
an “economic migrant” rather than an “asylum seeker.”  Thus, the legal production of 
his “victim narrative” made the asylum bureaucratic procedure move until the “public 
secret” (Taussig 1999) about his condition as a migrant subject surreptitiously came to 
the forefront.  In the next chapter, I extend the ethnographic observation and analysis 
of the asylum process as legal subjectification through the practice of asylum 
documentation and filing of the 1-589 asylum form, drawing particularly on 
anthropological engagement with and critique of documents and (legal) bureaucracy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
The life of Form  I-589  and the making of extra-legal documentation 
 
“The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and 
fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society recognizes and develops a 
mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked.  To be brief let us say that 
history, in its traditional form, undertook to ‘memorize’ the monuments of the past, 
transform them into documents, and lend speech to those traces, which, in 
themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in silence something other than what 
they actually say; in our time, history is that which transforms documents into 
monuments.” 
--Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
 
Introduct ion 
Central to the work of filing for asylum claims and initiating legal 
documentation, and inevitable if perhaps more peripheral in the burgeoning literature 
on contemporary asylum procedures, is the filling out of forms, expert reports, and 
affidavits, detailing physical attack and persecution suffered by asylum claimants and 
the likelihood of being persecuted if returned to the country of origin.  Produced with 
varying degree of care and attention, periodically revised by lawyers during different 
moments throughout the asylum interpretation depending on the changes and new 
information extracted from claimants, after several months and sometimes a year of 
working on and gathering them, such legal paperwork is part of the characteristic of 
asylum documentation.  During several hours of asylum interpretation sessions, and 
engaging in open-ended meetings and conversations with attorneys, I became familiar 
with the basic pattern repeated in each asylum procedure: filing of I-589 application 
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form to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or the U.S. 
Department of Justice; submission of the claimant affidavit along with medical expert 
and country condition expert reports; and interview at one of the eight Asylum 
Offices in the country or merit hearing at the Immigration Courtroom in Federal 
Plaza.  The seemingly less inconsistent but more demanding to gather and coherently 
formulate in asylum documentation, as any lawyer working on asylum application will 
tell you, is form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal (I-589 form, 
hereafter).  In particular, page 5 of I-589 form is perhaps the most critical and the 
most difficult information to obtain from claimants.  The difficulty is assumed to 
come with the territory of extracting from claimants their experience of “past 
persecution” and “well-grounded fear” of future persecution” (as per section 241 (b) 
(3) of the INA under the Convention Against Torture).  Further, these idioms 
constantly shape difficult, and unpredictable, moments of mapping both the 
claimants’ and lawyers’ place in the legal domain. 
At the same time routine legal documentation and consequential, the actual 
practices and the documentary forms demand from each party intense participation 
that forms part of the broad institutional processes concerning “asylum in the United 
States and withholding of removal (formerly called ‘withholding of deportation’).”29  
As Don Brenneis (2006) has noted in his investigation of academic research funding 
application documents the broad “policymaking and detailed planning with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 I-589 Form, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal Instruction  
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subsequent decisions” that shape not only the forms but also “scholarly knowledge” 
and “individual scholarly lives.”  In this sense, I-589 form is one of the first and most 
critical paperwork related to asylum documentation that lawyers assisting with asylum 
cases have to familiarize themselves and their claimants and legal interpreters.  
Arguably, the form is circulated among, shaped by and, in turn, informs legal scholars, 
policymakers, immigration judges and state officials at various decision-making stages.   
This chapter engages with and expands the conversation in the emerging 
scholarship on ethnography of documents.  Almost two decades ago, Ian Hodder 
(1994) argued that documents do not “talk back” to the ethnographer as informants 
do.  Two fundamental assumptions drive this argument: a) both people and 
documents are seen as objects and subjects of ethnographic study; and b) they are 
regarded as separate and un-intertwined and the possibility of one speaking for 
and/or representing the other is completely ruled out.  Anthropologists (Harper 1998; 
Riles 2000, 2006; Hull 2012) have illuminated close interconnection between 
professionalization and documentary forms with broader bureaucratic practices that 
accompany them within what Brenneis (2006) has called “documentary nexus.”  
Drawing on documentary practices and politics surrounding the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) application process, Brenneis has argued that the documentary 
forms as “artifacts of a particular sort…are necessarily interactive, their general 
features designed to elicit responses that they can shape but not wholly control” (42).  
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For Riles, “the document” is “at once an ethnographic object, an analytical category, 
and a methodological orientation” (2006: 7). 
My goal in this chapter is to explore the “social life” of I-589 form integral to 
the asylum process in some detail, focusing on two critical issues—a) the form as an 
“artifact” of asylum documentation providing the basis for initiating and maintaining 
intense engagement between lawyers, interpreters and asylum claimants; and b) the 
“analytically invisible” (Brenneis 2006) characteristics, underpinning the link between 
idiomatic practices and the cultural view of “documents” in the U.S., that the form 
may be reinforcing at large.  Needless to mention, I continue to be fascinated by the 
specific process through which an ordinary piece of paper—I-589—becomes “the 
document” animating one of the critical aspects of asylum procedure. Read with 
varying degree of care and attention by legal representatives assigned for the asylum 
case, the interpreters, like myself, are asked to conduct translation of the Form I-589 
to their client or asylum claimant.   
I ethnographically document behind-the-scene procedure involved in filling out 
of the I-589 form, an initial documentation step to filing asylum claims.  Here, I am 
concerned with the many stages that this form goes through, or takes on a “life of its 
own,” so to speak, before it is submitted as part of, what I call, “the asylum 
documents.”  Further, I am interested in tracing the specific ways in which this form 
is made legible to its pro bono lawyers, interpreters, and asylum claimants while it 
gradually marginalizes its narrators.  Through the actual mode of documentation, 
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where Nepali-English language translation and interpretation becomes indispensable, 
I elucidate differently situated engagement and investment of people throughout the 
process.  
Central to the following discussion is my concern as an ethnographer-
interpreter with the relationships among language interpretation not simply a means 
to an end—a form of communicative proficiency—but the very conditions to initial 
encounters, participating in the meaning-making process as an important social 
practice, and the broader ideological frameworks within which the relationships are 
already established and unfold notwithstanding the unpredictable nature of asylum 
interpretation process.  A first striking feature of interpretation during asylum 
interview and subsequent communicative boundaries created throughout is the legal 
framework that assumes people as social actors to speak from a particular place that 
they either actively occupy or are disciplined as a lawyer, claimant, and interpreter.  
Thus, each paired relationship, namely lawyer/claimant, or advocate/client exist only 
through mediation, making the three-dimensional-relationship inevitably shaping the 
asylum documentation process.  The mediation, I argue, is infused into institutional 
considerations and is inseparable from legal attempts to communicate and explicate 
the asylum process.   
 To be clear, by legal interpretation I do not mean practices concerning 
interpretation in and of law—a technical approach to present legal argument—which 
I assume every lawyer or legal expert must do for their clients, out of necessity, and 
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for the judges in the courtroom.  Demystifying asylum judgments and merit hearing, 
Tobias Kelly has stated that “there is little of the grand oratory of courtroom drama” 
involved in asylum and human rights cases (2012: 65).  This means there is very little 
actual opportunity for lawyers to interpret law during asylum hearings and tribunals 
because of the low priority it receives (Ibid.).  However, there is no denying the 
existence of elaborate and extensive legal “drama” prior to reaching the courtroom 
steps or the asylum offices.  The fact that each asylum case, once private law firms 
accept it and pro bono lawyers are assigned, whether by their own volition or asked 
by their senior associates, circulate for anywhere from 8 months to 2 years attest to 
the inescapability of drama of some sort.  
Asylum legal interpretation, like most legal procedures, renders visible 
differential, if sometimes mutually incompatible, views of legality [particularly 
ethnographies of Anglo-American dispute settlement cases (Conley and O’Barr 1990) 
and study of legal pluralism (Merry 1988)] and multiple ways of understanding and 
enacting in the world both pro bono lawyers and claimants encounter.  What at first 
seems an as mundane documentary practice of filling out the form can become 
extraordinary and completely incomprehensible.  At the same time, layers of 
interpretation are multiple and continuously overlapping: between legal and colloquial, 
and Nepali and English languages.  The switching between two very different 
languages and legal translation during asylum interpretation makes the process that 
much more difficult, complicated, and unpredictable. 
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 One way of thinking about asylum interpretation that I will be considering 
throughout this chapter—and certainly one that is seldom explored in the broader 
literature on asylum system and procedure—is the continuous overlap between legal 
unpredictability and documentary practice as opening of analytically interesting 
paradigms and paradoxes within and beyond legal documentation and bureaucratic 
procedures.  In doing so, I follow a host of anthropologists studying the 
interconnection between documents and bureaucracy in anthropology (Harper 1998; 
Heyman 2004; Shannon 2007; Riles 2006; Li F 2009; Cody 2009; Gupta 2012; Hoag 
2010; Hull 2003, 2012; Bernstein & Mertz 2011; Hohn 2013; Thomson 2012).  I 
discuss in some detail how such overlap is not entirely unexpected and what is 
accomplished from it while remaining marginally visible during asylum 
documentation.  Drawing on particular moments of interpretation during filling out 
the I-589 application form, I focus not only on inseparability of documentation 
practice from that of interpretation but also reveal uninterrupted and unanticipated 
moments of engagement seemingly peripheral to either processes—the extra-legal 
documentation.  I do so to draw attention to the importance of un-interpretability and 
undocumentability that arise not as legal or linguistic constraints inherent to asylum 
interpretation or documentation but as part of the broader subject-making rationale in 
the U.S.  
 As part of a larger ethnographic project, this chapter in particular is invested in 
the materialization of asylum process pre-and-post-production of legal documents and 
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at various stages shaping the everyday making of the asylum system.  My principal 
methodology has been that of switching between a participant-interpreter turned into 
observant-interpreter and ethnographer-interpreter, and drawing upon three years of 
Nepali-English legal interpretation experience on asylum and immigration-related 
work.  I have also become an increasingly self-conscious interpreter assisting Nepalis 
and lawyers with asylum-related forms, procedures, and documentation.  I also draw 
upon interviews with former and current asylum claimants and their pro bono 
lawyers, and Nepali translators and interpreters, over the last two and half years.  This 
chapter, in particular, draws upon asylum interpretation sessions and publically 
accessible asylum documents, including 13-page I-589 form, 14-page instruction 
manual for I-589 form to determine eligibility and the UNHCR documents, accessible 
both in print and on the Internet. 
My ethnographic discussion here has three core parts.  First is a consideration 
of asylum documents related to I-589 form and visual and interpretive aspects of 
specific pages, mainly because of the substantial amount spent by human rights and 
pro bono lawyers in explaining its significance in the writing of the claimants’ affidavit 
and submission of the asylum claims to the immigration judge or the asylum officer.  
In particular, I point the efficacy and centrality of transparency in the form that 
nonetheless assume knowledge not only of specific legal “culture” or pattern but also 
relies on interpretation by other than its immediate respondents—asylum claimants.  
Second part is guided by Brenneis’ (2006) extensive discussion of “documentary 
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nexus” that draws upon Harper’s (1998) view of document’s “career”: in what 
broader workings of the legal institution and bureaucratic practices does the form 
derive from and, in turn, reinforce its symbolic legitimacy? However, my goal is not to 
speculate potential rationale behind its production by state officials or members of the 
Congress nor it is to explore reasons for its distribution and circulation among asylum 
offices or law firms.  Rather, I am interested in the post-career of the document.  Or 
simply put: what makes the 13-page I-589 form an important piece of “the 
document” indispensable to seeking asylum in the U.S.?  I do so to locate if and how 
certain terms in the forms, read and subsequently explained by lawyers to claimants 
during interviews, interpretation meetings, eliciting particular and not entirely 
unpredictable responses from claimants.  I also discuss specific terms, absent and 
present in both I-589 form and the instruction manual accompanying it, yet repeatedly 
emphasized by lawyers.  Finally, I discuss how documentary practice and 
interpretation process overlap during different times, render visible the unanticipated 
switching between the two.  I explore the following questions: if and to what extent 
does interpretation process determine the rhythm of asylum documentation practice 
and the production of “the document” notwithstanding the framework within which 
the interpretation takes place?  What consequences, expected and unanticipated, does 
the form have for claimants, interpreters, and the lawyers throughout the process.  I 
will contextualize this discussion within the larger debate to open up some theoretical 
issues pointed out already and then conclude with a reframing of how documentation 
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practices might speak to the broad issues of socio-legal translation, asylum 
interpretation and the role interpretation-centered ethnography might assist in 
pursuing them. 
****************************** 
PART I:  Trans lat ing the  v i sual  and interpre t ive  f rames o f  Form I-589 
The I-589 form in figure 1.1, available on the Web and endorsed jointly by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Justice, which is one of the first legal 
papers introduced to claimants by their lawyers.  The form can be divided into three 
parts.  Pages 1 through 4 encompass questions that combine personal, professional, 
and legal information of the claimant and his/her family, including legal names and 
permanent home addresses in Nepal and in the U.S., social security number, social 
(marital) and legal status, date of entry into the U.S., and educational and occupational 
background.  It is only on page 5 (refer to figure 1.1) that the respondent is asked 
about reasons for seeking asylum, or rather has to check off from the six choices—
race, religion, nationality, political opinion, membership in a particular social group, 
and torture convention—given in the small boxes.  No detailed explanation is asked 
in the form regarding the specific grounds for seeking asylum.  Yet upon reaching 
page 5 the claimants are asked to describe in vivid, emotive, elaborate, and meticulous 
detail about their specific experience of “past persecution” and “well-founded fear of 
future persecution.”  The visual and visible frames between page 5 and 6 of the form 
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about questions related to seeking asylum, as I will further demonstrate 
ethnographically later, influence and determined by what I call interpretive frames that 
lawyers utilize throughout the asylum interpretation meetings.  The last part of the 
form, pages 7 through 9, primarily includes questions about criminal record or 
background of the claimant and his/her family members living in the U.S.  The 
assumption provided by the very frame here is far too obvious and absurd not to 
mention: any possible connection between criminality—vaguely termed under a rather 
broad range of alleged to attempted to execution of a particular action, say in causing 
physical harm to another person, are all grouped together—and il/legality—also listed 
under a broad category of being “interrogated” to “detained”—may be serious 
grounds to revoke claimant’s asylum application. 
The form clearly indexes both state-institutional and legal bureaucratic 
destinations—USCIS and Department of Justice—and figure prominently upon initial 
viewing and screening.  However, both content and consequence of features 
associated with the visible frames are elusive and address audiences other than the 
immediate respondents—asylum claimants or their pro bono lawyers.  Brenneis 
exploration of frames in institutional forms is particularly applicable here.  Drawing 
on Bateson’s notion of “metacommunicative frame,”30 Brenneis argues that “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  “A frame is metacommunicative.  Any message, which either explicitly or implicitly defines a 
frame, ipso facto gives the receiver instructions or aids in his attempt to understand the messages 
included within the frame” (Bateson 1972: 188, quoted in Duranti 1984: 240) 	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metacommunicative focus on instructing the respondent is quite clear; at the same 
time, because of their mundane, routine, and often literally unintelligible character, 
many other consequential features of the forms are effaced” (2006: 49).  I-589 
becomes “the document” so long as the respondents take seriously not only those 
features that are visible but also, and perhaps more importantly, those that are not 
visually accessible but require active participation—by following instruction manual, 
referring to outside sources, and using interpretive ways to respond.  In contrast to 
what Brenneis notices in the NSF application form in terms of the ease with which 
one can fall into the visual frame is not something that the lawyers with whom I 
worked on Nepali asylum interpretation cases instructed their claimants or themselves 
followed.  Since the stakes are incomparable between filling out of I-589 asylum 
application and academic funding application, the lawyers were acutely sensitive 
toward reading in-between lines and considering repeatedly and reinterpreting 
consequential features not readily visible or accessible in the form.   
Here, I want to draw on a recent essay by Nils Bubandt in which he analyzes 
the relationship between hyperhermeneutics and hypertextuality present in the 
circulation of “fake documents” that mimic and partake in the “illegitimate circulation 
of state authority and state authenticity” (2012: 559).  Writing about the post-Suharto 
conflicts in Indonesia, Bubandt explores the strategy of deploying, and often 
effectively, “fake letter,” perceived to be distribute by rebel groups to invoke terror 
during conflict and post-conflict situations, notwithstanding the certainty of its 
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fakeness.  He argues that the production and circulation of the “fake letter” 
encompass key dynamics of late modernity underlying bureaucratic practice and 
broader political imaginary: textual devices are powerfully employed in “the (fake) 
document” through “uncertainty, imagination, and sentiment” (559).  In pursuing the 
perversity of utter distrust and terror that normalizes reading “meaning into 
everything” regardless of the actual, if any, intention in circulation of written (fake) 
documents, he makes an interesting case in terms of the material consequences that 
“force of falsity” can have on people’s lives.  For Bubandt, the “social life” of what he 
calls “truthful fake” materializes into same consequences—terror and violence—not 
because of the certainty of its fakeness but because of the “dual reality of both 
seeming fact and seeming fake” at the same time (561).  Further, he demonstrates the 
ways in which state officials use the “fake letter” as a strategic element in countering 
suspected deception and terror by actual violence.  The centrality of empathy and 
inauthenticity of power, Bubandt argues, is what reinstates and makes the state 
enforce “legitimate” violence.   
Two concerns raised by Bubandt’s argument are salient for my discussion 
surrounding the “social life,” if invisible features, of I-589.  First, it has to do with the 
issue of reading between lines or interpreting “meaning into everything” by 
respondents, in particular, pages 5 and 6.  Unlike the production and circulation of 
“fake letter” in Bubandt’s essay, the existence of I-589 as a fact sheet is assumed in 
the context of asylum application.  The form is presumed to uphold transparency at 
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all times —as in constant referral to specific laws in the Convention Against Torture, 
U.S. federal laws, and I-589 instruction manual for determining eligibility—despite 
obvious opacity presented by indistinguishable parts between the form and the 
content, which I will discuss in some detail.  Second, it is not the question of fakeness 
or truthfulness of “the document” but the possibility of both potentially true and fake 
asylum claimant as respondent filling out the I-589 form that is assumed.  In this 
sense, the authority and the authenticity of the state produced by the form results in, 
arguably, similar but not same type of anxiety and illegibility.  Here, the document acts 
as a policing object that gauges deception to the state, which propels respondents’ to 
fully and imaginatively participate prior and during submission of the asylum claims.   
It is still the centrality of unpredictability or uncertainty regarding the actual 
asylum decision and utter illegitimacy of the claimant that make I-589 form that much 
more important from the perspectives of the lawyers, inviting them to fully participate 
in effective legitimization of state power.  For one, the form is co-authored and 
reviewed and revisited repetitively by several lawyers working on a given asylum case.  
It incorporates carefully thought-through choice of legal language, substantial time 
and strategy go into writing of these documents, but the final reception and legitimacy 
given to the final documents is either by the immigration judge or the asylum 
officer—and are just as unpredictable as the merit hearing or asylum interview itself.  
Further, how and which part of these documents will be read and subsequently 
emphasize by the assigned judge either in favor or in opposition of defense, 
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representing an asylum claimant, at the merit hearing is ultimately unpredictable.  
How they will be read by the federal prosecutor for carrying out the cross-
examination in the courtroom is equally random.  
The life of page 5 within and beyond legal certainty  
Central to page 5 (Figure 1.1) in I-589 form is soliciting both narrative 
description and specific information from the asylum claimant.  While not overtly 
referring to any particular narrative, the first question under “Part B” asks the 
following: “Why are you applying for asylum or withholding of removal under section 
241(b)(3) of the INA, or for withholding of removal under the Convention Against 
Torture? Check the appropriate box(es) below and then provide detailed answers to 
questions A and B below:”  The irony of the visible frame is far too evident to ignore: 
the question is followed by a lengthy instruction to “provide specific dates, places, 
descriptions about each event or action described” along with a recommendation to 
follow series of quite specific instruction, starting with “Part 1: Filing Instructions, 
Section II, ‘Basis of Eligibility,’ Parts A-D, Section V, ‘Completing the Form,’….”  To 
assist the claimant, six different options are provided with clear if, again, somewhat 
empty terms: “Political opinion,” “Membership in a particular social group,” or 
“Torture Convention.”  For such defining practice visible in the form, one would 
assumes an equally clear, succinct, and straight forward response desired from the 
respondent, which is not the case in the asylum interpretation process.  
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A second crucial point to note is the way in which the terms such as 
“mistreatment,” “threat,” and “harm” appear in the two questions, followed 
methodically by “when,” “how,” “why,” “what” and “who” statements, inviting 
respondents to “explain in detail” specific incidents and events.  Responses to the two 
questions, as every pro bono lawyer I worked with attested, are perhaps most 
important in increasing the likelihood of the claimants’ document to be considered and 
read closely once the claim is submitted.  In what follows, I consider the two 
questions and offer some discussion on specific consequences of the rhetorical 
devices used: 
Question 1A:  Have you, your family, or close friends or colleagues ever 
experienced harm or mistreatment or threats in the past by anyone? 
Question 1B:  Do you fear harm or mistreatment if you return to your home 
country? 
At the outset, the seeming clarity and transparency of the two questions leave no 
space for recalling, articulating, and narrating experiences of “harm” and 
“mistreatment” in non-chronological order or presented in disjointed and fragmentary 
memories.  But I want to suggest that the transparency and precision communicated 
by these broad and general terms are meant to elicit animated and specific accounts of 
“mistreatment” and “harm.”  
This is also where lawyers’ employment of interpretive frames—making 
reference to the I-589 instruction form or UN Convention Against Torture 
handbook—is assumed and expected.  Consider the following instruction pertaining 
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to the two questions on the form on the I-589 instruction manual (Figure 1.2, also 
available online): 
This part asks specific questions relevant to eligibility for asylum, for 
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, or for withholding 
of removal under the Convention Against Torture.  At Question 1, check the 
box(es) next to the reason(s) that you are completing this application.  For all 
other questions, cheek ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in the box provided (sic). 
 
If you answer ‘Yes’ to any question, explain in detail using Form I-589 
Supplement B or additional sheets of paper, as needed. 
 
You must clearly describe any of your experiences, or those of family members 
or others who have had similar experiences that may show that you are a 
refugee. 
The explanation is additional “empty” phrases restating, and not necessarily 
reframing, the questions in the form, but two issues are visually striking on this page 
of the instruction manual: recommendation to further refer to the section 241(b)(3) of 
the INA under the Convention Against Torture and the usage of the term “refugee” 
that appears nowhere in I-589 form.  While “eligibility for asylum” is regarded highly 
critical according to both I-589 form and instruction manual, page 4 of the same 
manual provides contradictory information.  Under “Legal Sources Relating to 
Eligibility,” for instance, it is clearly written that 
The documents listed below are some of the legal sources relating to asylum, 
withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3)….These sources are provided 
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for reference only.  You do not need to refer to them in order to complete your 
application. 
Several “legal sources” (Figure 1.3) are listed following this blurb about eligibility 
statement.  Such instruction written with clarity and precision communicate mixed 
messages to respondents unfamiliar with the particular legal frame and pattern of, and 
not the law pertaining to, asylum documentation.  It is, thus, particularly tricky if one 
is filing the I-589 form for the first time.  Claimants are, in effect, expected to 
determine their eligibility prior filing the asylum application as per page 5 on I-589 
with reference to specific instruction on part about “Completing the Form” only to 
receive further direction that is based on specific knowledge—and not necessarily 
experience of “harm” or “mistreatment” or “threat”—that has already been 
documented as legal source in the Convention Against Torture.  Arguably, it is this 
implicit knowledge that is expected to guide the respondents’ determination of and 
subsequent response to their eligibility as a “refugee” through the interpretive lens and 
legal framework written in the Convention document.   
The instruction form is then much more directive, shifting the responsibility 
for the forms to legal experts, representatives, or anyone familiar with or knows how 
to “read meaning into everything” for gathering information required to fill out the 
application form. Consider, for example, explicitly directive, if trivially figured, passage 
in the instruction form pertaining to the two questions, discussed above, on page 5: 
	  165	  
If you have experienced harm that is difficult for you to write down and 
express, you must be aware that these experiences may be very important to the 
decision-making process regarding your request to remain in the United States.  
At your interview with an asylum officer or hearing with an immigration judge, 
you will need to be prepared to discuss the harm you have suffered.  If you are 
having trouble remembering or talking about past events, we suggest that you 
talk to a lawyer, an accredited representative, or a health professional who may 
be able to help you explain your experiences and current situation. 
The passage above highlights, again, the visual frames indicating both clarity and the 
precision.  Yet what appears on the outset as a series of options and 
recommendations, provide very specific legal and interpretive frames beyond listing of 
one’s experiences of “harm,” “mistreatment,” or “threat.”  On a very basic level, the 
language employed in this instruction is precisely that—an instruction.   
Indeed, I want to draw attention to the subtext of the statement and the 
importance of reading “meaning” into clearly communicated instruction—as an 
object of study of transparency and not of opacity.  It reflects a measured and 
calculated assumption and provides a narrative frame not for talking about “harm” or 
“mistreatment” in one particular way or another.  Rather, the instruction here 
introduces immediate respondents—claimants and lawyers—the inherent and even 
necessary “difficulty” of “writ[ing] down or express[ing]” past experience of harm.  
“The messier and more complicated the story, the better and believable it is.  You see, 
no one remembers past events (especially the traumatic ones) chronologically or in 
some orderly fashion,” Elise, one of the pro bono attorneys I worked with on a 
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different asylum interpretation case, reflected when I inquired about the rather lengthy 
time —8 months to up to 12 months—required to complete I-589 asylum form and 
the affidavit.   
Another attorney Lisa, who had already represented over a dozen asylum 
claimants, was proud of having 100% success rate in winning asylum cases, offered a 
similar explanation.  When asked what factors contributed or determined success rates 
of the asylum cases, she mentioned the importance of providing detailed, vivid, and 
descriptive images of specific violent incidents from the past that will ultimately 
facilitate making a compelling affidavit.  She also recalled how putting together the 
affidavit for each claimant was as glaringly discomforting as it was painfully slow for 
her:   
The story has to be told in claimant’s own words.  You see, I can write their 
stories but the words and the voices have to be theirs [claimants’].  Everyone 
knows that asylum seekers won’t be using big words or adjectives…I do not 
mean to sound disrespectful toward my clients but their original and authentic 
voice will be very different from legal terminology or phrases and sentences we 
write.  And it is not easy for asylum clients to discuss their traumatic past.  But 
we have to obtain detailed descriptions to make the story coherent and 
consistent to put together in the affidavit that will ultimately provide legal 
summary in documenting Form I-589. 
For both Lisa and Elise, as lawyers who have worked on and won a number of 
asylum cases, crafting a detailed asylum story and presenting a convincing affidavit 
relied on making her claimants’ words visible and voices audible.  The obvious 
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question that then follows is: are claimants required by law to have legal counsel?  The 
answer is, again, yes and no.  Here, I want to draw attention to visual transparency of 
the I-589 forms that relies on opacity and unpredictability of a particular 
interpretation.  No explicit criteria exist that asks asylum claimants to be accompanied 
by legal representatives or seek legal assistance except for a brief section in the 
instruction manual under “IV. Right to Counsel” (Figure 1.3):  
Immigration law concerning asylum and withholding of removal or deferral or 
removal is complex.  You have a right to provide your own legal representation 
at an asylum interview and during immigration proceedings before the 
Immigration Court at no cost to the U.S. Government. 
 
If you need or would like help to complete this form and to prepare your 
written statements, assistance from pro bono (free) attorneys and/or voluntary 
agencies may be available.  Voluntary agencies may help you for no fee or a 
reduced fee, and attorneys on the list referred to below may take your case for 
no fee.  If you have not already received from USCIS or the Immigration Court 
a list of attorneys and accredited representatives… 
The section provides options for asylum claimants to seek legal assistance—for free—
by “attorneys and accredited representatives.”  Here, I would argue, based on 
extensive interviews and interactions during and post-asylum interpretation process, 
the clear and transparent rhetorical devise employed in the “Right to Counsel” is not 
so much to inform, instruct or even recommend claimants to seek out lawyers to 
represent them.  For people seeking asylum whether knowledgeable or unfamiliar with 
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details pertaining to asylum law or procedures rarely embark on immigration-related 
paperwork for legalization without legal representation.  On the contrary, the fact that 
they have equal right to not have counsel—immigration and/or pro bono lawyers—
and can “legally” file asylum claims to the U.S. state is more of a mystery.  Further, 
the usage of “right” here is oriented toward not only potential asylum claimants but 
also legal representatives.  The information as an instruction in this section is written 
for potential and current pro bono attorneys and agencies, real and imagined.  
Consequently, what and how responses pertaining to experiences of “harm,” 
“mistreatment,” or “threat” should be narrated are already anticipated, if not wholly 
control, by the frames in the forms.  These directive sections and passages act as 
breaks in the forms that point to a shared legal (and socio-cultural) understanding of 
those terms—“harm” or “mistreatment”—that allow space for varying degree of 
interpretive frames.   
These interpretive frames is what makes forms—as pieces of paper—highly 
esteemed legal “document” contributing to the asylum claim to be submitted to one 
of the two state agencies responsible for granting asylum—U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) or Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).  
The transformation of forms to “the document” requires extensive and quite 
elaborate process when asylum claimants are non-native speakers of English.  Since I 
was introduced to the asylum documentation process as a participant-interpreter, this 
transformation materialized in front of my eyes.  I “witnessed” and corroborated in 
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the very documentation process.  It is, thus, to the unpredictable and rather counter-
intuitive process of legal interpretation that I turn to.  My goal, as I mentioned above, 
is to unfold what I saw as inseparable method—interpretation and documentary 
practices—integral to understanding asylum-seeking process at large.  I do so to 
capture and draw attention to specific moments where deployment of legal 
interpretive frame gives in to linguistic (between Nepali and English) interpretation, 
and vise versa.  I also attend to moments when it becomes completely 
indistinguishable which process is framing and subsequently driving the asylum 
interpretation and documentation.   
************************************ 
PART II :   Asylum interpre tat ion and engaging “the document” 
The pro bono lawyers go over and explain, with the assistance of an interpreter, 
the specific grounds for seeking asylum31 to an asylum claimant on their very first 
encounter.  Often, it is the first time that the interpreter is introduced to the asylum 
claimant in the law offices unless the case was recommended by non-profit agency 
where the same interpreter was called upon for initial screening interview session with 
the potential claimant.  Although pro bono attorneys, who accept to represent the 
claimant, directly contact me, almost all Nepali asylum cases for which I provided 
interpretation were recommended by the same non-profit, human rights, agency.  As a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 According to CRS: “Foreign nationals seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if 
returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 
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result, it would often be my second meeting with prospective asylum claimant in 
whichever law firm the case was assigned. 
“People not wanting to sit next to her, give her any work, or associate with her 
is sad, unfair, and maybe an experience of discrimination, but certainly not torture,” 
Lisa got impatient during one of the interpretation sessions. 
“But it is a type of mistreatment, no?” I asked for clarification, first, before 
interpreting in Nepali Lisa’s concern to Priya, the asylum claimant. 
“Yes, but you see cases that are usually granted asylum involve severe torture 
like capital punishment or FGM,” Lisa continued to explain to me her specific 
experiences representing asylum claimants from different countries. 
“To answer the most important questions in the I-589 application, we have to 
know the exact dates and detailed description of Priya’s experience of harm,” Lisa 
insisted.  Lisa asked me to interpret for and, in particular, express the gravity of 
communicating the utter terror Priya experienced in the past that needed to be 
verbalized, interpreted through me to the lawyers, which assist in the writing of the 
affidavit that would then allow lawyers to craft a legal summary on page 5—a clear, 
succinct, and compelling legal summary of two critical and interconnected reasons for 
filing an asylum claim: evidence for “past persecution” and “well-founded fear of 
future persecution.”   
After almost three long hours of going over the first question on page 5 about 
past experiences of “harm” or “mistreatment,” the interpretation had simply come to 
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a halt.  While Lisa and her co-counselor Jessica explained and debated if and what 
experiences shared by Priya counted as appropriate account of “harm,” 
“mistreatment,” or “threat,” Priya kept adding to the list of “harmful” experiences she 
encountered with Maoists in Nepal due to her political activities and affiliation with 
non-Maoist party.  Upon repeated emphasis to recall an incident of physical attack, 
Priya started recounting one particular event that both lawyers agreed to be a perfect 
fit in terms of particular past “harm” or “mistreatment.”  However, Priya was hesitant 
to speak about the details of the incident let alone explain in detail the particularities 
of her experience.  Another two hours were spent interpreting, back and forth, to 
each party with very little success.  An hour and half was probably spent explaining 
what and how that incident needed to be unfolded, so it was only last half hour that 
the actual incident that Priya brought up was, in all practical purposes, “documented.”  
Finally, Lisa said, “We have spent almost five hours trying to document one 
incident and we need at least three or four such incidents that provide sufficient 
evidence and detail description of her experience about past persecution.”   
I interpreted back to Priya, who simply nodded in agreement. 
“I understand how difficult it must be to recall and share something that you 
have been trying to forget for the last 8 years but now you have to remember it for us 
to document it.”  Lisa explained and I interpreted for Priya.  
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“Perhaps Priya can start writing journals everyday about her painful past and 
traumatic experiences, and we can reschedule our meeting in two weeks, and she can 
just read it to us?” Jessica added enthusiastically.  
Lisa suddenly brightened up, utterly pleased with her colleague’s suggestion.  
“It is an excellent idea.  So we can all meet next time and just go through each 
incident in detail.” 
As I interpreted their proposal and excitement to Priya, she said softly, “Tara 
malai English ma lekhna ta garho huncha ni [But it is difficult for me to write in English]” 
“You can just bring the Nepali version and Tina can read it to us in English, 
right?” Lisa suggested. 
The interpretation meeting ended that day with an understanding to come 
together in two weeks.  Priya was instructed to reflect about the incident with specific 
date, place, time, and her reaction to the harm done to her.  I, on the other hand, was 
alerted about my additional role—as a document translator—in the next 
interpretation meeting.  We agreed to gather in two week, same time and same place. 
From the judge’s point of view 
When we met two weeks later, Lisa, Jessica, Priya and I sat down to continue 
with our asylum documentation from where we left off.   
Priya pulled out a sheet of paper in which she had documented the incident she 
started to discuss with us in the last meeting.  She handed a piece of paper to me and 
said apologetically, “Maile eitnai lekhna payen.  Aru lekhna garho bhayo.  Harek hafta cha 
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dinai kaam thiyo.  Pheri yesari kahan lekheko thiyen ra kahile?  Sorry.  [I could only write this 
much.  To write more was difficult.  I had to work six days a week.  Besides, when did 
I have to write like this ever?  Sorry.]” 
I did not have to interpret much this time.  Lisa and Jessica stared at the piece 
of paper and checked both front and back of the paper.  Although it was written in a 
language they could not read, they seemed disappointed by the length of the paper.  I 
was then instructed to translate it into English for them.  I finished translating Priya’s 
writing in less than half hour.   
Lisa cleared her throat, leaned forward, picked up her pen and started 
scribbling in her legal notepad, and insisted that she needed descriptive images of the 
violence Priya experienced in Nepal: 
“Can you explain to Priya that the asylum judge may not even know where 
Nepal is located on the map or if it is even a country?  She has to explain in vivid 
details the repeated persecution she suffered in the hands of the Maoists.” 
“How is that going to help the judge figure out if and where Nepal is located 
on the map?” I asked.  Instead of interpreting lawyer’s question to Priya, I started 
inquiring the legal rationale.  What I really wanted to ask, of course, was: shouldn’t I 
be interpreting for the judge, instead?  After interpreting for several Nepali asylum 
cases over the past year and half, I was becoming familiar with the asylum-seeking 
process and, in particular, legal language required to frame asylum narrative that 
provided sufficient evidence for “past persecution” and “well-founded” fear of future 
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persecution.  By requesting for clarification of their rationale and legal workings, I was 
also assisting lawyers, if unintentionally, to reframing Priya’s narrative that contributed 
to what Kleinman and Kleinman (1991) has called “the professional transformation” 
of narrative through bureaucratic (and legal) procedures. 
“You know how long it has taken for us to understand Priya’s experience.  At 
the hearing, she will not be given time to explain herself.  She will simply have to 
respond to whatever she is asked by the judge.  Besides, the judge may not be patient 
with Priya.  She has to know the exact dates of each Maoist visit to her house in 
Kathmandu, in chronological order, and be consistent as we have been emphasizing 
it.” Lisa gave me a lengthy response that did not necessarily answer my question.   
“You see consistency and accuracy are central to writing the affidavit and filling 
out the Form I-589 that will establish her credibility at the merit hearing,” Jessica 
added.  
“The judge needs to imagine violence Priya suffered in Nepal and sympathize with 
her when she listens to her story,” Lisa further added. 
Another two hours was spent trying to interpret and explain lawyers’ 
dissatisfaction with Priya’s meek attempt at writing a diary.   
Lisa and Jessica then thought of trying something different.  They 
recommended the following: “Perhaps it would be easy for Priya to simply write 
everything she needed to as though she was not sharing it with anyone.   She can give 
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it to you every week and before we meet and you can just email the English versions 
to us before every interview.”  
I immediately agreed without asking further questions.  I volunteered to 
translate Priya’s journal entries into English and subsequently bring them to the law 
firm for our meetings for the next several weeks.  I was, after all, as much immersed 
in the moments of sheer frustration and disappointment shared by the lawyers as the 
moments of vulnerability and anxiety shown by Priya.   
After three more months of document translation and interpretation sessions, 
the I-589 form was finally ready for submission.  Put together in a language that 
shifted between highly individualized account of fear and legal prose on persecution, 
the purpose of I-589 form was to present a legally compelling introduction of Priya’s 
case to the judge.   
As both Lisa and Jessica said to me one evening, after completing our 
interpretation session, “Two things matter most once the case is in front of the judge: 
one is luck—some judges are known to grant asylum and others are not—and the 
other is consistency—it is okay to forget specific date and details due to stress or 
pressure in front of the court but not provide conflicting information.”   
I learned then that the last 10 months of interpretation meetings to extract 
detailed information and descriptive images of Priya’s past experience that culminated 
in the successful writing of the affidavit and filling out of the I-589 form did not 
guarantee granting of asylum.  I left the firm with Priya that day, utterly confused and 
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somewhat disillusioned by the asylum process.  I simply did not know of appropriate 
response(s) to this new information I had been given.   
The force  o f  unpredic tabi l i ty   
The asylum documentation pertaining to form I-589, discussed in the two 
scenes above, is embedded in and draws upon multiple interpretation sessions.  In 
particular, the transformation of the form to “the document” is deeply influence by 
unpredictability of each interpretation session and implementation of new legal and 
interpretive strategies throughout the documentation process.  I will discuss first the 
role of interpretation, including varying issues related to translation of certain words 
and phrases from legal to colloquial, English to Nepali; then I will attend to larger-
scale contexts of legal documentation practice that frame interpretation sessions 
notwithstanding the unpredictable and counter-intuitive moments.   
Although the direction of asylum interpretation session was seemingly 
dependent on Lisa and her co-counselor Jessica’s legal knowledge and frame of 
inquiry, neither the duration nor the immediate responses from the claimant or me—
as an interpreter—was entirely predictable.  If initial difficulty to comprehend each 
other was a consequence of legal interpretive frame employed by Lisa unfamiliar to 
me, the latter was a matter of untranslatability not from one language into another but 
between multiple social and subject positions that frame the very perception, 
understanding and subsequent participation in the interpretation process.  As a legal 
expert and representative working on the asylum case, Lisa position was starkly 
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different from Priya’s as the asylum claimant, expected to respond to questions asked 
by the former.  Further, Lisa determined the responsibility of what type(s) of 
experience counted as “harm” and how it was to be included ultimately.  Priya, as the 
claimant, was asked to provide specific information to assist in that documentation 
process.  I, on the other hand, had an ongoing task of dual-mediation: I was seen as 
an informed-outsider by lawyers for whom I, indeed, acted as an informant, and at the 
same time, I was a distant-insider32 for Priya, and other claimants like her, with whom 
I shared common language.   
Likewise, moments of untranslatability kept invisible to the production and 
circulation of the form and answering of the two questions on page 5, in particular, 
reveals what I will call extra legal and interpretive frames that facilitated the 
transformation of the form to “the document.”  The interpretation process, as 
illustrated by the above scenes, did not follow straightforward instruction provided by 
I-589 form and its instruction manual.  Although distinct interpretive strategies, 
employed by lawyers during each interpretation session, may have been guided by the 
two questions on page 5, the intense engagements and dialogues constantly interjected 
and even suspended the act of documenting—and filling out the form.  Further, 
lawyers’ instruction to the claimant and me and indirect invitation to participate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  My role as an “outsider within” (Collins 1991), deeply implicated in my constant engagement with 
both parties and contribution to the interpretation process, is part of the broader debate that I 
pursue elsewhere.	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contribute in answering and, by extension, assisting in filling out the form I-589, in 
particular, raises interesting anthropological questions.   
In following through particular recommendations in the instruction manual, 
Lisa laid out two ground rules clearly from the very beginning of our meeting.  First, 
both interpreter and claimant were made familiar with “cases that are usually granted 
asylum involve severe torture like capital punishment or FGM;” in practice, this was 
not only meant to introduce and educate Priya and me of what qualified as asylum 
claims but also to encourage us to speak of and discuss in detail only those aspects of 
“harm” and “mistreatment” that involved physical violence equivalent to legal-
political understanding of torture.33  Second, the introduction of I-589 forms as an 
important piece of document that needed extreme care and attention guiding the 
interpretation sessions over the next several months.  Judging from my own 
experience as an interpreter, the in-depth discussion of the forms facilitated the 
interpretation session and my own responses.  It also established distinct roles as each 
of us were asked to play, indicating lawyers’ overall control over the context and 
content, and not necessarily the direction, of inquiries related to the form and 
conversations pursued thereafter.  
Another important aspect of initiation process has to do with what and how 
certain questions are read legally and, in turn, interpreted to the claimant for achieving 
desirable responses.  Here, let me begin with Lisa’s initial attempt to search for and 	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indirectly guide the claimant to conjure up specific account of “harm” or 
“mistreatment” not simply derived from eligibility parameters and requirements in the 
asylum law.  Her understanding of what counted as severe “mistreatment” was drawn 
from her previous knowledge and experience working on asylum claims and 
representing different claimants.  As such, her expertise on asylum law and process 
was as dependent on her familiarity with legal knowledge and pattern as on her skills 
to convince Priya and me to fully participate and follow specific procedure 
throughout asylum interpretation.   
The overt introduction and importance given to the two questions, especially 
the emphasis on 3-4 particular events and incidents of “harm” that needed to be 
described in detail with vivid images, and the encouragement to the claimant to keep 
journal entry to recount “painful past and traumatic experiences” unable to narrate 
efficiently gradually led to more active involvement in the documentation practice on 
my part as well as on the part of the claimant in terms of using their imagination and 
sentiment.  The claimant was encouraged, indeed instructed, to consider, among other 
things, the difficulty of recalling, expressing and, sharing of her painful past.  For 
instance, Priya’s attempt at writing her painful experience in less than a page 
document in the second interpretation scene was not totally surprising given lawyers’ 
declared conviction regarding the understandable difficulty of sharing traumatic past.  
It lays bare, on a basic level, the equal “difficulty” of writing about an incident of 
“harm” or “mistreatment.”  Indeed, I want to draw on this moment of interaction 
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between the claimant and the lawyers, shaped by very different discussions than in the 
previous interpretation session, when the difficulty relied on the claimants’ response 
to questions on page 5 of the I-589 form.   
At the outset, the short, written document presented by Priya seemed to go 
against lawyers’ expectation.  In retrospect, however, lawyers’ apparent disbelief and 
disappointment, assisted in the ultimate establishment of Priya’s credibility due to 
perceived hesitancy to disclose fear.  Recall Lisa’s matter-of-factly comment—“it is 
not easy for asylum clients to discuss their traumatic past” or Elise’s conviction—
“The messier and more complicated the story, the better and believable it is.”  Pro 
bono lawyers representing asylum claimants repeated emphasis that disclosure of 
one’s experience with violence being neither coherent nor comfortable point to 
interesting analytical problems, nonetheless.  It is the anticipated messiness and 
difficulty of recalling and narrating past, traumatic experiences during interpretation 
sessions that enable lawyers to determine and subsequently identify whether or not 
the claimants’ story is “credible.”  Central to witnessing messiness is anticipated 
unpredictability throughout the documentation process, and especially answering the 
two questions on page 5 in the I-589 form.  As such, the lawyers’ disappointment 
regarding the length of the short journal presented by Priya sustained, ironically, both 
interpretation and documentation process that is built on this unpredictability as part 
of the asylum law.   
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A second pivotal issue that I want to consider for discussion is the writing of 
the specific incident(s) by Priya, seemingly outside the legal interpretive and 
documentation activity, which nonetheless figured prominently in the actual 
transformation of the form to “the document.”  First, these writings in Nepali and my 
translation from Nepali into English for an extended period of time contributed to 
and even directed conversation during interpretation sessions.  For instance, it was 
Jessica’s suggestion that Priya try writing about her traumatic in Nepali, from which I 
was instructed to translate and read in English during our subsequent meeting.  In the 
subsequent meeting however, the lawyers advised me to translate the Priya’s writings 
in English prior our meeting.  Secondly, along with the claimant, I too was invited to 
play active role in the construction of the asylum narrative.  Such an advise may seem 
impromptu, and somewhat unanticipated, given the fact that each instruction was 
devised at the end of each interpretation session depending on the content and the 
direction of the topic being discussed.   However, these moments of ambiguities and 
uncertainties, materialized throughout interpretation process, were not without a 
purpose, even if they may have been accidental.  It consistently opened up a space for 
broader interpretive frame to be employed by lawyers, claimant, and interpreter.  They 
collectively facilitated and became the ground for making of “the document,” as it was 
asylum interpretation sessions like the ones I have described in some detail that led to 
filing of the I-589 form. 
Documents do “talk back” 
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It is critical to note several summary points, not so much about the practical 
legal dimensions of the documentary practice as about the interpretation process 
through which the form became “the document” and made its traces visible.  A first 
point is the general language pregnant with terms with which the form invites active 
participation and animation by its respondents—lawyers, interpreter, and asylum 
claimant.  Three central words here are “harm,” “mistreatment,” and “threat” that 
both invoke legal interpretive strategy and specific narrative practice.  It is not quite 
clear what those terms mean or how might one recognize the desirable and 
anticipated effect within the institutional context.  Only through anticipated 
participation by lawyers and their legal expertise and familiarity with the asylum 
process, and not the asylum law, that their institutional meaning becomes somewhat 
possible to grasp.  This is not to suggest that asylum legal procedure and 
documentation process are inefficient or unimportant indeed, nor is it to claim that 
asylum documentation is alone using these broad words and vague framing of 
questions that invite and instigate ambiguities and extra-legal meaning.  In fact, the 
conviction among asylum legal experts and practitioners of the form’s significance in 
documenting detail experience of their claimants’ “harm” and “mistreatment” is 
directly related to documentary inutility—which implies that something other than the 
usual documentary method is a prerequisite to successful documentation. 
Consequently, that prerequisite has to do with the narrative specificity that can 
only come across through and is grounded on mediation within and beyond legal 
	  183	  
documentary practice.  The work of mediation—as in interpretation process—focuses 
on how and to what extent eliciting of the most practical, comprehensive, if 
fragmented and disjointed, and intense information from respondents be collected: 
how might indirect references be framed relating to specific questions on the I-589 
form leading to the most desirable types of responses by the claimants?  And how 
might the institutional language and requirements of legal interpretive frame assist 
lawyers in collecting, encouraging, and instructing their clients in a one particular way 
or another.  Not only must there be a space for greater legal interpretability as to how 
asylum claims would be submitted successfully, but such framing must also expect 
broader incorporation and active participation of claimants—non-English speakers—
and their legal representatives—that subsequently allow them to learn and discipline 
themselves to act (upon learning) what and how appropriately to respond to certain 
inquiries. 
A further point about the interpretation process has to do with extra-legal 
documentation that reinterpreted the flow and parameters of responding to the two 
questions in the form as well as provided a different format for continuing 
interpretation.  The shift from filling out the form to writing and translating of 
specific incidents of “harm” during non-legal documentary practice point to a much 
more interesting issue about unpredictability of responses, not in content per se but in 
the kinds of issues related to “harm” or “mistreatment” raised and pursued during 
interpretation.  Inasmuch as lawyers’ emphasized the centrality of coherence, 
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consistency and accuracy in filling out the form and general legal documentation, it 
gradually became clear to me the role of inconsistent, incoherent, and seemingly 
marginal extra-legal documentary practice throughout the interpretation process.   
The actual filing of the form did not occur until the extra-legal documentation, 
repeated guidance, and reinterpretation of the same terms and anticipation of 
responses discussed to the satisfaction of lawyers assisting with the case.  In this 
sense, the non-legal documentary practice and interpretation simultaneously 
influenced the actual documentation of the form as well as achieved successful 
disciplining, expected or unanticipated, of the asylum claimant and the interpreter.  
Not to mention, this combination of extra-legal documentation and interpretation 
process was akin to some sort of legal workshop on asylum procedure: as lawyers 
experimented with different legal interpretive strategies to come up with the most 
efficient way to extract information, claimant and interpreter learned to gauge, 
improvise and construct their measured responses with guidance and approval of 
lawyers.  Interpretation process, thus, above many other things, was not simply an 
indispensable aspect of but provided the very format to undertaking asylum 
documentation. 
******************************** 
PART III :  Interpre t ing the  extra- l ega l  documentat ion  
Filling out of I-589, inseparable from making of the form into “the document,” 
as critical aspect of asylum documentation all materialized during interpretation 
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process.  If one reads the form with care and simply attends to practical question 
concerning description of past “harm” or “mistreatment” without lawyers’ constant 
interpretation and insistence on identifying and subsequently responding to 
experiences in a particular way, the form would not have had the same effect.  And 
rarely are the claimant or the interpreter likely to read into or pay attention to the 
questions in the form in the same manner, say the ones on Page 5.  As Harper (1998) 
suggest, “careers” of documents anticipate and are embedded in specific moments of 
present—in ways forms are used, read, filled out, and incorporated—both in terms of 
their immediate consequences for expected audiences and in the broader institutional 
practices they are circulated and processed.  Brenneis (2006) builds on the immediate 
career of documents to point beyond the specific consequences to larger historical 
process that also shapes roles of and expectations from different respondents to the 
same form.  As such, for the claimant and the interpreter (the first time around) 
unfamiliar with the frames of the I-589 form, the apparent transparency may seem as 
straightforward and simple; for the lawyers, familiar with asylum-seeking process, 
what surfaces as transparency becomes the central point of contention, in-depth 
investigation, and analysis.   
Likewise, both type(s) and direction of specific issues pursued during 
interpretation dependent on both legal and language interpretation of the form for 
asylum documentation.  The unpredictable moments of non-legal, or, what I have 
called extra-legal, documentary practice as inconsequential to the legal documentation 
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of asylum claims is not supported by my ethnographic engagement during and post-
asylum interpretation process.  Instead, as I have illustrated in this chapter, the form 
as “the document” that transformed and materialized at particular, if random, 
instances only confirm the open-endedness and unpredictability within—as an 
anticipated if not particularly desired consequence of—legal interpretation.  The 
documentary practices, central to this chapter, are essentially legal instruments for 
establishing credibility of the asylum claimants, although, again, it is not explicitly 
framed either I-589 form or the accompanying instruction manuals.  The issue of 
credibility of the asylum applications and claimants, now a defining feature in the 
burgeoning literature on asylum (Yngvesson and Coutin 2006; Good 2009; Ticktin 
2011; Cabot 2012; Kelly 2012), form an important basis for studying asylum 
documentation.  Kelly (2012), for instance, has tracked the topic of credibility in an 
asylum case in the United Kingdom, following the prevalence and pervasiveness of 
inconsistent decision made by the asylum judges.  I will only touch briefly upon two 
of Kelly’s insights that are pertinent for my discussion here.  First is his observation 
that no evidence in particular stand for the credibility of the claimant because of the 
legal recognition of its absolute uncertainty:  “Although judges are warned not to 
universalize from their own experience on issues of credibility, there is no expectation 
that different judges looking at the same pieces of evidence will come to the same 
conclusion” (2012: 64).  In other words, even when the documentation of past 
“harm” or “mistreatment” in the application form and other materials like the 
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affidavit meet the eligibility requirement surrounding legal definition of “torture” 
outlined by the UNHCR, judges necessarily rely upon the recognized partial measures 
on the “credibility” of the claimants.  Before the case reaches the judge, however, it is 
up to the pro bono lawyers, like Lisa or Elise, working with claimants who are 
positioned to gauge for credibility throughout the screening and the subsequent 
documentation process.  What each lawyer “knows” about asylum documentation and 
decision-making process, in particular, is intrinsically obscure and unpredictable, but 
she/he must act upon it, drawing from his/her previous experience of representing 
clients, as if providing a consistent, comprehensive, and coherent narrative 
documentation can compensate for judicial uncertainty.  
Recall Lisa’s comment, posed as a question, during our interpretation meeting:  
“…the asylum judge may not even know where Nepal is located on the map or if it is 
even a country.”  Lisa’s statement was not meant to elicit a follow-up inquiry, as I had 
done, about the judge as much as in fact to heed in agreement.  She was not 
withholding any key information about the sheer chance or luck that determined 
assigning of the asylum judge.  Implicit in her out-of-context statement about the 
absent presence of the judge was the simple truth behind not only seeking asylum but 
also of any legal documentation and subsequent judgments: uncertainty is not 
acknowledged as something to overcome but provides the very basis for convoluted 
working of legal decision-making (Good 2007; Latour 2010).  Lisa’s off-handed 
comment confirms Kelly’s point that uncertainty lies not simply on judges’ potential 
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skepticism of a certain asylum claimant but the ground upon which their skepticism 
resides (2012).  Arguably, with the extension of interpretation as comprehensive 
process as a particular outsourced strategy, it is not simply about insuring the 
claimants’ credibility in broader legal bureaucratic practices, but the process also 
becomes a sanctioned ‘extra-legal’ space for making “accredited representatives” 
responsible for gauging credibility with increased scrutiny and disciplining of 
claimants as potential legal subjects.  In a compelling study on the workings of the 
liberal state power, Wendy Brown (1995) has convincingly demonstrated that 
language of rights is more likely than not bring upon actual harm because it codifies 
and reinscribes, if inadvertently, the structural hierarchies and unequal power 
relationships that it was designed to challenge and subvert.  In particular, Brown is 
wary of the various emancipatory projects of late modernity that relies on protective 
measures rather than freedom they promulgate.  “The state is not an it,” Brown has 
argued, “but an ensemble of discourses” (174).  The entanglements of asylum 
documentary practice and interpretation—from the initial phase of verbalizing 
fragmented incidents of “harm” to the making of coherent legal statement and the 
ultimate symbolic authority given to I-589 form—point to paradoxes of liberal and 
legal subject-making. 
Kelly’s second crucial point for this discussion is that in the UK system an 
attempt to clarify the issue of credibility looms large and provides guidance to legal 
representatives working on asylum cases to identify between “internal” and “external” 
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credibility issues: the former is associated with “the coherence of the account and the 
details provided by the applicant” and the latter relates to “the match between the 
account and ‘generally known facts’” never explicitly outlined and documented 
(2012:64).  The asylum procedures employed in the UK system is applicable to the US 
system since both are shaped by the UNHCR Convention Against Torture, which 
defines credibility on the basis of “coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally 
known facts, and therefore is, on balance capable of being believed” (UNHCR 1998: 
11, cited in Kelly 2012: 64).  Lisa’s statement, followed by her elaborate reason for 
Priya to explain in detail her past experiences of harm or mistreatment in couched 
under this importance of coherent and consistent account of past persecution.  Also, 
recall Jessica’s forthright statement—“consistency and accuracy are central to writing 
the affidavit and filling out the Form I-589 that will establish her credibility at the 
merit hearing.”  The lawyers’ emphasis on filling out the form in a particular way was 
based on two decisive factors: their knowledge of specific requirements upheld by 
both USCIS and Department of Justice drawn from the UNHCR and, consequently, 
their anticipation of the merit hearing where judgment about credibility of claims is 
ultimately based on “assessing limited oral evidence against a range of written 
evidence” (65).  Not only asylum documentation is gradually revealed during 
interpretation—from legal discretion-laden phrases to practicality—so also are the 
discretionary roles of judges and asylum officers and their anticipated participation in 
the process.  And these moments of visibility and of transparency addressing practical 
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issues during interpretation, I have been suggesting throughout this paper, do not 
conceal but justify the overt conditions to legal discretionary power of the state and 
broader implications on individuals as asylum claimants. 
My own ethnographic engagement throughout the documentation process 
suggests an additional kind of transformation and making of “the document”: 
bureaucratic forms are made accessible, transparent, and free from broader legal 
framework so active participation from respondents are anticipated, even encouraged, 
while effectively making them into increasingly disciplined legal claimants, interpreters 
and lawyers during the process.  As I have tried to illustrate this point through actual 
interpretation sessions how this legal documentation practice is sustained and even 
contingent on extra-legal activities and documentation at particular interpretation 
moments.  It is not so much that one “becomes” an asylum claimant or a pro bono 
lawyer as that one gradually learns how to be perceived as recognizable claimant or 
lawyer or asylum interpreter, for that matter.  As anthropologists (Britan and Cohen 
1980; Crozier 1967; Strathern 1995, 2004; Riles 2000; Brenneis 2006; Shore and 
Wright 1997; Frohman 2008; Feldman 2008; James 2010) have consistently shown 
that the embeddedness of social actors in different bureaucratic contexts that are not 
somehow external to the range of ethical concerns and political possibilities. 
Finally, I want to briefly point to the broader implication of interpretation 
process informing and improvising asylum documentation practice.  By assuming 
respective role as legal experts or representatives of the claimants, the asylum 
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interpretation meetings become, arguably, the extension of a state politically “at large” 
through disciplining and training of the asylum subject.  The asylum documentation 
achieves its authority by invoking the state through judicial power of the absent judge.  
At the same time, in ways similar to the judicial power that the asylum documentation 
invokes, the asylum interpretation throughout documentation becomes an important 
legal platform to negotiate, measure, and ultimately produce evidence for “well 
founded fear.”  The asylum documentation and interpretation process are thus shot 
through with unpredictability, intensity, and imagination.  Their production entails 
mixture of inconsistency and hesitation, of incomprehension and untranslatability that 
highlight intrinsic connection between fear and credibility.  The unpredictability of the 
asylum decision (should) remind us that fear is as much a condition to the production 
of legal subject as an individualized account of persecution. 
Concluding thoughts   
Asylum interpretation sessions are, thus, arresting encounters of intense 
engagements, moments of awkward silences, disjuncture, and unexpected 
interruptions, featuring not simply the production of legal documents and their social 
life thereafter, but rather they become the ground for negotiating and laying out rules 
for those seeking asylum and those assisting with asylum claimants.  Such a line of 
thinking forces us to see asylum legal interpretation as providing the very format for, 
and not simply a by-product of, asylum “suffering narrative” and documentary 
practices.  There are two recurring and interconnected concerns about interpretation 
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and documentary practice that I hope readily materialized from this chapter.  The first 
question I kept coming back to relates to the conditions of production of asylum 
documentation: What rationale entail for legal advocates and experts working on 
asylum cases to emphasize claimants’ own voice and words—disjointed thoughts and 
fragmented memories due to fear of persecution—to be reflected in the affidavit that 
is crafted with precision and consistency, and in a coherent and a chronological 
suffering narrative, to ultimately distinguish it from legal expertise and language 
required for its representation in the courtroom to increase (at least potentially) 
credibility of the asylum claimant?  The dual invocation of fear in asylum seekers—
either as a consequence of recounting one’s “past-persecution” or as a cause of 
absolute unpredictability in the asylum decision—and gauging of credibility by lawyers 
throughout the interpretation signals the inevitability and even importance of 
inconsistency and open-endedness required of asylum documentation.  To me, it 
suggests that fear and credibility, though seemingly invoked for unconnected reasons, 
may be more intimately linked than generally acknowledged in the asylum legal 
procedure. 
 My second concern has to do with the reverse, and not necessarily 
contradictory logic, about the efficacy of the I-589 form when presented in front of 
the judge: Why emphasize the fragmented and disjointed thoughts, words, and 
“authentic” voice of claimants when many lawyers, indeed most of whom I assisted in 
the asylum interpretation cases, whether it was their first or tenth asylum case, 
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unanimously declared absolute unpredictability of the judge’s decision?  The force of 
credibility that I am describing here therefore does not depend on narrative coherence 
and legal consistency.  Rather, it is a credibility that is suspended, even assumed to be 
in possession of the asylum judge or the officer that has the absolute authority over 
the lives of asylum seekers.  When credibility is undermined, even when it may be 
revealed that asylum claimant is displaying “real” fear, there is clearly a relationship 
between judicial power and invocation of fear, and inconsistency and documentation, 
worth exploring further. 
Determining “claimant credibility” is unpredictable in legal assessment of 
asylum cases while remaining central for lawyers assisting with Nepali asylum 
claimants (as illustrated above).  There are no hard and fast rules or facts about this.  
That establishing credibility of a claimant has very little to do with the “generally 
known facts” or individual’s “extraordinary personal circumstances” presented as 
evidence to the court is not up for debate.  As Tobias Kelly has argued in the context 
of asylum procedure in the United Kingdom, “the courts recognize that credibility is 
in the eye of the beholder” and, more importantly, “rejections on the grounds of lack 
of credibility are very difficult to take further” (2012: 64).  Thus, the fact that asylum 
decisions are completely erratic and based on the discretionary power of the judge or 
an asylum officer is irrefutable although not publicly acknowledged.  This is quite 
simple.  What is of interest to me then is how (and in what specific ways) do lawyers 
and human rights workers align what they must do with what they say they do to ensure  
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“claimant credibility.”  More importantly, how is this elusive thing called credibility 
might be put into practice by asylum lawyers and human rights experts?  This is the 
subject I examine in some detail in the next chapter. 	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Figure 1.1: Form I-589, Appl i cat ion for  Asylum and for  Withholding o f  
Removal  (Page 5) 	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Figure 1.2: Form I-589, Appl i cat ion for  Asylum and for  Withholding o f  
Removal  Instructions (Page 6) 
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Figure 1.3: Form I-589, Appl i cat ion for  Asylum and for  Withholding o f  
Removal  Instructions (Page 4) 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Asylum cultural orientation: putting “claimant credibility” into practice  
 
 
“…for most human action is less a product of intellectual deliberation and conscious 
choice than a matter of continual, intuitive, and opportunistic changes of course—a 
‘cybernetic’ switching between alternatives that promise more or less satisfactory 
solutions to the ever-changing situation at hand.” 
--Michael Jackson (Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies, and Effects, 2005: xii) 
 
 
In the last chapter, I focused on the creation of the document and how it ‘talks 
back.’   This chapter expands on this argument by documenting asylum process that 
structures socio-legal relationship between asylum claimants and pro bono lawyer 
lawyers—a template for not only thinking and self-reflection but the condition to 
social engagement, performance, and action.  I emphasize how the production of 
asylum claimants as victims correspond equally with the production of compassionate 
actors/agents—suffering narrative looks different depending on variety of positions 
people occupy in the spectrum of asylum cultural system and experiences that they 
draw on and interpret them accordingly.  In particular, I discuss asylum claimant-pro 
bono lawyer relationship through the lens of “claimant credibility” as a discourse and 
practice orienting lawyers and human rights workers’ professional outlook and action 
in their everyday engagement with the asylum work. 
Claimant credibility reconsidered 
By focusing on legal practices surrounding asylum claimant credibility as an 
object of analysis, I highlight that legal-political and bureaucratic motivations and 
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compassion practiced by both state and non-state actors to justify and simultaneously 
give meaning to doing their job effectively eclipse larger ideological agendas they 
themselves may be adhering to, if unconsciously.   Consequently, it elucidates that a 
commonly shared ideological stances and cultural practices among private and 
privileged U.S. citizens may play an important role despite variation in their actual 
face-to-face interviews and repeated encounters with asylum claimants, directly 
shaping and reinforcing their declared liberal, progressive outlook and action.  At a 
basic level, parallel and unanimous consensus seem to exist on the issue of credibility 
between those labeled as the US state representatives and those described as non-
state, humanitarian agents than generally acknowledged in the burgeoning study of 
asylum and immigration, particularly in the legal production of migrant subjectivities.   
The ambiguous and uncertain nature of the term credibility has only received 
some anthropological attention, if indirectly, by scholars (Good 2011; Kelly 2011; 
Maklin 2007) who have served as expert witnesses or written country condition 
reports for asylum seekers and have extensively researched on asylum judicial and 
legal proceedings.  In his succinct study on “Witness statements and credibility 
assessments in the British asylum courts,” Anthony Good reflects on what exactly is 
meant by credibility in the asylum courts, by referring to the broad definition in the 
UNHCR Handbook employed by legal practitioners:  “basic requirement is that the 
asylum seeker’s account should be ‘consistent and plausible,’ and ‘not run counter to 
generally known facts’” (UNHCR 1992: 204, cited in Good 2011: 4).  He proceeds by 
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arguing that credibility can never be completely unambiguous—it merely manages to 
push the limits of the “corroborative” evidence provided by the claimants or his/her 
legal representative a bit further in asylum court hearings without necessarily 
overturning a denied asylum claims.  To quote Kelly’s related view: “credibility is 
often an issue of assessing limited oral evidence against a range of written evidence, 
looking behind both, to make an assessment of the motivations of those who 
produced the evidence” (2012: 65).  Writing in the same vein the utter impossibility of 
determining rationality behind credibility, Maklin has stated, “Decision makers may 
put a lot of faith in their ‘gut feeling’ about credibility, but recognize that gut feeling 
does not amount to a legally defensible basis for a decision” (2007: 1103).  Both Kelly 
and Good particularly draw on the distinction between “external” and “internal” 
credibility proposed by the UNHCR manual and employed by legal representatives, 
government officials and asylum judges in the UK system.  “The UK Border Agency 
has tried to further clarify the issue by providing guidance than divides credibility into 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ issues.  Internal credibility relates to the coherence of the 
account and the details provided by the applicant.  External credibility refers to the 
‘apparent reasonableness or truthfulness’ of the account, without referring to whether 
the individual is actually telling the truth” (Kelly 2012: 64).  “As such,” Kelly cites one 
of the plausibility clauses used in an asylum decision, “ ‘a story may be plausible and 
yet may properly be taken as credible; it may be plausible and yet properly not 
believed.’” (64).  
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The responses, reactions, and interpretations surrounding credibility that was offered 
to me by legal experts and human rights workers, for whom I provided interpretation 
for Nepali asylum cases, can be seen in the same light.  Didier Fassin, commenting on 
contemporary French immigration politics, highlights that the question concerning 
legalization of undocumented migrants is “less about who is legally present than who 
can legitimately claim legal status” (2001: 4).   
In a similar vein but with a reverse logic, I propose that contemporary US 
asylum procedures are animated less by who can legitimately establish credibility but 
who is already assumed not to be credible unless proven otherwise.  That is, credibility 
conceals a particular political agenda and ideology of how society or a nation should 
be arranged, and who should constitute its supposed credible and suspicious members 
and incredulous outsiders.  It is perhaps this illusion of apparent lack of substantive 
agenda that makes credibility relatively immune to criticism.  Similar arguments about 
such illusion and invisibility have been made with regards to other terms and concepts 
often associated with neoliberal governance.  Take, for instance, a term like 
‘transparency’ is argued to have “the common lexical currency” (Schumann 2007) 
central to political-economic discourses and practices on administrative, bureaucratic, 
economic and democratic reforms (Sanders and West 2001, 2003; Holmes 2000; 
Pelkman 2009).  Pelkman, for instance, shows in the case of Kyrgyzstan that 
evangelical missionary visions and practices went largely unchallenged in the post-
Soviet decade because of their promulgation of terms like ‘transparency’ and ‘free 
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market.’  Pelkman points out that “It legitimize[d] combining humanitarian and 
proselytizing activities: humanitarian activities are a means to reach people who 
previously did not ‘have a choice’ ” (2009: 431).  As a result, Pelkman writes, “the 
rhetoric of ‘freedom of choice’ and of an ‘open society’” effectively diverted 
“attention away from missionary purposes” (432).  And one can neither oppose 
‘transparency’ nor criticize ‘freedom of choice.’  Likewise, it is difficult to argue 
against credibility or practicing compassion for that matter.  
 Like the approaches outlined above, this chapter stresses the limitations and 
ambiguities of practices and discourses centered on credibility.  But rather than 
focusing solely on what remains inaccessible or invisible, I suggest looking at what is 
made accessible in the process and subsequently made meaningful to those advocating 
for its significance.  I argue that the emphasis on compassion and the ideal of 
credibility produces analytical shift that put procedural and practical detail in the 
spotlight, thereby concealing ideological agendas.  This logic resonates with a rarely 
discussed paradox inherent in the term credibility itself.  In common speech, 
‘credibility’ refers to situations or people that are reliable, trustworthy, plausible, and 
free from inconsistency.  But this increased believability is gained only upon allowing 
one’s credibility to put to test, so to speak.   In other words, questions of credibility 
arise out of doubt or suspicion, outright or anticipated.  In a literal reading it is 
paradoxical in the sense that when someone is put to the credibility test it is already 
assumed that he/she is untrustworthy to begin with.  Applied to the case at hand, I 
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argue that ‘credibility’ directs our gaze on particular details of the now and here, 
resulting in two parallel outcomes:  it obscures the larger political agendas and 
simultaneously takes for granted the ideological positions occupied by people as social 
actors (and legal professionals, experts, and practitioners in this case).  
 
******************************* 
 
Contextual izing “c la imant credib i l i ty”  
   
What struck me initially was that in every asylum interpretation cases, lawyers 
and human rights experts emphasized what they called ‘claimant credibility’ through 
and through.  
Claimant credibility was then the most important concept with which pro bono 
lawyers and human rights representatives made sense of the work and the world of 
asylum that they found themselves completely immersed in: it informed how their 
lawyering, and especially litigating, skills were useful and put into practice on a regular 
basis.  Cultivating compassion, on the other hand, explained to a greater extent, the 
‘real’ purpose of their hard work and investment into individual asylum cases [that 
took up so much of their hours in the law firm].  However, ‘hard work’ and 
‘compassion’ are represented as unmarked, professional as well as ethical ideals 
embodied in assisting with and representing asylum claimants despite their grounded-
ness in material effect for asylum lawyers and human rights practitioners and experts.  
Similarly, claimant credibility itself is an all-encompassing objective, albeit an elusive 
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concept, which both produces and is dependent on maintaining a fine balance 
between legal representatives’ compassion and potential claimants’ suffering.  As such, 
analyzing the particularities, contradictions, and limitations intrinsic to the concept of 
claimant credibility—repeatedly and almost involuntary employed by asylum lawyers 
and experts while referring to asylum narratives and describing individual claimants—
I attempt to unfold its value ideologies and predominant use shaping the 
contemporary asylum seeking process.     
 I would argue that despite its ubiquitous use by asylum lawyers and human 
rights experts, ‘claimant credibility’ remains an uninvestigated concept that needs to 
be contextualized within particular legal institutional configurations and a specific 
interpretation of contemporary asylum system.  When discussing with pro bono 
lawyers the concrete measurement and establishment of claimant credibility in the 
asylum process, I often received an oblique and never a straight-forward response: 
“The genuine fear of persecution and suffering shown by claimants, backed up by the 
paper evidence, and consistency in their stories establish their credibility.  After all, 
each asylum decision rests on credibility of the claimant and the claims made by 
him/her.”  These responses project a rather ahistorical asylum system across time and 
space; conflate consistency with credibility; flatten the complexity and multiplicity of 
enacting and in turn interpreting fear and suffering; and reinforce a dominant, if 
narrow, approach to suffering.  Investigating claimant credibility, then, necessitates 
delineating its meaning, uses, and consequences for the asylum cases I interpreted as 
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well as comprehending the emergent cultural ideologies justifying asylum system at 
large.   
 Consider, then, an article in The New York Times published in early-May 2011 
reporting the case of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the then director of the International 
Monetary Fund and a likely candidate for the presidency of France, charged with 
sexually assaulting Ms. Nafissatou Diallo, a hotel chambermaid and a former asylum 
claimant in New York City.  A month later, Mr. Strauss-Kahn stated in a televised 
interview that the sexual encounter with Ms. Diallo was ‘an error’ and a result of ‘a 
moral failure’ but not a criminal act.  During that same month (June 2011), the same 
newspapers promised to elucidate more details about the story—a rather intrusive and 
supposedly relevant personal history of the accuser Ms Diallo.  One newspaper stated 
the following: “investigators had uncovered major holes in the credibility of Ms. Diallo.  
Although forensic tests found unambiguous evidence of a sexual encounter between 
Mr. Strauss-Kahn and Ms. Diallo, prosecutors no longer believed much of what she 
had told them about the circumstances or about herself.”  Media sensationalized the 
story, as one newspaper headline read “A Story with Twists and Turns.”  Still another 
newspaper ran the same story titled, “Strauss-Kahn Accuser’s Call Alarmed 
Prosecutors.”  Media repeatedly reported on Ms. Diallo’s “suspicious” past—her 
immigration history, and in particular, her alleged “fabricated” account of being gang-
raped in Guinea and ultimately fleeing to the United States in her asylum application 
in December 2004.  In a matter of less than two months, Ms. Diallo was portrayed as 
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a victim of sexual assault to a manipulative and a compulsive liar.  One newspaper 
reported the plausible dismissal of the rape charges against Strauss-Kahn on the basis 
that “little by little her [Ms. Diallo’s] credibility as a witness crumbled” due to the 
“pattern of untruthfulness” (my emphasis).  Debating whether acquitting Strauss-Kahn 
of the rape charges based on Ms. Diallo’s “credibility” was unjust and preposterous, 
not to mention completely irrelevant to the case at hand, is not an issue that I want to 
take up here for close analysis.  There is an exhaustive list of publications and 
magazines, following the debate and dissecting it from different angles34.  For my 
purpose here, this case provides an important starting point to draw attention to the 
concept of claimant credibility with which I began this chapter.  In particular, the shift 
in the public discourse on Strauss-Kahn--Diallo case that opened a plethora of 
vigorous and competing views, opinions, and debate about the “asylum system” and 
especially the issue of credibility. 
During fieldwork, whether I was assisting lawyers with asylum interpretation 
cases or engaging with them regarding their respective views and opinions about 
individual asylum cases, there was no phrase I heard more than “claimant credibility.”  
This concept permeated almost every conversation and discussion I had with human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Here are some of the New York Times articles on this issue: Dwyer, Jim, William Rashbaum and John 
Eligon (June 30 2011) “Strauss-Kahn Prosecution Said to Be Near Collapse.” Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/nyregion/strauss-kahn-case-seen-as-in-
jeopardy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Dwyer, Jim, and Michael Wilson (July 11 2011). “Strauss-Kahn 
Accuser’s Call Alarmed Prosecutors.” Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/nyregion/one-
revelation-after-another-undercut-strauss-kahn-accusers-credibility.html?_r=1 
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rights workers, case managers, and asylum lawyers— nearly everyone who had 
worked in the asylum system.  For my legal interlocutors and collaborators, “claimant 
credibility” meant more than taking an asylum assignment or representing and 
advocating for asylum claimants: it also signified an assertion of purpose that 
materialized into a concrete action that nonetheless depended on their and their 
claimants’ performances.  Ensuring and advocating for claimant credibility for lawyers 
was as much an ethical as professional concern upon taking up asylum assignments.  
It was a peculiar yardstick with which to measure individual’s commitment and asylum 
institutional practices, fundamental values, and its continued existence.  Because 
claimant credibility is the standard by which asylum laws and debates about its 
institutional workings are constructed and measured, I approach it as a critical 
component connecting the American asylum culture.  
In my initial discussions with pro bono lawyers in private law firms and human 
rights workers, one of the primary concerns was to understand how asylum lawyers 
and advocates negotiated the link between their acute preoccupation with claimant 
credibility and the massive ‘backlog’ of cases awaiting legal representation, merit 
hearings and decisions, and the all-time high asylum rejections and denials despite 
proper representation and advocacy.  Nearly every asylum expert and professional I 
encountered in the city took it for granted that claimant credibility is the most critical 
aspect in the asylum-seeking process.  When I asked Laura, an asylum and human 
rights lawyer, what was the single most important reason to represent and advocate 
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for individual asylum claimants, she replied that legal representation increased the 
chance of establishing claimant credibility and the trust between claimants and their 
legal representatives.  “The purpose of continuing to do this work,” she told me, “was 
to ensure that every potential asylum claimant has the opportunity to establish his/her 
credibility through legal representation,” adding that “rather than asylum seekers be 
automatically held for deportation procedure or, worse, detained without being 
heard.”   Elizabeth, a litigation lawyer, gave a similar response.  “What asylum legal 
representation does is try to improve claimant credibility for clients that they are 
advocating for.  And that, professionally and morally, it is the right thing to do.”  Lisa, 
upon successfully winning Priya’s case, shared with me that her experience of working 
with a dozen of asylum cases in the past three years had helped her prepare individual 
claimant thoroughly that his/her the issue of “undermining” claimant credibility never 
existed for her; further, she prided in the efficiency with which she was now able to 
prepare her clients for the court hearings. 
What struck me initially was that in most asylum interpretation cases lawyers 
articulations of claimant credibility as the primary goal of all legal representation, there 
was hardly an acknowledgment of how this strict adherence to credibility depended as 
much on face-to-face encounter and intense interpretation sessions with individual 
claimant they advised as on the production of asylum legal documentation—I-589 
form, client affidavit, and expert witness reports.  While my interlocutors recognize 
the consequences of claimant credibility being questioned despite proper legal 
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representation and documentation—ultimately resulting in the outright rejection of 
asylum claims in some cases, and the instantaneous processing of deportation of 
claimants in most cases—the significance of their own initial interactions with 
claimants throughout the asylum process were often uttered as a matter of fact and 
business as usual to establish credibility rather than something that emerged out of the 
first several intense engagements and negotiations of competing views and 
perspectives.  In other words, the asylum interpretation and interview sessions were 
merely seen as a set of preliminary work—useful but not indispensable—to ensure 
claimant credibility was appropriately reflected on asylum legal documentation and 
during training for witness preparation prior to merit hearings.  This is not to say that 
asylum lawyers were not sympathetic or aware of the intense work that asylum 
interpretation and interview sessions required—over a period of eight months to up 
to two or even three years for each case.  In fact, most had thought about extensive 
period of asylum interpretation sessions and acknowledged the unprecedented time 
and energy, including their own, which typically characterized claimant-credibility-
driven legal representation.  Yet they did not see or acknowledge how extensive 
asylum interpretation sessions they were practicing and advocating via directly 
employing their litigation skills were in fact the basis for co-constructing claimant 
credibility.  Indeed, claimant credibility was not something that was determined in 
advance, say, prior to the screening interviews and rigorous interpretation sessions at 
human rights organizations and private law firms.  What was I missing? 
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Based on my own background and academic exposure to anthropology of law, 
I was aware of the rigorous professionalization that top law schools in the country 
required of their law students—thus attorneys—into “Thinking like a lawyer” (Mertz 
2008).  In particular, Mertz’s exploration of the extent to which attorneys are 
socialized into ‘naturalizing’ law and legal process that it takes a life of its own, so to 
speak.  Mertz’s ethnography shows how law school classrooms emphasize not only 
the interpretation of individual cases but also the manner in which they are presented 
(via language of law) and litigated.  This training of law students, as future lawyers, 
depends on their ability to effectively normalize the official language of law, thereby 
reinforcing the perceived neutrality of the law.  Such a socialization (or 
professionalization) then rests on “willful suspension of disbelief,” where believing in 
their client’s story and their “credibility” become an ethical imperative for lawyers.  It 
also makes the client-interrogating process geared toward legality, separated from 
what lawyers interpret as moral orientation or reasoning despite the unclear boundary 
between the two throughout the legal procedure.  Lawyers are, thus, trained to elicit 
“legal” accounts of their client’s grievances and claims by overlooking and even 
actively evading those that may remotely pass as “moral” reasons.   
This is also similar to Conley and O’Barr’s (1990) proposition regarding “rule-
based” versus “relational-based”35 accounts and how each materializes in actual legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Conley and O’Barr identify a rules-relationships continuum, which they believe, explains litigants diverse 
outlooks of the legal system and their expectations of the rights and responsibilities.  Rules-oriented litigants 
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procedures.  Further, legal practitioners are taught primarily through intensive study 
of court cases, judicial procedures, and decisions in which contextual detail is 
removed from the preceding events.  This, according to Conley and O’Barr, is seen as 
a principle factor that allows legal professionals and scholars to argue that law is 
“predominantly about purportedly neutral principles…believed to transcend human 
variation” (1990: 9).  They further insist: 
The discourse which is the raw material of the case is treated as transparent, 
transformed into a window through which the law views the set of constructed 
meanings it calls 'facts' ... Most law school teaching is still premised on the 
formalist belief that law is a set of discoverable principles and its corollary 
assumption that judges find facts, and then identify and apply the relevant legal 
principles (1990: 11). 
 
Given my assumption about claimant credibility arising out of my own 
interaction between claimants and their lawyers, I jumped at the opportunity to talk to 
Katie, one of the pro bono lawyers for whom I had provided interpretation and who 
would help me clear my confusion.  I had been eager to talk to Katie mainly because 
of her slightly different positionality as an asylum lawyer: she worked as a clerk for an 
immigration judge in the 2nd circuit before taking up a job in the private law firm.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
are described as people interpreting disputes through rules and principles that comply with legal structure and 
use deductive method to search for human agent as the cause.  Litigants who show relational-orientation, in 
contrast, use inductive method to interpret disputes by addressing broad social rules.  According to Conley 
and O’Barr, relational-oriented litigants’ accounts can be seen as imprecise, illogical, and irrelevant to the case. 
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Katie spoke of many asylum claims while working as a clerk, where many people had 
“fabricated their stories and obtained asylum” and more credible claimants without 
proper legal representation being denied.  Because she was not in a position to 
challenge or dispute any of those “fabricated” cases she grudgingly approved and to 
provide assistance to credible claimants, she felt the need to “do something” about 
“genuine refugees and credible asylum seekers trying to obtain asylum in the US.”  
Situated at these crossroads, Katie was “the ideal” interlocutor.  I was hopeful that 
Katie could capture the ongoing relationship between the frequency of asylum 
interview and interpretation sessions with that of establishing claimant credibility.  
Assuming that Katie would be alert of the elusive nature of claimant credibility and 
more forthcoming to acknowledge the limitations offered by the concept, I asked 
“Do you see there is an inherent inconsistency between establishing claimant 
credibility and the actual asylum process—the fact that asylum seekers already occupy 
a role of suspicious individuals given that asylum interpretation sessions and 
interviews go on for years—especially the process of building mutual trust between 
you and your clients?”  She seemed confused by my question and my line of 
reasoning.  She answered in the following way: 
Here is what you need to understand—claimant credibility is not so much established 
as it is undermined during merit hearings.  So far as the claimant credibility 
goes, we get asylum cases through referral from well-established human rights 
agencies and non-profit organizations where the cases already go through 
rigorous screening and interviewing process.  What we are thinking when we 
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take asylum assignments is not ‘is this asylum seeker credible’ but ‘how do we 
do everything so that claimant credibility is not questioned by the judge or the 
asylum officer.’  Many law firms like ours represent big companies and time is a 
luxury that we cannot afford.  You see the asylum cases we take up are pro-
bono.  The amount of time we put in is completely voluntary, not to mention 
unpaid.  The firm as a whole is less likely to spend time doing ‘fact-check’ or be 
concerned with claimant credibility.  Once we accept the asylum assignment, 
the assumption is that they are credible.  Thus, winning the case becomes 
absolutely important for those of us working in private law firms given that we 
have insane hours of doing regular, mind numbing, paid-work although it is not 
as personally fulfilling as asylum work.  The private law firms like ours do not 
care how much hours and emotional investment we may put into each asylum 
case…if we do not win we have nothing to show for all our hard work…(my 
emphasis) 
 
 I was stunned.  Katie promised to illuminate me with the subtler and 
unpronounced components sustaining the US asylum system by exclaiming, “Here is 
what you need to understand,” and filling me in with details and, to a great extent, 
bringing me up to speed with the rationale associated with and beyond asylum work.  
In particular, by presuming the relationship between claimant credibility and asylum 
interpretation sessions (because for me, as an interpreter-ethnographer, the legal 
questioning and repeated inquiry into claimants’ stories and the co-construction of the 
asylum suffering narratives as well as documentation practice clearly marked an 
important aspect of establishing credibility), I had somehow completely missed the 
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point.  Whereas I had assumed that the asylum interpretation sessions in private law 
firms were structured to gauge claimant credibility, the most important being 
investigation process prior to and during filling out of the I-589 Asylum Application 
Form and client affidavit, Katie understood the screening process at the human rights 
organizations to have already established claimant credibility.  I had thought that the 
purpose of intense interrogation was about assessing validity of asylum claims and 
consistency in claimants’ stories, fact-checking their version of suffering narratives 
with that of expert witnesses, and that the crux of filing and submitting asylum claims 
lied in distinguishing between credible stories from supposedly implausible ones.  
However, Katie said that the work of pro bono lawyers representing asylum claimants 
was about doing everything to prevent claimant credibility from being undermined 
during case hearings and critical components of asylum interpretation and 
investigation facilitated lawyers to providing superior legal representation to those 
unable (whether due to lack of resources or information) to seek legal advise or 
representation otherwise.  She spoke passionately about asylum work that she had 
been invested in and how providing legal assistance and representation to credible 
asylum seekers realigned her purpose of practicing compassion.   
In this worldview, asylum interviews and interpretations sessions in the private firms 
did not so much increase claimant credibility as to ensure that it was not undermined, 
and any attempt to interpret their close relationship and one effecting the other 
seemed unthinkable or, at least, unquestionable for lawyers like Katie.  Although in 
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the contemporary history of asylum legal practices in the United States, ensuring 
claimant credibility is not new, what is clearly unique is the increased involvement of 
private law firms in the asylum cases and litigation lawyers’ perspective of claimant 
credibility to have been already established and to be external to the intense 
engagements and interactions throughout asylum interpretations.  Thus, for Katie, 
establishing claimant credibility during asylum interpretations or co-constructing 
asylum suffering narratives did not present any conflict based on her previous 
experience of working as a clerk and, now, a lawyer in a private law firm.  
 What I also observed during my two years of fieldwork, interpreting for asylum 
claims, was that simultaneous with the frequent usage of claimant credibility among 
pro bono lawyers and human rights workers was the rationalization of a combination 
of compassionate work and professional expertise and efficiency required in assisting 
with asylum cases—playing a role of a legal advocate, an advisor, facilitating smooth 
and compelling translation of suffering stories into the legal language, allowing 
claimants voices to be heard.  In other words, protecting claimant credibility itself as a 
condition to continuing their profession and practicing efficiency and compassion 
required in working with asylum claimants.  In the face of this ‘fact,’ asylum lawyers 
continued to maintain a faith in the utmost importance of claimant credibility.  
Although some of the my interlocutors began to question whether or not claimant 
credibility was appropriately established during asylum interpretation and 
documentation practices, especially in the cases where judges denied asylum and 
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lawyers had to appeal to the BIA (as in the case of Tshering discussed in some detail 
in chapter two), such a doubt did not seem to subvert their belief in the righteousness 
and compassion required of their investment into and continued engagement with the 
asylum cases, nor their belief about assumed impartiality in the asylum judiciary 
proceedings and hearings. 
 Their approach to, and understanding of, claimant credibility was somewhat 
limited, if not contradictory, in two important ways.  In one sense, most asylum 
lawyers simultaneously assumed claimant credibility while rationalizing possibilities of 
it being undermined by the asylum officers and immigration judges. More experienced 
lawyers, who have experienced overseeing and working on a wide-variety of asylum 
cases, could discern the problematic nature of the discretionary power of the 
government officials and judges.  Yet the particular logic surrounding claimant 
credibility gave asylum lawyers the tools to articulate their professional position in 
representing asylum claimants, even explain their action in terms of performance and 
efficiency.  In another sense, a contradiction existed between their understanding of 
claimant credibility as having already existed prior to asylum interpretation and 
documentation process yet the intense interrogation, legal translation, and 
documentation of suffering narrative reveal suspended belief of credibility and its 
consequences at the least.  To understand my interlocutors’ narratives of claimant 
credibility, it is crucial to situate their explanations and rationale within the broader 
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understanding of how and why proliferation of claimant credibility became a 
dominant topic in the contemporary asylum process in the first place. 
 
“Working hard to  ensure  ‘ c la imant cred ib i l i ty ’”  
Katie explained to me that even in the obvious and an “extraordinary” case of 
torture, legal interpretation of claimant credibility was required.  Drawing on the case, 
she said, “It is difficult to know exactly what part of the claimant’s life would 
ultimately be considered significant and credible at the merit hearing.  In Radha’s case, 
as you saw, everything we did was to go around explaining the 9-year lapse in filing 
the asylum application.”  The deadline to file the I-589 application for asylum and 
withholding of removal is 1-year and the case Katie represented and I provided 
interpretation during prep-session prior to the case hearing involved a Nepali female 
claimant seeking asylum on the basis of political violence she suffered 9 years before 
her arrival to the US.  Katie continued, “Can you believe that it has 1 year deadline, 
and we were stuck having to make-up for 9 years of explaining Radha’s stay in the US 
without filing for asylum.  I mean, even her marriage to the white American guy was 
kind of suspicious since it lasted less than a year.  So we explained and provided 
evidence of how she was traumatized by her marriage and was taken advantage by so 
many people for the last 9 years in the US!”  Katie did not seem to find any 
contradiction that her claimant was deemed credible and granted asylum on the basis 
that her life in the US, and not Nepal, was miserable.  When asked how details of 
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Radha’s bad marriage in the US were considered relevant to the asylum claims, Katie 
mentioned that it was a combination of Radha’s “extraordinary personal 
circumstances,” including mental health problems and depression and the political 
changes occurring in Nepal.  Since I had attended Radha’s case hearing I inquired 
Katie if the fact that the judge mentioned she had been to Nepal and had retired 
friends living there made a difference in her decision.  Katie immediately agreed, “Yes, 
of course.  We were extremely fortunate to have had a judge who knew about Nepali 
culture.  Her cultural knowledge and compassion played important roles in going 
forward with Radha’s case and not undermining her credibility.  But more than that, 
we were lucky to have had such a compassionate judge.”  The fact that Radha’s 
credibility had primarily depended on the judge’s “cultural knowledge” of the ongoing 
political situation in Nepal from her brief visit did not particularly seem contradictory 
or legally irrelevant to Katie.  Indeed, Radha’s was an “extraordinary” hearing.  Still 
Katie’s emphasis that judge’s compassion prevented undermining of claimant 
credibility and ultimately obtaining asylum for her client is something that needs to be 
contextualized in the legal discussion of credibility. 
 Whether or not claimant credibility was questioned or completely undermined, 
however, was not unambiguous.  Despite pro bono lawyers’ rationalization of 
claimant credibility involved in the asylum process and their stress on the 
compassionate nature of the asylum work, their interactions with claimants during 
asylum documentation and interpretation sessions revealed a sometimes-contrived 
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faith in claimant credibility and its actual manifestations in their enactments.  
Although it was clear that the asylum assignments they took on were those they 
deemed credible, not all my interlocutors took for granted or explained claimant 
credibility to exist prior to actual engagement with individual claimants during asylum 
interpretations.  I would not go as far to suggest that my interlocutors as a whole were 
perfectly aware that the logic of claimant credibility contradicted the protracted 
process of asylum documentation and interpretation that they deliberately participated 
in exacerbating their clients’ indeterminate legal statuses while remaining skeptical of 
their asylum claims.  In the next section, I trace a diversity of contradictory incidents I 
encountered regarding claimant credibility throughout interpretation sessions in my 
fieldwork and beyond. 
 On the one hand, I continually learned of unwavering adherence to claimant 
credibility as that which existed prior taking up individual cases, and on the others, I 
constantly witnessed instances of lawyers share ‘failed’ or rejected asylum cases 
despite being credible.  For example, one of Katie’s colleagues Elise agreed to speak 
to me about her experience of working with rejected asylum cases from different 
countries.  When Elise first met me she thought I was a potential asylum claimant.  
When she realized that I was an interpreter, she was frank about her views on asylum 
seekers: she said she primarily felt sorry for asylum claimants.  In the last four years 
she had worked closely with over a dozen of asylum seekers and supervised many 
junior associates in the firm.  As a second-generation immigrant herself and her 
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parents fleeing from political violence in eastern Europe, she said that she understood 
the plight of many asylum seekers wanting to bring their families to the US but that 
they needed to lose their “immigrant mentality” and “cultural biases” upon coming to 
the US.  Confused by her statement, I asked for clarification.  Instead, she 
immediately recounted two separate asylum stories for me to illuminate her point: 
first, a case of 30-year old female asylum-claimant from Mali who had not had genital 
surgery and was seen as an outcast among her Malian community causing her mental 
and emotional distress even after having fled to the US and obtained asylum; and 
second, a case of a young male from Nigeria who, upon receiving ill advise from his 
Nigerian friends in the migrant community, hid critical information from her about 
specific incidents pertaining to his claims that ended up “hurting” than doing good 
for his case.  At the end of our meeting she told me that she was leaving the firm and 
no longer wanted to work on asylum claims.  She admitted that she was burnt out 
after seeing too many claims get denied when she knew they were credible and any 
lawyer who had extensively worked with as many asylum claimants as she had would 
understand her sentiments.  She added that this line of work required patience and 
compassion without ever being certain of the actual outcome—asylum decision.  
When asked what entailed patience and compassion, she responded in the following 
way: 
As you know already how long these asylum cases can go on—2 or 3 years.  
Especially claimant preparation and interpretation sessions are thorough, 
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extensive, and quite taxing.  During the asylum seeking process it is important 
to build trust with your clients and in these cases it can take several months. 
  
According to both short-term and long-term measures, pro bono lawyers’ 
perspectives and opinions regarding claimant credibility fluctuated in many instances.  
Whether claimant credibility was thought to have existed prior to the asylum 
documentation and interpretation process or that which gradually emerged through 
engagement with individual claimants over the course of 2 years, almost all of my 
interlocutors pointed, if unintentionally, to its intricate connection to their job 
obligation, efficiency, and especially work of practicing patience and compassion.  
Seen this way, claimant credibility must be read as a specifically cultural strategy in the 
co-production, circulation, and reinforcement of suffering narrative and its 
appropriate alignment with asylum victimhood.  This logic of claimant credibility 
imposed certain legal and extra-legal practices that ensured, on the most fundamental 
level, the undocumented or at least publicly unacknowledged yet indispensable 
component of the asylum process in the US. 
 
“You just  have to  be a good ac tor”:  The ro l e  o f  per formance and e f f i c i ency  in 
c la imant credib i l i ty  narrat ives  
 
 The question then becomes, how did my interlocutors manage, rationalize, and 
explain the failures of the claimant credibility strategy (whether existing prior to or 
emerging out of the asylum documentation and interpretation process) in the face of 
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uncertainty surrounding asylum judicial procedure and final outcome?  When asked, 
many produced standard, textbook responses that neatly linked the US’s adherence to 
the 1967 UN protocol as a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, the establishment of 1991 Asylum Corps, increasing ‘backlog’ in the asylum 
applications, efficiency.  However, I soon realized that only a minority of pro bono 
lawyers adhered to such a circular logic regarding claimant credibility.  Lisa (L, 
hereafter), after successfully winning Priya’s case, responded in the following way:  
L:   If you are an asylum claimant, you will not know the US asylum law.  
Most probably, you will not even know English.  I do not mean to 
sound disrespectful toward my clients but their native language and 
authentic voice will be very different from legal terminology or phrases 
and sentences I write as a lawyer.  When I take a credible case, my job is 
to make sure that claimant credibility is not simply unquestioned during 
the hearing but it is also apparent to the asylum officer or the judge.  
While it is not easy for asylum clients to discuss their experiences of past 
persecution in vivid and detail description, it is equally time consuming 
and difficult work for us to obtain that information before we can make 
their asylum stories coherent, put it all together in the affidavit, fill out 
the I-589 form, and prep claimants for witness preparation prior their 
hearing. 
TS:   So you are saying that establishing claimant credibility is essential 
throughout the asylum process yet the way it works is ultimately how 
individual claimant performs at the hearing? 
L: Exactly.  To establish credibility and make it visible you just have to be a good actor.  
Take Priya’s case, for example.  Remember how I instructed you not to 
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interpret stoically and to allow yourself to cry if and when Priya does?  
You saw how the asylum officer was moved by her suffering story 
during the asylum interview?  I knew that Priya would be granted asylum 
as soon as we exited the asylum office that day (emphasis mine).   
Indeed, I was perplexed by the extent of the performance required not only of the 
asylum claimant but also interpreters like myself, and often wondered how to make 
sense of it all, given my interlocutors utter confidence in becoming visibly in pain–all 
for achieving claimant credibility.  Lisa described successful asylum cases as those that 
not only retained claimant credibility through consistency but also made it 
conspicuous through conscious performance—you just have to be a good actor—during 
asylum interview or merit hearing.   
By explaining winning of the asylum case and claimant credibility with 
discourses of performance and visibility, Lisa, like Katie, not only erased claimant 
suffering based on “past persecution”—the basis of seeking asylum in the first 
place—from her account of claimant credibility but also deflected into a concrete 
present concerns and offered a critique, if unintentionally, that asylum hearing and 
judicial procedures might subvert the professed reasons for granting asylum.  Lisa not 
only assumed claimant credibility went unquestioned in Priya’s case because of her 
ability to make a compelling suffering performance that in turn “move” the 
officer/interviewer during the asylum interview, but also that superior performance-
led asylum hearings necessarily produce desirable outcome, acknowledgment of both 
compassionate and efficient work throughout witness-preparation process.  Claimant 
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credibility, then, gets interpreted as a thing in concrete, as a sign of careful, concise, 
and compelling performance of suffering accessible beyond asylum documentation, 
including filed I-589 form and detailed and vivid descriptions and narrative of 
suffering in the affidavit.  
Implicit in Lisa’s seemingly out-of-context statement was the truth not only 
about asylum but also of any legal proceedings: performance is not acknowledged 
outright as something inescapable despite being necessary to compensate for the 
asylum legal uncertainty and the very basis for legal decision-making (Good 2007; 
Latour 2004).  Lisa’s off-handed comment should be thus understood in the asylum-
seeking context where performance of asylum claimants plays a role in counteracting or 
at least accounting for asylum officer or judges’ skepticism.  
During an interview with a team—a human rights expert, lawyer, and a case 
manager— at a non-governmental, human rights agency that I call NHRA,36 I learned 
that the issue of claimant credibility posed as much an inevitable problem in their 
professional encounter with asylum applicants as in the decision-making process.  If 
pro bono lawyers in private law firms provided legal representation to asylum 
claimants, it was not without an arduous and lengthy journey of being repeatedly 
tested for credibility during various stages that individual claimants would go through 
before making it to the lawyers.  Often, it involved mediation of an agency like 
NHRA matching up individual claimants with private law firms in the city that have 	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signed up with the agency’s Asylee Protection Program.  The question of claimant 
credibility meets another challenge: not everyone in the business of law, or providing 
legal representation to asylum claimants, was driven by a desire to protect the credible 
asylum claimants.  Rather, as Miriam Ticktin has written with respect to medical teams 
and humanitarian workers in France writing medical reports for sans-papiers, some 
people saw themselves as professionals engaged in simply doing their work, and were 
often “overwhelmed by their [undocumented migrants’] need rather than inspired by 
it” (2011: 104).  For asylum claimants were primarily identified as “refugees” or 
“applicants,” and not necessarily “asylum seekers,” at the initial screening interview at 
non-governmental, human rights agencies.  For it was only later in the private law 
firms, once the case was referred by agencies like NHRA, and during asylum 
interpretations and preparation sessions for court hearings or asylum interviews that 
claimants were increasingly identified as “asylum seekers.”  
The NHRA team of human rights experts goes through asylum applications 
they receive from various asylum programs: Immigration Court where pre-screening 
of applicants take place; other non-profit and immigrant rights organizations 
throughout the city; detention center at Elizabeth, New Jersey.  Both human rights 
worker—Annie—and the legal expert—Marie—at the NHRA were quite 
forthcoming and willing to talk to me after more than a year of providing, if 
periodically, free translation of documents and interpretation assistance with Nepali 
asylum claims.  According to Marie, only 50% of those who submit application to the 
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NHRA are initially screened at the detention center or the Immigration Court are 
short-listed for interviews for possible legal representation.  She emphasized the 
competitive screening process and that not all applications reviewed at the 
organization resulted in the consideration for further process.  When I asked Marie 
how and to what extent NHRA accounted for claimant credibility, she replied, “Well, 
that is just what we do before we recommend cases to private law firms.  It is the 
single most important work that the Asylee Protection Program does here.  Because 
you find people without legal representation going through deportation procedures 
and hearings or those wrongfully detained because they simply do not know the 
Immigration laws in this country or understand English.  What more, asylum cases are 
not a priority for the government and there is a backlog in the system.”  Annie, 
assessing the NHRA’s impact on assisting asylum cases, said, “If the initial screening 
interviews are successful we find private attorneys and legal representatives in law 
firms.  We assist lawyers throughout the cases we refer to until they are closed either 
way.  We do not have the capacity to assist every case that we take—which is only 
about 50% anyway—that is why the agency has partnered with various private law 
firms.  In the end, it is also a matter of making this kind of work more efficient.”  For 
both Marie and Annie, claimant credibility was not simply a taken-for-granted phrase 
as it was for pro bono lawyers like Katie and Lisa representing claimants.  Nor did 
they explain away establishing or undermining of claimant credibility in relation to 
ultimate performance of suffering during merit hearings or asylum interviews.  
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Instead, Marie and Annie spoke of efficiency:  reducing ‘backlog’ in the asylum system 
and the rigorous work of screening process were explained whenever claimant 
credibility was mentioned. 
The majority of my discussions, however, fluctuated between private lawyers’ 
confidence on already established claimant credibility and Marie and Annie’s hesitant 
accounts that admitted hints of doubt—that only 50% of the applicants were selected 
for interview at NHRA and even fewer received asylum legal assistance and 
representation—although not adequate to maintain a robust challenge to the claimant 
credibility narrative. When asked how many successful interviews usually made it for 
pro bono legal representation, Annie and Marie enthusiastically responded that over 
90% of the cases recommended by the NHRA to private law firms won.  “Because we 
adhere to a very tough screening process of claimant credibility here, less than 50% of 
the cases upon interview make it to the next step.  That is finding pro bono legal 
representation for each applicant,” the caseworker Gloria responded to my question 
and redirected our conversation back to the everyday workings concerning the 
screening process.  Still none of them could agree or point to anything in concrete 
that counted for a “successful” interview or credible applicant.  Part of the reason, as 
I gradually learned, was the absence of credibility-establishing criteria or guidelines as 
such.  They all agreed unanimously that having screened for asylum applicants and 
familiarizing oneself with specific protocol related to the Asylee Protection Program 
in the agency primarily contributed to their knowledge about credible applicant.  
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According to Marie and Annie, claimant credibility was contingent on their 
professional experience and ability to identify a certain pattern.  They refrained from 
speaking what, in particular, encompassed this pattern except that it was something 
they had acquired after working in the Asylee Protection Program at the agency.   
Instead, Marie, Annie and Gloria all focused on what their everyday work 
entailed upon selecting credible asylum applicants.  For them, the actual selection of 
asylum applicants was prerequisite to the asylum process and their complete 
internalization of selecting credibility pattern they hinted did not figure in that process.  
“We send out emails to pro bono coordinators listed in our database and 2 or 3 
attorneys usually get back to us regarding their interest in taking up the case,” Annie 
started to discuss the asylum case assignment procedure at the NHRA. 
“We have to first check if there is a conflict of interest, of course,” Marie 
joined in.  Upon asking to clarify in lay terms for me, she kindly elaborated, “If the 
law firm willing to assist with and take up a Nepali asylum case, for instance, is 
representing the Nepali Government in some other area then it will clearly be a 
conflict of interest for the claimant who is seeking refuge and withholding of removal 
from the U.S.”  
“This is rarely the case,” Annie interjected and continued, “We prepare a case 
packet—narrative of the client, a case summary, and an engagement letter along with 
petition filing for spouse and children.  We also send information and human rights 
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publications and reports on country conditions, and legal memos to be reviewed by 
the lawyers.” 
I learned later that Marie and the director, whom they kept referring to, at the 
agency ultimately made legal decision with interested pro bono lawyers and assigned, 
or rather handed over, the case under review.  “We follow-up up to 1 year or more 
with pro bono lawyers and their clients to ensure smooth processing of the 
application I-589 and its timely submission to the Immigration Court,” Marie said. 
“We actually send out reminder notes and emails to lawyers and have to be 
available so they are on top of the cases they accept.  Most of the time the attorneys 
working on asylum are not familiar with the asylum law and legal paperwork and 
deadlines.  In fact, many of them have never been to the court,” Annie added with 
sarcasm. 
After almost an hour of measured responses and awkwardness, both Annie and 
Marie warmed up to our open-ended and informational meeting that I was finally 
granted after having assisted on a number of Nepali asylum cases over a year.  
Perhaps I too was being subjected to their internal credibility test for a year.  I never 
found out.  While they conducted in-person interview with claimants they judged 
were credible (which each did slightly differently depending on their roles and 
assigned job responsibilities as a legal expert, a human rights worker, and a 
caseworker) they emphasized their ethical dilemmas involved in their actions.  In 
talking to me, all of them raised concerns about the arduous process of working with 
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lawyers and clients throughout the asylum process that provided job satisfaction at the 
cost of being constantly overworked and overwhelmed by new cases that came 
through the agency.   
After our meeting ended, I realized that asylum claimants would need to orient 
their mode of interaction and narrating their stories depending on what caseworker, 
human rights worker, and asylum lawyer emphasized during asylum interview.  Unlike 
my conversations and interviews with lawyers, the human rights workers and legal 
team at the NHRA spoke primarily of a more rule-bound nature of their work and 
their own continued participation in the process.  If as a human rights worker and a 
caseworker, Annie and Gloria, were concerned about logistical aspect of reviewing 
asylum application and efficiency in locating potential appropriate pro bono lawyers, 
Marie primarily shed light into legal proceedings and practice related to asylum law.  
However, all of them seemed particularly preoccupied with job efficiency and 
obligation in relation to establishing claimant credibility in the asylum process. 
Mary (M, hereafter), a litigation lawyer at a private firm who had previously 
worked as a clerk in the 9th Circuit, began our conversation on efficiency.  He made 
the typical argument that pro bono lawyers, taking up the asylum cases, have made 
asylum system more efficient, while admitting that hard-work and compassion 
required of lawyers for each asylum case oftentimes was emotionally draining and 
demanding: 
	  231	  
As a public counsel, I saw many asylum cases—potentially credible ones—that 
were rejected simply based on the I-589 Asylum application forms and without 
legal representation and hearing.  There was this period of backlog in the 
asylum system; my colleagues and I would often discuss cases that we had to 
reject.  Private law firms have stepped in and solved the problem of backlog 
tremendously.  Providing pro bono legal counsel and establishing claimant 
credibility is making the entire process manageable and efficient.  The cases 
that would have otherwise overlooked or simply slipped out of the system are 
getting legal representation.  
[…] 
I have realized that I could assist with asylum cases and make a difference in 
individuals’ lives working in a private law firm.  I recognize the value in taking 
up asylum assignments although it is essentially unpaid time and sometime 
underappreciated investment you are putting into it.  But it is a rewarding work, 
you know.  It feels good, after all, to have helped someone obtain a new life 
and opportunity.  
 
Mary briefly acknowledged that lawyers in the private law firms have made the asylum 
process more “efficient” while ensuring claimant credibility, she soon deflected the 
attention away from the talk of efficiency to hard-work that encompassed “essentially 
unpaid time and …underappreciated investment,” sparkling me to make further 
inquiries: 
  TS:   What in your opinion consist of hard work about assisting with asylum 
cases? 
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M:   Are you referring to the asylum interpretation meetings and 
documentation with claimants or external research and collecting of 
documents for the submission of asylum claims?  
 TS:   Everything that you consider hard work. 
M:   Well, the external research that consist of finding country-condition 
experts, medical practitioners or psychologists to corroborate on the 
cases require lot of time, but I would not quite call it hard work.  It is 
work nonetheless.  As for the asylum interpretation meetings, you know 
how much time we devote on each session with claimants.  In order to 
fill out the I-589 form and answer questions on pages 5 and 6 require 
anywhere from 8 weeks to over six months.  And that is only the tip of 
the iceberg.   You have seen the affidavit we submitted for the last case 
we worked on.  To be able to capture in vivid details the persecution that 
claimants suffered so long ago, extract that information carefully that 
fills holes in the stories they narrate so that a holistic picture of their 
suffering emerge that can then be translated coherently in a legal 
statement of 200 to 300- pages is quite some work, wouldn’t you say?  
TS:   Absolutely.  I have witnessed the extent to which asylum interpretation 
and documentation can drag.  But is it the time invested in the asylum 
cases and claimants you represent(ed) that you consider hard work? 
M:   Although putting time into something that is unpaid is not the same as 
work, you become well-acquainted with your claimant’s past and current 
circumstances.  The sad stories they have to repeatedly talk about during 
interpretation meetings are sometimes difficult to imagine.  Most lawyers 
who have worked on asylum cases realize that claimants have to retell 
their traumatic stories in order to apply for asylum and once they are 
granted asylum they will never have to talk about it again.  In that sense, 
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it is difficult for lawyers assisting claimants as you get to know them 
personally, and in many cases establish the close relationship you have 
established lasts even after they get asylum. 
TS:  So would you consider this process of asylum interpretation meetings 
and documentation as the basis for establishing close relationship with 
claimants? 
M:  Um…yes.  I guess so.  I mean, it is all about ensuring that claimant 
credibility is not undermined during the hearing.  We do everything 
during asylum interpretation meetings to ensure claimant credibility, and 
then you wonder about the arduous process of getting to know your 
clients’ past and present experiences and whether the relationship you 
have built with them has any role to play…you know? 
TS:  Do you think it does affect your work and specific ways that claimant 
credibility is ensured in general or does it not…  
M:   I think the fact that cases are referred to us by human rights agencies 
mean that the tough screening processes ensure claimant credibility.  I 
mean, hopefully, the ones you are representing have credible claims and 
all the background research in terms of learning about their home 
countries and locating country-condition experts pretty much takes care 
of the claims.  But in terms of building actual trust, I am sure interacting 
face-to-face has a huge advantage over a random person with a client 
number. 
TS:  Do you think that the close interaction and building of the trusting 
relationship with claimants detract from the question of credibility or 
reinforce credibility?   
M:   That is very difficult to say.  My gut response is that it reinforces 
credibility.  It is probably different in different cases though…but the 
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amount of work you put in just the same.  The long hours of gathering 
information and interviewing claimants are unpaid…this goes on for 
years and when they are not granted asylum it is heart-breaking and 
disappointing.  It is like not being compensated for your hard work… 
TS:  And why is it that most claims get rejected despite having gone through 
rigorous screening process for credibility? 
M:   Well, I am a hopeful person.  And I would like to think that everything 
works itself out and the credible claimants are ultimately granted asylum, 
but sadly that is not the case.  You do not always get a sympathetic judge 
or a thoughtful asylum officer.  The public prosecutor’s job, for instance, 
is to find holes and inconsistencies in the affidavit and ask questions 
during cross-examination that recast doubt on claimant’s credibility.  
That is why many credible claims are rejected and courtroom hearings 
are so unpredictable.  You can never know what part of the asylum story 
would be considered significant and relevant in winning the case. 
TS:  And claims that are denied based on credibility issues are often 
irreversible, correct? 
M:  Exactly.  See you can be a lawyer too.   
[Laughter] 
Not readily acknowledged how the value of establishing claimant credibility may be 
reinforced during asylum interpretation and documentation process even on its own 
terms, my interlocutors instead emphasized retaining of credibility in asylum cases in 
relation to hard work and efficiency.  At the same time, however, the extensive period 
of face-to-face engagement and building relationship with individual claimants was 
recognized as something not completely inconsequential in shaping claimant 
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credibility beyond efficiency--it was explained in terms of hope, optimism, and 
compassion.  My exchange with Mary illustrates that “claimant credibility” is not 
always unproblematically naturalized—its significance in making the asylum system 
“efficient”— and spoken as something concrete in relation to pro bono lawyers’ 
experience working on asylum cases—“underappreciated work” and “unpaid time.”  
At the same time, this interview indicates asylum lawyers’ emphasis on claimant 
credibility and its inseparability from their work.  Whether expressed as claimant’s 
final performance at the hearing, as Lisa had indicated, or the practice of efficiency, as 
Mary demonstrated, they acknowledged if in a roundabout way the value of close and 
face-to-face interaction with claimants over the years forming the basis of “trusting” 
relationship and laying bare terms of engagement for maintaining claimant credibility.  
Even those, like Katie, who was ambivalent about expressing claimant credibility 
entirely in terms of performance or efficiency, shared the link between claimant 
credibility and hard work such that they are always understood on relational terms 
although not necessarily becoming one and the same. 
Elizabeth (E), a junior associate and litigation lawyer at a private law firm, has 
an understanding of claimant credibility similar to Mary and Lisa’s yet is more critical 
of either efficiency during asylum interpretation sessions or performance at merit 
hearings being defining features.  When I prompted her with a question of the 
probability of existing relationship between efficiency and performance associated 
with claimant credibility, she readily acknowledged that asylum system is driven by 
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“more than one aspect of the asylum claims and the claimant affidavit that 
accompanies it, clearly…”: 
E:   When you have so little time to work on asylum cases given that it is not 
our area of primary business, I do think about claimants whose claims 
are denied based on credibility issues…It is not fair because sometimes it 
is not even claimants fault, you know.  It is up to lawyers to extract 
information carefully from their clients and thoroughly prepare them for 
witness testimony.  I feel it is unfortunate that many lawyers like myself 
are recruited to work on asylum cases, sometimes without necessarily 
having a choice.   The clients end up teaching us so much about their 
countries, political situations, and their circumstances.  In addition to 
that, the field of asylum law is under immigration laws, which keeps 
changing and if we are not on top of it, the clients may not receive good 
legal advise.  So working efficiently is good as long as claimant credibility 
is not jeopardized.  You miss something seemingly minor in their 
narratives during witness preparation session and the public prosecutor 
picks up on that…well, you are screwed. 
TS:   What about the performance of claimants during asylum interview or 
merit hearing in the Immigration courtroom?  Does it facilitate in 
increasing the chances of claimant credibility not being undermined?  
E: It is difficult to say.  I have seen cases being rejected when this woman 
was bawling throughout her hearing and the judge simply dismissed her 
case saying it was a bogus claim.  Yet I still think some lawyers emphasize 
the importance of witness preparation and spend more time with their 
claimants so they know exact dates, major and minor episodes related to 
their claims in the affidavit like the back of their hand.  You have to 
prepare them to be questioned about anything and in any order of their 
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life histories. It is okay to forget dates but cannot provide conflicting 
information…the suffering narrative has to match the affidavit.  But if 
you overdo it [over-prepare] and the client’s responses become too 
rehearsed, mechanical, or simply over-the-top and dramatic then it does 
not appear authentic; claims may be rejected based on the issue of 
credibility like in the case that I just mentioned.   
Elizabeth spoke of claimant credibility without incorporating or relating the work that 
lawyers are doing to make the asylum process more efficient or the work of 
performance that claimants do at the final stages of the asylum seeking process.  
Instead, Elizabeth strictly measured claimant credibility in terms of maintaining a fine 
balance between legal documentation (filing and submission of affidavit) and witness 
preparation: so the claimant is not inconsistent or ill-prepared but at the same time 
does not appear “too rehearsed, mechanical…over-the-top and dramatic.”  While she 
engages with and goes beyond the explanation of work efficiency and performance 
associated with retaining claimant credibility, she does not question the basis for its 
materialization: the tedious process of asylum interpretation meetings preceding 
numerous prep-sessions that guide and influence individuals claimants performance, if 
indirectly. 
 Finally, to my surprise some lawyers deflected the articulated discourse of 
claimant credibility and instead focused on work ethic and preparedness in assisting 
the asylum claimants.  In particular, they sympathized with the asylum officers and 
judges having to make decisions based on legal documents and the hearing without 
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“know[ing] claimants’ stories intimately.”  Below I share a conversation with Amy (A, 
hereafter) on the relevance of working on asylum cases for explaining claimant 
credibility: 
TS: While all asylum lawyers and human rights workers attend to ensuring 
claimant credibility throughout the asylum interpretation meetings and 
documentation, many asylum cases are rejected based on the issue of 
credibility.  How do you explain that?  What is the rationale?   
A: Well, there is no single rationale, really.  For me, it is all about how 
prepared you are and willing to learn on the job.  We are not 
immigration attorneys and half the time we have no idea of the political 
situations in the countries that claimants are fleeing from or their 
cultures.  You saw how much we have learned about Nepal in the last 
two years.  So most important job as a lawyer is to do your homework.  
No short cuts.  When you are working on asylum cases the responsibility 
is tremendous…sometimes overwhelming. 
TS:  Overwhelming?  How so? 
A:  Let me give you an example of what most of us do here [private law 
firms].  I have now worked here for last 3 years and doing the same job 
over and over again.  We would have to drive up to some random, 
remote, parts of the state to interview a girl mourning for her father’s 
death from cancer and interview her to discredit her claims in order to 
find credible reasons to advocate for some pharmaceutical or tobacco 
company.  But asylum cases are different.  You actually talk to your 
clients, interview them and build trusting relationships over an extensive 
period of time.  Working on asylum gives me hope and comfort, every 
now and then…that what I am doing is important.  So, when you decide 
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to take on an asylum case, you have an obligation to the claimant at all 
times.  The responsibility falls on lawyers to advocate on claimants 
behalf but it is the claimant who has to recount his story and be 
consistent during cross-examination.  The judges or the asylum officers 
do not know personal stories of claimants intimately; they only have the 
affidavit and the submitted I-589 form in front of them to make 
decisions.  If it takes 8 months to 2 or sometimes 3 years to complete 
each asylum documentation to get a full picture of individual claimant’s 
lives, imagine making decisions based on documents and a single 
interview or merit hearing, as the Immigration judge or the asylum 
officer do?  And claimant credibility can fall short depending on how the 
hearing goes and what information the judge decides to put weight on.  
TS:  So the asylum decisions—those that are accepted or rejected—pretty 
much depends on the discretionary power of the judge or the asylum 
officer believing (or not) claimant’s story?  It is subjective? 
A:  I am not sure if you can call it subjective.  It is not about believing but 
finding claimants’ stories credible. 
This discussion with Amy demonstrated that claimant credibility might not be the 
dominant mode for explaining the significance of accepted or rejected asylum 
decisions.  However, it was something that confronted my interlocutors with 
questions about the specificities of legal work that depended on prolonged face-to-
face interaction and engagements with asylum claimants.  It was about job 
responsibility and ‘obligation to claimants’ despite it being ultimately dependent on 
the subjective disposition and discretionary power of the asylum judges and officers.  
Still the hesitancy demonstrated by Amy about credibility based on “finding” and not 
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“believing” is quite telling.  Her outright acknowledgement that the judges and the 
asylum officers do not have a complete picture or “know claimants’ stories intimately” 
support my previous argument (chapter three) that the legal interpretation sessions 
and asylum documentation procedures lay out the discourse on “claimant credibility” 
to take concrete shape.  While Amy readily recognized the significance of prolonged, 
face-to-face interaction with claimants in establishing claimant credibility, she was 
hesitant to concede that the asylum judicial procedure was subjective.  Part of the 
reason, I suggest, is that acknowledging (at least, publicly) subjective force in the 
asylum decision-making process would mean simultaneously recognizing (and 
reflecting) on the role of subjective dispositions that lawyers themselves develop 
during protracted asylum interpretation meetings, opening a host of new questions 
about their professional training and habitus situated within and beyond asylum legal 
processes.  
In all my interviews, structured and informal, with lawyers and human rights 
workers on claimant credibility was a starting point of conversation that led to 
interesting, sometimes vague, and oftentimes precise understanding of their stake at 
the asylum work.  First, this type of self-reflection was not as central to explaining 
claimant credibility in a better light or unambiguous term as I had anticipated.  
Second, their justification of hard work, efficiency, and performance required in the 
asylum process did not clarify the constant deployment of “claimant credibility.”  Part 
of the problem, as I gradually realized, had to do with the way legal professionals and 
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human rights experts talk about credibility always in relation to the asylum cultural 
process.  For instance, let us return to the notion of “credibility pattern” that human 
rights workers and experts like Marie and Annie highlighted during interview about 
the day-to-day work related to asylum procedure at NHRA.   
First, claimant credibility narratives I gathered from my interlocutors point to 
an interesting relationship: lawyers’ job responsibility and obligation to their clients 
and anticipated performance by asylum claimants.  It is this relationship in concrete 
that the discourse of establishing or undermining claimant credibility makes possible 
although my interlocutors seldom explicitly verbalized until pushed further to 
rationalize the day-to-day, practical dimension of so-called “claimant credibility” 
related to their asylum work.  Almost all of them accepted the sheer uncertainty of 
asylum decisions regardless of “knowing” about credible claims and claimants.  To 
make sense of this conundrum, they acknowledged, not only unpaid time required of, 
but also movement toward, representing and preparing claimants throughout the 
asylum documentation and interpretation process as a protracted investment and hard 
work.  I had begun to learn from my legal interlocutors about layered understanding 
surrounding claimant credibility and its relationship to asylum work, and especially, 
functioning of the US asylum culture. 
Second, I argue that it is crucial to reconsider the notion of credibility in the 
asylum literature (and broader debate in the social sciences), as the understandings of 
credibility grounded in asylum legal and judicial practices linked to the uncertainty of 
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asylum decision-making do not explain ways in which pro bono legal practitioners and 
human rights experts rationalize (or redirect questions pertaining to) claimant 
credibility: “unpaid time” and “hard work” producing a protracted investment into 
asylum cases and relationships with claimants.  Certainly, private lawyers and human 
rights workers assisting with the Nepali and other asylum claims unanimously declared 
that their work contributed to the overall efficiency of the asylum seeking process in 
the US.  At the same time, it consisted of a particular type of labor—hard work—
which in turn depended not only on their professional performances and experiences 
but also the performances of claimants during various stages in the asylum seeking 
process.  However, although claimant credibility was seen as a crucial ground from 
which the asylum stories were extracted during asylum legal documentation and 
interpretations sessions, the intense engagements and face-to-face encounters with 
individual claimants over a long period of time influenced lawyers’ positions on and 
practices of “claimant credibility” was not readily accepted by all lawyers.  In some 
cases, they fully recognized how credibility was constantly being undermined during 
asylum interviews and merit hearings despite fully preparing claimants (and sometimes 
their interpretations) to anticipate questions pertaining to undermining credibility 
during cross-examination procedures.  While many explain claimant credibility as 
something that existed prior asylum interpretations sessions, others elaborated on 
specific work involved in establishing and reinforcing it.  Still others rationalize 
establishing claimant credibility in relation to their long-drawn-out and intimate 
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engagements.  They never expressed (or even hinted) their skepticism about either 
asylum claims they worked on or the asylum judicial process even when those cases 
were rejected based on the credibility issue.  In sum, the irony lies in the following: 
legal representatives and human rights workers pride themselves in assisting claimants 
they thought were “obviously” credible and relate their “hard work” about 
establishing claimant credibility during legal documentation and interpretation process 
could potentially result against their claimants credibility in the final stages of the 
asylum judicial process.  Although my interlocutors did not fully question this blatant 
inconsistency of claimant credibility, I observed their contradictory and uncertain uses 
of performance and overall efficiency and resorting to hard work of their encounters 
with claimants as evidence of gaps between the declared work of establishing 
credibility and actual materialization in their everyday practice. 
Credib le  reasons  
Throughout my interviews post-asylum interpretation sessions, I found that 
pro bono layers who have worked on numerous asylum cases often formulated a 
standard explanation of claimant credibility as a valuable aspect of the overall asylum 
process in the US despite large number of claims they thought to be credible were 
either rejected outright or had to go through the BIA appeal process.  The more 
junior pro bono litigators and human rights workers expressed, if hesitantly, a subtle 
critique of claimant credibility when pressed to reflect on their own role, experience, 
and participation during asylum documentation and interpretation process.  My data 
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suggests that the more experienced lawyers had internalized credibility as the absolute 
deciding factor in asylum decision-making without necessarily questioning the internal 
contradictions.  Many of the experienced interlocutors deflected the question in terms 
of their hard work or, more accurately, “unpaid and underappreciated work.”  Legal 
representatives and human rights workers for whom it was either their first or second 
time assisting with asylum claims were willing to discuss the contradictions, since they 
themselves were making sense of the puzzling process.  Their responses varied, 
opening up more engaged discussion regarding what credibility meant and how 
“establishing” it materialized on the ground—a superior performance by claimants at 
the hearing; a result of legal representatives performing thorough homework and 
preparing client—all in anticipation of asylum claims being rejected by the judge or 
the asylum officer. 
My analysis of claimant credibility narratives by legal and human rights 
interlocutors has shown that legal practices of asylum work anticipates and even 
produces the condition for undermining credibility.  It is the ambiguity of determining 
or establishing claimant credibility in the asylum judicial process that ironically also 
legitimates the work of pro bono lawyers and human rights workers assisting with 
asylum claimants.  Asylum work, as related to me by my interlocutors, goes beyond 
rationalization of credible vs. bogus asylum seekers, and instead seeps through 
multiple and sometimes conflicting, and even mutually incompatible, views and 
participation of those advocating and offering legal advise to asylum claimants.  My 
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data suggests that part of the reason for lawyers’ ambivalence and varied responses to 
questions surrounding credibility arises out of the prolonged engagement with 
claimants.  Similarly, the claimant credibility narratives, anecdotes, and opinions, 
though seemingly irrelevant to specific asylum cases and claimants, point to an 
interesting paradox: it is about the narrative of hard work that is performed by legal 
representatives and advocates working closely with claimants over the period of 2 and 
sometimes 3 years. 
The insights I gained from the claimant credibility narratives made my work as 
interpreter-ethnographer for/among Nepali asylum seekers difficult.  I had assumed 
that apprehending the underlying reasons for lawyers’ emphasis on “establishing 
claimant credibility” would ultimately perform my own role as a legal interpreter more 
effectively and simultaneously assist in the smooth transition of Nepali claimants’ 
suffering stories into legal narrative of asylum suffering, or what Kleinman and 
Kleinman (1991) has called “the professional transformation” of narrative through 
bureaucratic (and legal in this case) procedures.  I had assumed mistakenly that 
claimant credibility was measured, or rather tested, throughout the asylum 
interpretation and legal documentation process by lawyers and human rights workers.  
As a result, I had expected to obtain legal rationales and justifications pertaining 
specifically to my interlocutors’ work with claimants, and particularly Nepali asylum 
claimants (considering that I was introduced to the phrase claimant credibility upon 
acting as an interpreter for Nepali claimants).  However, attributing talks of claimant 
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credibility to the overall efficiency of the asylum system and deflecting it to often-
extensive discussion, as my interlocutors had done, about their investment and time 
into asylum work more often than not added to my confusion.  While lawyers 
reconciled and sometimes agreed to internal inconsistencies and contradictions 
between asylum legal documentation and judicial procedures, none of them saw 
asylum interpretation sessions and interrogations as part of questioning claimant 
credibility.  Instead, they kept reiterating their primary roles as legal and human rights 
advocates and liberal supporters of claims that they saw as evidently credible despite 
the actual asylum decision.  As such, how can one account for the fact that even when 
lawyers and human rights workers realized that asylum claims they assisted and 
continued to push through by specifically employing claimant credibility could be 
outright rejected precisely for “credibility reasons” were never explained in terms of 
asylum judicial inconsistent practice?  More importantly, how do they see themselves 
as both advocating for credible claimants and simultaneously anticipating for rejection 
based on credibility? 
 When I observed that asylum seeking process explained in the name of 
claimant credibility, not only to explain Nepali claimants and their legal 
representatives’ mutual participation and intense engagement—hard work—but also 
to transform suffering stories into asylum narrative during documentation and 
interpretation sessions, I learned that the over-usage of the phrase claimant credibility 
could not completely explain how and why lawyers and human rights workers were 
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compelled to assist claimants and even co-construct asylum narrative that did not 
promise a desirable result.  As such, I realized that something else besides claimant 
credibility was mediating legal interpretation sessions and asylum work at large such 
that counter-intuitive relationship between co-production of consistent asylum 
narrative at interpretation sessions and unpredictability of asylum hearing (and 
judicial) process could be mapped out beyond “establishing” or “undermining” 
credibility.  Why did lawyers and human rights workers emphasize with absolute 
certainty the credibility of asylum seekers as potential claimants they assisted in 
relation to their work, both professional and personal time and investment, at the 
level of their everyday practice on the ground?  Seen this way, claimant credibility is 
also a basis for producing sociality among lawyers and human rights experts in a 
specifically asylum legal practice.  It is to this concern I turn to in chapter 6.  Claimant 
credibility cannot be dismissed as a tangential discourse rationalizing “actual” job 
performances and obligations of lawyers and human rights experts and somehow 
divorced from the larger asylum institutional culture and contemporary politics at 
work.  In other words, lawyers and human rights experts’ constant emphasis on 
claimant credibility without a direct or clear explanation and always in relation to their 
“hard work” should not be seen as a consequence of ambiguity or unpredictability 
surrounding credibility.  Rather, I seek to follow how unpredictability and ambiguity 
around credibility generate and sustain a particularly influential asylum cultural 
process.  For lawyers and human rights experts assisting asylum claimants are not 
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isolated individuals working in particular law firms and non-profit organizations, 
respective, and unconnected to the contemporary asylum institutional culture or, to 
quote one of my interlocutors, “asylum industry” in the US.  It also follows that 
consistent usage of claimant credibility and tangential yet extensive rationalization of 
hard work are not inevitable from the contemporary asylum cultural context and 
institutional orientation.  Its meaning, explanatory (and inexplicable) power, and 
everyday enactment are all part of and contingent on the changing asylum cultural 
practice.   Moreover, the co-construction and circulation of asylum suffering narrative 
(chapter 2) during legal documentation (chapter 3) can be apprehended through an 
examination of the asylum cultural orientation that influence and reinforce actions, 
attitudes, behaviors, and purpose that lawyers and human rights experts publicly 
profess and perform, and oftentimes unconsciously enact.  A bird’s eye view of 
cultural orientation of “asylum industry” can direct us to questions about 
contemporary asylum seeking process as a template for producing “suffering 
narrative” always in relation to “hard work.” 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Compassionate (in)consistencies  
 
 Compassion can be an important driving force in the asylum process: those 
advocating for and involved in assisting with asylum claimants know specific aspects 
of the reality and everyday work they participate in and are part of, yet do not consider 
it as such, or do them by sense of overwhelming responsibility, practical conventions, 
and affective action.  In this chapter, I document and analyze the significant 
contribution of dual aspects of compassion as reason and work in the contemporary 
asylum cultural process in the US.  Rather than take compassion as a taken-for-
granted dimension of affect for social and moral action, I am interested in the vital 
element of its labor across the social (i.e. legal-professional) relations produced 
through and by compassion, which are open to specifically asylum-assistance 
experience but absent from larger asylum debate and literature on critical asylum 
system. 
 This dual aspect of compassionate reason and work are not usually apparent to 
those immersed in the asylum system.  It is not something actively reinforced as the 
crux of the job responsibility of those assisting with asylum claimants as documented 
in the last chapter.  Rather, it is inadvertently produced through legal/linguistic 
conventions, transparency, and differentiation between places of thoughtfulness and 
indifference.  Switching between compassionate rationale and work according to 
circumstance and asylum claimant maintains relations critical to conduct “asylum 
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work”—efficiently interconnecting professional lives, institutions, and knowledge 
across differences in legal experience, expertise, and power.  Compassion is, then, 
what is produced in the asylum system under different stages of legal and judicial 
procedures; in turn, it influences relations of those intricately involved in the asylum 
work and maintains its internal dynamics. 
The anthropology  o f  compass ion  
For anthropologists “compassion” has increasingly become a topic of 
fascination and concern (Bornstein and Redfield 2011).  Contemporary 
anthropological work on compassion focuses on its material consequences, primarily, 
though not exclusively, on moral accountability and ethical reasoning.  This chapter 
sets out to analyze the synergies between legal and judicial practices surrounding 
invocation and reinforcement of compassion and kindness as everyday, practical 
dimension of asylum work performed by legal practitioners and human rights workers 
and experts.  It also seeks to question if, and to what extent, the discourse and 
practice of compassion rely on and influence the production of asylum as a cultural 
system notwithstanding the actual legal rationale.  I do so to grasp how and why pro 
bono lawyers and human rights workers assisting with asylum seekers explain, 
interpret, and give meaning to their “hard work” and job responsibilities.  As such, I 
seek to draw upon and engage with the contemporary literature on compassion 
pertaining to asylum process by bringing together seemingly separate debates on the 
governance of im/migrants through documentary and bureaucratic procedures (Cabot 
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2012; James 2010) and complex judicial decision-making processes (Kelly 2011, Good 
2007) with political motivations and compassionate actions on the ground (Ticktin 
2011; Rozakou 2012) or what Didier Fassin (2012) has called “politicized 
compassion.”   
Centrality of compassion in the burgeoning anthropological literature (Feldman 
2007; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Ticktin and Feldman 2010; 
Redfield and Bornstein 2011) is undeniable.  These studies have taken into account 
wide-ranging critiques and formulation of compassion.  Ethnographic insights and 
critiques of “humanitarian governmentality” (Fassin 2010) have bought to the fore 
foundational basis of inequality and production of hierarchies inherent in the practices 
of compassion (Redfield 2005).  Since the passing of the Refugee Act in 1980 and 
1982 in the U.S., Aihwa Ong’s ethnography of refugee healthcare projects in 
California illustrates the institutional and political processes through which 
Cambodian “refugee identity” became a salient “ethical figure” transformed “back 
into citizens” as “welfare recipients” (2003: 79, 86).  Through her ethnography among 
Quakers in Gaza after World War II, however, Ilana Feldman emphasizes the 
complexities and dilemmas of the humanitarian workers and documents practices on 
the ground that render “refugees” as “political, rather than ethical actors” (2007: 700).  
Miriam Ticktin further builds on this line of thought illuminating how, following a 
political shift in the immigration laws and the illness clause in France, the effects and 
the consequences of “ ‘apolitical’ humanitarian regimes” became most prominent, 
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where “practices of care and compassion” relied consistently on recognizing 
“suffering body” of asylum claimants as “morally legitimate” (2011: 2-4).   
One of the dangers of overemphasizing and even overanalyzing the politics and 
the practices of compassion among bureaucrats and private citizens in liberal 
democracies is that it can make obsolete the actual, unambiguous, ways in which they 
are positioned in ways that continue to effect in concrete ways the lives of those 
categorized as migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.   Contextualizing roles of 
people as humanitarian workers, experts, and practitioners not only directs out 
attention to details of variations in the name of ‘complexity,’ ‘diversity,’ and 
‘ambiguity,’ but also threatens to disconnect the bureaucratic management with 
broader historical, political, and thriving cultural patterns.  Apart from exploring 
bureaucratic and humanitarian workings on the ground, ethnographies need not be 
uncritical of the predominant socio-cultural logic of compassion underpinning 
contemporary immigration discourse and practices.    
What is the benefit of assuming that compassion—whether political or 
apolitical—necessarily guides everyday legal and bureaucratic work of social actors 
notwithstanding their distinct political ideologies, motivations, and actions?  Why, 
after all, is compassion taken as an analytical tool?  Emphasizing the political 
significance of compassion, Ticktin (2012) has argued that “compassion is not a fixed 
or essential emotion” (113).  Drawing on Hanna Arendt, she writes, compassion  
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is directed toward particular individuals, possessing a practical character in that 
it can only be actualized in particular situations in which those who do not 
suffer meet and come face-to-face with those who do, nevertheless, the 
emotional commitment involved in compassion is dependent on the ability of 
the person called on to imagine the suffering.  That is, even if they are face-to-
face, for imagination to play its role in the coordination of emotional 
commitments, people must make a case for it, nourishing their imagination 
from the same referents; their claims must be shaped by the same ideas of what 
suffering is and where the threshold of the bearable is drawn (113). 
Ticktin’s reading of compassion as “a practice that all are trained in” (Ibid) engages 
with and extends Fassin’s (2005) ethnography of medical professionals who must find 
ways to subvert the rigidity of state requirements for asylum seekers.  Unlike Fassin, 
who sees therapeutic potential of medical corroboration and reports for asylum 
claimants, Ticktin is more skeptical of the political ideologies in which 
humanitarianism discourse ends up limiting understanding of humanity solely within 
the context of suffering claimants’ bodies or to its biological core—i.e. “bare life.”  
For both Fassin and Ticktin, it is the medical professionals’ accounts, expertise, 
professional cultural orientation and political practices that they draw upon to 
compare humanitarian practices and human rights discourse—evoking ethical and 
moral imperatives to relieving suffering of claimants.  As my data and ethnographic 
study among pro bono lawyers and human rights advocates assisting Nepali asylum 
claimants have revealed, compassionate rationales materializing into concrete actions, 
say through understanding of professional accountability and/or job responsibility is 
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as much part of the contemporary narrative of  “relieving suffering” of others and 
individuals’ personal investment and understanding of those they encounter.  What I 
am proposing through ethnographic documentation of legal professionals and human 
rights experts’ accounts of their everyday engagements with claimants (primarily 
Nepalis), legal documentation and interpretation of asylum suffering narratives and 
victimhood, and their shared dilemmas and concerns about assisting claimants—as 
hard work—is that compassionate actions and imperatives interpreted solely through 
the lens of people’s conscious or unconscious political agendas, in the end, becomes 
less useful or practical to investigating the ever-changing workings of humanity “on 
the ground.”   
In this chapter, I explore the contribution of compassion to the larger socio-
political order in a more rational, self-consciously produced and thought-through 
situation than the politicized dimension or as emotional reaction.  I particularly build 
on but also extend Ticktin’s argument: compassion depends on “circulating narratives, 
images, and histories—on evoking a historically located moral legitimacy—and often 
on maintaining this unequal power relation between…citizen and foreigner” (121).   A 
different set of questions surrounding compassion interests me in the following pages: 
what entails (declared) compassionate work and what purpose does it serve for both 
asylum advocates and practitioners and their anticipated targets—asylum claimants?  
The compassionate practices employed by both state and non-state officials 
and citizens’ I have thus far described pose a number of analytic concerns.  First, how 
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might we develop theories that allow these individuals as social actors making 
decisions for asylum claimants and participating in the contemporary politics of 
asylum-seeking process in a variety of ways that reinforce their individual decision-
making power, without either overanalyzing their actions as forms of (political) 
consciousness that may not have been part of their experience-- something like a 
radical politics—or solely justifying their compassion and concerns as genuine, 
(a)political or misplaced?  Second, how might we account for the fact that these actors 
both control and contribute to the contemporary debate and cultural ideologies about 
immigration and, in particular, claimants as “genuine refugee” or suspicious migrants 
without employing ambiguous analytical concepts like affect, which completely 
absolves them of their active participation in the ongoing state discourses and 
practices around compassion?  Third, how might we acknowledge that their 
‘professional’ opinions and ‘job’ responsibilities—as judges, lawyers, asylum officers, 
or human rights workers—play a decisive role in the everyday making of and 
management of desirable non-citizens and credible asylum claimants? 
This involves looking afresh at how compassion is brought about, forming part 
of the same worldview, actions, and politics.  In what follows, I demonstrate what is 
understood to be compassion—the fundamental basis of the asylum law, which both 
citizens and non-citizens consent to—is an intensely socio-political construction, the 
one that is only recognized through the frame of legal authority.  In this case, 
compassion is actively produced through discretionary power of the state authorized 
	  256	  
personnel—the judge—and non-state institutional partners and individuals—lawyers 
and human rights experts.  First, I introduce asylum experts, who I see as powerful 
but hidden actors in the US asylum judicial and decision-making procedures, as 
panelists at the “Asylum Law Workshop” that I attended two consecutive years.  I 
trace in some detail their speeches and performances—a recruitment ground for 
private, pro bono lawyers.  I examine how legal experts and bureaucrats are trained to 
interpret the law and asylum claimants and, in particular, what to expect and how to 
perform their respective roles in representing asylum claimants.  I do so to illustrate 
how private and privileged citizens are inducted to becoming border patrols or, in 
Ticktin’s works, “gatekeepers” (2011) of not only what asylum account qualifies for 
compassionate work but also the concept of compassion.  
Second, I take orientation from contemporary anthropological study of 
compassion—of its usefulness and socio-political and ideological significance—to 
investigate the emergent social and professional network surrounding asylum work in 
the U.S., for which compassionate reasoning an active practice within asylum 
institutional culture.  My specific guiding question is how (and why) the work of legal 
practitioners and human rights experts brought together by their commitments of 
“doing good work” and transforming suffering of others—asylum claimants—
through compassion retains and, paradoxically, depends on the very suffering of those 
they are assisting? 
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Compassion is the primary incentive apart from the job responsibility in the 
broadest sense; its advocates and practitioners benefit from it.  Similar to suffering, 
compassion is equally hard work.  Compassionate work pertains in this site to 
experiences and responsibilities described by actors and participants in the asylum 
institutional community—human rights experts and legal participants, asylum officers, 
criminal judges, and state and non-state bodies who are connected by asylum work.  
Practicing compassion is not the raison d’être for assisting asylum claimants, as many 
interlocutors admitted.  Yet it was something repeatedly offered as an explanation of a 
valuable resource.  In professional conversations, public speeches, and asylum 
interviews, compassion appears at times to be a driving factor, whereas—upon 
requesting for a concrete example or a more detailed experience—most, although not 
all, of those who have extensively worked with asylum claimants admit to simply 
doing their jobs as efficiently as possible.  As a result, the type of investment and 
work pertaining to asylum is simultaneously emphasized as compassionate work and 
job responsibility, constituting an interesting paradox, in which practicing compassion 
toward an object in concrete encompasses a foundation of asylum socio-legal 
organization and process.  
******************************** 
PART I:  Compass ionate  reason and asy lum-work on the ground 
One early evening in the summer of 2011, I went to a workshop for lawyers on 
the theme of the asylum law and related legal documentation.  It was held in one of 
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the private law firms located in mid-town Manhattan and organized by a non-profit, 
human rights agency (NHRA)37 that screened asylum claims and the claimants before 
recommending to the law firms.  There were around 250-300 lawyers in the audience 
and four speakers: human rights lawyer representative from the NHRA, an asylum 
officer, a judge, and a medical representative from Bellevue/NYU program for 
survivors of torture.  Every year, the workshop served as an introductory crash-course 
for lawyers on asylum procedures while it also provided a recruitment forum for the 
organization to identify interested lawyers to do pro bono work in representing 
asylum claimants.   
 
Speaker I:  Human Rights Lawyer, NHRA: between credibility and compassion 
The human rights lawyer, one of the representatives from the NHRA, opened 
the seminar with a welcome speech.  “This is an opportunity to make a difference in 
people’s lives and become part of their family reunion process.  People come to the 
US for safety and want to bring their families to a safe haven,” she spoke in measured 
tone to a room full of potential pro bono lawyers from over 200 private firms 
throughout New York City.  “Legal representation makes a huge difference in 
winning asylum cases and reverting decisions,” she said and went on to describe the 
work of NHRA’s Program through which asylum cases are taken up only after initial 
screening—and in-person interview with potential claimants.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This is a pseudonym. 
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The lawyer’s talk was divided into three parts.  First, she emphasized the 
importance of becoming familiar with and following the UN Convention of the 
Refugee definition to ensuring, first and foremost, the eligibility of potential claimant 
and briefly outlined the entire process involved in representing asylum claimants.  She 
walked through the asylum application and documentation process, highlighting, again 
the legal definition of “torture” according to the UN Convention Against Torture.  
She discussed the importance of extracting, recording and documenting a coherent 
and consistent story when filling out the I-589 Application Form.  “The specific dates, 
events, and details of each incident need to be consistent when filing claims to 
Rosedale or New Jersey offices,” she said.   
After speaking about general asylum documentation, including gathering facts 
and checking for accuracy, she moved on to not-so-clear area of asylum process, legal 
or otherwise:  the issue of trust and credibility.  “Once pro bono lawyers take up the 
case it is important to build trust with the claimant.  You can also bring the interpreter 
and the client to the hearing.  Actually, you will notice that the client and the 
interpreter would have formed a trusting relationship by the time you arrive at the 
asylum office or the Immigration court, and many would even feel more comfortable 
having the same interpreter there although the court will have their own interpreter 
appointed either on the phone or in-person,” she added.  This was the only 
information she gave regarding asylum interpretation process.  In a solemn tone, she 
said, “It does not matter if you believe in the client’s story; it is the judge or the 
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asylum officer who need to believe in the credibility of the client and his/her story.”  
She added that people at her organization are available for general guidance and 
consultation about the asylum procedure, and they assist with each case in every step 
of the process.  She later spoke about personally sending out reminder notes and 
updates to lawyers regarding asylum application submission and related deadlines.  
Finally, she made a full circle and ended her talk with logistics related to post-
documentation—what to expect once the case reaches the judge—and how lawyers 
can assist in the effective facilitation of the process: 
The Immigration Court is overwhelmed with asylum cases.  Merit hearing is 
taking longer these days and asylum cases, in particular, are all time high during 
this time.  The Department of Homeland Security counsel represents the U.S. 
government.  Maybe you can reach an agreement with the opposing 
counsel…Or maybe you can have a thorough investigation done prior reaching 
the courtroom, say detail and updated reports on the country conditions and 
other expert witness reports…that can bypass having a number of witnesses to 
be called to the court for each case.  You will have significantly reduced the 
merit hearing time for yourself and the client.   
Speaker II: Asylum Officer, the Department of Homeland Security: credibility and manageability 
“Let me just begin with a simple fact that we represent the U.S. government 
and the government is not a friend of your client.”  A Caucasian male, probably in his 
early 40s, spoke with confidence.  He paused for a second and continued, “Our job is 
to identify refugees.  It is not our job to prove or disprove the credibility of client or 
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his/her story.  Credibility is established through consistency—that is what asylum 
officers are trained to do and look for in every case.” 
The officer was referring to the “well-known fact” among government officials 
in the eight regional asylum offices, where each new asylum officer “completes an 
intensive five-week basic training on new legal issues, country conditions, 
procedures…” (Ramji-Nogales et al. 2007: 311). 
“All officers at the Asylum Office have had significant training and higher 
education in terms of identifying refugees or clients,” the officer continued in his 
stern voice.  “Asylum officers are only fact finders and cannot act as non-adversarial.  
We do not know what goes behind closed doors in every office.  If you feel that they 
are not being objective, you can talk to their supervisors.  Asylum officers receive 
extensive legal training and are evaluated for their performances by quality control 
department at all times.  This significantly reduces chances of inconsistent decision-
making.  In fact, we have investigated individual asylum officers thoroughly in cases 
of irregular rulings.”   
For someone unfamiliar with bureaucratic language the asylum officer’s fluid, if 
well informed and well intentioned ‘transparent’ speech can appear cumbersome and 
rather opaque.  First, the officer’s speech about the training, the anticipated dispute 
that may arise from individual officer’s ruling on asylum claims, and the opportunity 
to address concerns related to asylum officer’s decisions to his/her supervisor all draw 
on contemporary legal and public discourse that center on familiar issues, such as 
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“objectivity” and “transparency” of bureaucratic and decision-making procedures that 
provide superior “control” and “performance” measures, ensuring “consistency” in 
asylum process.  Take, for instance, the following report published by one of the 
leading review journal of law:  
Asylum officers are not exempt from the supervision experienced by other 
government employees; they must meet strict timetables for deciding cases and 
undergo regular performance evaluations…Asylum officers must secure their 
supervisor’s assent in every case before a decision issues…These features 
illustrate the tradeoff inherent in adjudication systems that stress managerial 
control: decisional independence is greatly reduced, but the system is thought to 
promote policy consistency and greater uniformity of decisions (Taylor, 2007: 483, 
emphases mine). 
 
Second, the asylum officer’s speech relies on and is reinforced by the legal discourse 
on asylum law and process.  Words and phrases like “performance evaluation,” 
“managerial control,” and “consistency” are all but ways to absolve accountability.  
The verbal and written emphasis on reducing  “decisional independence” and 
“promot[ing] policy consistency and greater uniformity of decisions” reinforces 
precisely its stated mission: managerial control.  Indeed, it is through such measures of 
transparent control that the illusion of meaningful content, and not meaning-making 
context, is (re)produced and even assumed out of these “empty phrases.”  What such 
speech and legal discourse does, in the end, is it simply reduces its debatable 
independence: by highlighting organizational details it effectively blurs ideological 
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underpinnings informing state official’s practices and judicial rationale upon which all 
decisions rest notwithstanding seemingly distinctive outcomes for individual asylum 
cases.  That policies and decisions related to asylum law does not simply arise out of 
but provide the condition of possibility of practical concerns encompassing individual, 
managerial, and structural workings.  
“The job we do here is not easy,” in a more solemn tone, the officer suddenly 
changed the topic. “We are expecting for people to talk about very personal stories, as 
you know…their traumatic experiences and past events of violence they suffered in 
about half an hour to a stranger like us.”  With this general introduction, the officer 
started discussing his “work” in relation to those of pro bono lawyers’.  He continued, 
“In my five years of experience as an asylum officer, I have seen that pro bono cases 
are most complex and challenging.  But they are also very interesting.”  The officer 
did not hesitate to make it clear to his audience that personal interaction and 
interviews with asylum seekers allowed for sympathy to be evoked—it allowed asylum 
claimants to appear as people and not simply as numbered files or blank applicants.  
At the same time, it allowed their subjective experience and realities to be 
incorporated in the judgment.  He explained face-to-face encounter with claimants as 
valuable resource for determining credibility and allowing asylum officers to perform 
their duties effectively.   
He concluded his talk by giving professional advise to the lawyers on two 
interconnected topics: a) clients’ legal status and b) interpreters’ effectiveness:   
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You have to make sure that the clients’ legal status is clear at all times and has 
proper documentation to be in the US.  You should coach your clients 
thoroughly to be prepared to answer questions and not be nervous.  We all have 
different ways of handing nervous energy and so something may come out 
incorrectly, so you should emphasize consistency in the story at all times.  You 
should make sure whether the interpreters are effective or not.  Also make sure 
to monitor their effectiveness before coming up for the asylum interview.”   
He shared an anecdote about how an interpreter spoke a different dialect from that of 
the asylum claimant and the case was rejected because the questions were not 
answered consistently and coherently.  The denial of asylum in that particular case, the 
officer, implied was completely due to misinterpretation.  “Since most of the time 
asylum officers make their decisions based on consistency of the asylum story and 
claimant’s credibility.  You have to make sure the interpreters are doing their job well.  
You should give plenty of time to test the quality of their performances as well as 
clients.  But you should not worry much about interpretation as we now have 
interpreters on the telephone available to monitor the interpreter you bring to the 
asylum office.”  The asylum officer’s instruction echoes what Susan Coutin (1994) has 
said about U.S. citizens becoming and even recruiting others as enforcers of the law 
(immigration-related topics).  In this case, credibility of claimant could depend as 
much on claimant’s first encounter or an in-person interview with the asylum officer 
as on the relationship formed between a claimant and pro bono lawyers in charge of 
his/her case. 
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 Unlike the human rights lawyer’s emphasis on the “trusting relationship” that is 
often formed between the client and the interpreter, the asylum officer’s instruction 
was a warning against interpreter’s inefficient “job” performance to outright 
misinterpretation that can potentially influence the outcome of an asylum decision.  
But like the human right lawyer, the officer also pointed out the presence of 
government assigned interpreter to monitor the in/efficiency of the interpreter.   
Before taking his seat and in a seemingly out-of-context manner, he concluded 
his speech by thanking the NHRA for organizing this workshop every year and giving 
asylum officers, like himself, the opportunity to having face-to-face encounter with 
potential pro bono lawyers.  This workshop, he suggested, gave lawyers some idea of 
how swamped the asylum offices were and how hard they had to work everyday in 
performing their job effectively.  The officer then pitched lawyers’ facilitation in 
performing their jobs: “I have seen that people who have participated in the NHRA 
program have been better lawyers in representing asylum clients.”  And after a 
moment of silence, he continued in a theatrical mode, “they have just been better 
human beings!” 
 
Speaker III:  Immigration Judge’s speech: between credibility and criminality 
The Immigration Judge, a Caucasian woman in her late 50s, was one of the 
judges whose asylum decision I had witnessed only a couple of months ago.  She was 
the one of the few judges not only familiar with where Nepal was on the map but had 
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traveled there recently.  I learned later, from the NHRA staff organizer, that the judge 
was known for her leniency and liberal politics.  And one of the pro bono lawyers also 
mentioned that she was one of the few agreeable judges who granted asylum without 
scrutinizing clients’ claims.  Indeed, the Nepali asylum seeker, who was granted 
asylum by this judge, was one of the more complicated cases—claims based on 
political violence entangled with domestic violence more than a decade ago in 
Nepal—with least protracted courtroom drama. 
“Folks, I came out of criminal court.  I have over a decade of experience,” she 
announced to her audience.  “When you represent clients in criminal proceedings, 
what do you do?” she posed a rhetorical question.  Her manner of speaking was quite 
informal.  Answering her own question, she continued, “You prepare your clients.  I 
cannot emphasize enough the importance of preparing those refugee people.38  I do a 
lot of asylum cases.  My views do not represent the U.S. Department but my own 
experience of the asylum process.  The statute represents the freedom and values of 
the U.S.  And this country represents those values where people are seeking refuge.  
Many people in the Detention Center are not represented.  But individuals at the 
court represented by pro bono attorneys like you are likely to succeed.”   
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  Judge’s description of asylum seekers and refugees should be understood in the broader context 
of what Ong (2003) has compellingly shown: how “race began to color American perception of 
refugees from communist countries” with the arrival of black Cubans in the 1980s (2003: 81).   Post 
World War II and up until then, the perception of refugees were that of upper-class, educated, 
especially Jews (Portes and Stepick 1994). 	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Drawing on her decade of experience on criminal case hearings, she talked 
about “witness preparation” for almost 20 minutes.  Without processing her talk, I 
started taking notes feverishly not wanting to miss a single word that uttered from her 
mouth.  I felt like I was in a law school classroom attending a lecture on criminal law, 
for I was learning new phrases, like “evidentiary standard” or “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” related to criminal proceedings rather than asylum.   Beyond court hearings in 
asylum and criminal cases there seemed very little connection between two very 
different types of laws, procedures, and required preparations.  I realize now, having 
had more information and the benefit of retrospective knowledge, there are several 
parallel features central to both legal proceedings, which I will discuss in some detail 
later.  
The judge seamlessly moved from the topic of criminal law to discussing 
asylum process.  First, she characterized “asylum seekers” and “refugee people” and 
invited lawyers to participate not only in helping them “rebuild” their lives but also 
imagining clients’ stories and accounts. 
Unlike criminal cases, where you don’t want to know everything about your 
client, asylum clients you want to learn as much as you can.  The story and 
interview after you hear them…just close your eyes and think and imagine if it 
makes logical sense.  Follow-up with questions next time you see them.  Most 
people are immigrants who are from different cultures, often uneducated, and 
not used to speaking with white people or men and women in fancy law firms.  
So they are, obviously, nervous and intimidated.  Your clients rely on you and 
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your knowledge of law in this country.  They think you are helping them 
rebuild their lives. 
 
Second, she gave several anecdotal accounts and different types of asylum cases.  All 
her examples of asylum cases had one thing in common—connection between 
claimant’s questionable credibility from his/her suspected criminality—that I found 
peculiar and perplexing.  Take, for example, the following case she shared with us:   
A woman from Guinea bought her identification document that she had to 
have her brother sent it all the way to the U.S.  It did not matter to me that the 
document she obtained was bought from the government in Guinea; it was not 
a big deal and I did not give much weight to the documentary evidence.  But I 
did not buy the whole story of this woman for I just knew it was a hoax—
having been raped and traumatized.  There was inconsistency in her oral 
testimony and lot of gaps in her account of what really happened to her in 
Guinea.  It was not even clear what she did or how she made her living there.  I 
just knew there was something wrong.  I did not find the woman credible.  But 
the lawyers representing this woman did not know that the identification 
document was bought and mailed to her by her relative in Guinea.  Make sure 
this does not happen to you.  In other culture that is how things get done 
because of the widespread corruption and widely accepted bribing system 
among government officials.  Everyone knows that places like China, Nepal, or 
Guinea, for example, it is like going to your local DMV downtown and buying 
your identification card or something.  That is how things are done in the Third 
World but make sure you tell your clients that you know about those things.  
You have to look for inconsistencies in their stories from the very beginning 
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and imagine it over and over again throughout the process of witness 
preparation. 
 
Several interconnected, quite disjointed and fragmented, issues were revealed by the 
judge’s anecdote.  Of many potentially contentious issues introduced by the judge’s 
anecdote, I found her statement on credibility and consistency intriguing and 
illuminating of the asylum decision-making process: one could choose to overlook 
evidence for a possibly counterfeit document based on “generally known fact” yet 
suspect claimant’s credibility based on unclear or inconsistent oral testimony and 
subsequently reject the case without providing clear explanation.  The irony of the 
judge’s disclosure of her discretionary power is quite instructive.  She admitted openly 
that buying government documents, like identification card in the “Third World,” was 
not something unusual or unexpected—not a “big deal”—but not buying particular 
asylum story based on an issue of questionable credibility despite documentary 
evidence was always a possibility.  Her familiarity with different local “cultures” in the 
“Third World,” where obtaining counterfeit documents are considered commonplace, 
revealed her ability to discriminate documentary evidence.  Indeed, the judge’s 
seemingly perceptive and well-informed knowledge about this practice echoes Bill 
Maurer’s discussion of the “counterfeit”: “counterfeit is only known when its 
circulation, its flow, is halted.  If it circulates, even it is ‘false,’ it is nonetheless ‘true’ in 
the now of the transaction: it is efficacious” (2005: 59).  As such, the judge’s declared 
ability to make such a decision revealed to her audience her seemingly well thought-
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through and thoughtful judgment arising out a very liberal, progressive worldview.  At 
the same time, I would take this further and argue that was also her liberal, 
progressive, political outlook that was presented as a justification for her rationale to 
deny asylum to the woman from Guinea—“  
It was not even clear what she did or how she made her living there.  I just knew there was something 
wrong. I did not find the woman credible.  In other words, the judge’s unexplained 
“knowledge” of the woman’s questionable credibility based on ambiguous ways of 
“what she did or how she even made her living” in Guinea could be used as a legal 
rationale for rejecting her asylum claims.  The ir/rationale for establishing credibility 
was then as much contingent on identifying desirable citizens-to-be as distinguishing 
what that desirability encompassed—claimant who is perceived to have “clear” or 
traceable means of livelihood.  One can deduce that the likelihood of those same 
“Third World” countries that the judge listed might also not have a similar tax system 
as the U.S. and the government that did not require people to submit their source of 
income or livelihood obviously did not figure in the judge’s (re)telling of her 
discretionary rationale.  The judge simply drew upon this anecdote to instruct lawyers 
to anticipate possible variations of asylum cases and warn about “cultural” 
backgrounds of different claimants. 
If, in a criminal case a client was often said to be innocent until proven guilty, 
in asylum cases a claimant was already imagined as an incredible until proven 
otherwise.  This attests to Kelly’s findings in the UK system that “in practice, many 
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lawyers argue that they actually find it hardest to prove an asylum claim and easiest to 
get a criminal conviction”  (2012: 47).  Consequently, the question of an asylum judge 
making an error in judgment was not something entertained, let alone explored in 
detail, throughout the lecture and examples she drew.   
Towards the end of her talk, she abruptly switched to a different topic of 
logistics:  “I have 1700 asylum cases sitting in my docket, currently, folks.  It is no 
joke.  Think about why you are doing this—maybe your own story or family members 
who came to the US—all of us are immigrants to this country except for Native 
Americans.  We all came from outside the U.S. She ended on yet another invigorating 
and a moving, recruitment note:  “This experiences of working with detainees and 
asylees is something you will look back with fond memories that you have helped 
people get an opportunity to live in this country.”   
She received an ovation from the audience, as she spoke these words.  But she 
remembered yet another tip: “Oh yes, and I forgot to mention, make sure your clients 
are paying taxes to the U.S. government if they are working.”   
********************** 
Hard work o f  compass ion 
In this part of the discussion, I lay out some of the basic terms of engagement 
that characterize present asylum work in this site (representative of other state and 
non-state sites I have visited during my fieldwork).  I highlight the emphasis placed on 
compassionate reason and work—as expressed in idioms of voluntariness, 
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resourcefulness, action, and moral choice—that influences both expectations about 
participating in asylum assisting process and practices of legal and human rights 
collaboration.  I suggest that this contemporary circumstantial rendering of asylum 
process and collaborative work makes compassionate reasoning all that forceful not in 
spite of but because of the inherent ambiguity.  In the remaining of the chapter, I 
observe concrete engagement—a type of emergent collaboration drawn together by 
the work of compassion—between state and non-state workers (from asylum judges, 
officers, medical practitioners, human rights and legal experts to potential litigation 
lawyers to be recruited).  I document it to primarily show how, while rationalizing 
compassion as a central motivating factor, people extensively draw on their 
experiences and continued effort of “hard work.”  In expressing compassionate action 
and work interchangeably, they do not refute, conceal, or ignore its connection; at the 
same time, they do not establish it as explicit truth.  Rather, they alternate between 
compassionate reason and asylum work, contradicting professionalization to a 
correspondence theory of compassion.  Practicing compassion serves to make US 
asylum legal collaboration feasible; to link professionals, institutions, lives, and 
resources across seemingly divergent expertise and power; and to produce and 
validate, under given socio-political and moral circumstances, asylum culture.  But, I 
add here, this feasibility is not without ethical and political costs: compassionate 
action and work of assisting asylum claimants ultimately depends on and 
simultaneously generates a cultural template for what is regarded as an acceptable 
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asylum “suffering narrative” through which claims, witness testimonies, and 
claimants’ performances are scrutinized.   
The importance of compassion in this situation poses an interesting analytical 
challenge for anthropology: while classical critique of compassion (and compassionate 
action) rests on privileging it as a universal human condition—a sort of absolute 
truth—contemporary post-modern debates are primarily preoccupied with 
documenting its particular political or, politicized and ethical consequences.  Either 
determining compassionate practices as genuine or dismissing them as calculated or 
strategic actions corresponding to certain socio-political circumstances forecloses 
analytically useful engagement: the multiple rationalizations and justifications 
surrounding compassionate practices and actions are also about understanding and 
materialization of compassion that is not limited to particular world-views, opinions, 
and values.  Instead, I want to attend to “work of compassion” interconnected to the 
“work of suffering”—neither as a consequence of nor a condition to moral or ethical 
orientation but as a material and socio-legal relationship. 
Producing compass ion for  pro fess ional  co l laborat ion 
Asylum work—claims to recognizing and alleviating suffering of refugees and 
asylum seekers, based on recognizable and standardized patterns, negotiated through 
international debate and academic consensus, and aspiring for transformations of lives 
and the bodies of the individuals—has been dependent on the work of compassion in 
the US since its inception.  Indeed, producing compassion in the institutionalized and 
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private settings, including recruitment of lawyers and human rights workers, asylum 
interpretation and legal documentation, preparation of standard witness testimonies—
are at the core of determining ‘claimant credibility’ of asylum seekers.  It gives moral 
legitimacy and ethical urgency to asylum work as a legal-political endeavor, determine 
its focus on credible sufferers of “past-persecution” and targets of “future 
persecution” and violence, and generate consensual measurement and specificity of 
political suffering (assumed to) occurring elsewhere but not (or less likely) in the US.  
Such work involves associations between state actors—asylum judges and 
asylum officers—and private citizens—lawyers and human rights experts—not only 
because asylum law relies on and engages with broader networks of professional 
consensus but also because certain forms of expertise and experience, say medical 
knowledge or language interpretation, are not readily available within the US 
Citizenship and Immigration Services or the US Department of Justice, two of the 
main branches overseeing asylum application and judicial procedures.  American 
asylum system thus involves a rather variety of expert networks and relationships 
across professional and institutional differences.  Instead of these different 
professional experiences, skills, and expertise being sources of potential friction, they 
come together as a unifying site for reproducing and validating “asylum suffering 
narrative.”  Thus, the question of how (and why) particular way of practicing 
compassion is assumed not only the driving force in asylum work but also interpreted 
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as a universal and necessary condition to gauge and ultimately alleviate equally 
narrowly defined way of embodying and expressing suffering.  
Compassionate action and, notably, “doing good work” remains the focus and 
justification of asylum legal collaborations.  However, rendering compassion through 
everyday hard work, recognizing legal interlocutors continually reiterated “credible” 
asylum claims and representing “genuine” suffering of claimants.  Instead of 
paternalistic inclusion, the contemporary compassionate practice is premised on 
agency of potential asylum claimants, emphasizing the autonomy, independence, and 
knowledge that individuals have of their past and present situations.  The association 
and orientation that produce asylum legal culture—relations with claimants as well as 
among legal colleagues, expert witnesses, and institutions—are here to be understood 
less in terms of recognized professional difference, incompatibility, and material 
inequality.  If the explicit demarcation of social and material difference between 
asylum seekers and asylum advocates is explained through compassionate work, 
professional difference among legal experts and human rights workers is construed in 
terms of serving “common humanity.”  For asylum legal practice to be professionally 
sound, asylum “clients” and legal “experts” in collaborative and compassionate 
asylum work are to meet as equals notwithstanding the former’s dependence on the 
discretionary power of the latter. 
The postulate of common humanity and compassionate work—not in a 
tangible material but in a narrow legal practical sense—applies to the potential asylum 
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claimants and to the pro bono lawyers assisting individual cases.  And it also refers to 
organizations, like NHRA, and state institutions engaged through common 
understanding of and agreement on what counts as compassionate action.  On 
different scales, associations that constitute the legal network are imagined as 
voluntary linkages between independent social actors and private citizens.  Work of 
compassion for common humanity has become basis for the legal asylum endeavor. 
*****************************************************************
***** 
PART II :  Compass ionate  incons is t enc i es  
 
The condition of claimants’ socio-economic and (protracted) legal insecurity  
 
Inconsistency is most obvious around relations with Nepali asylum claimants, 
recruited through the “Asylee Protection Program” in the city, for whom 
undocumented legal status is directly linked to anxiety and credible fear more often 
than the past experiences of persecution.  For many Nepali asylum claimants, 
economic and legal insecurities intersect, affecting their decisions to seek asylum in 
the first place.  Despite overwhelmingly visible fear that claimants demonstrate due to 
their irregular legal statuses to fear of persecution in some distant past and place, and 
the primacy of legalization through asylum in claimants’ lives, undocumented legal 
status is little (if and when acknowledged) spoken about in asylum legal interpretation, 
documentation, and judicial hearing.  When potential claimants are interviewed at 
organizations like NHRA, their constant struggle to learn about and ultimately obtain 
legal assistance through social networks and informal channels do not figure in the 
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questionnaires used during “screening interviews” that can be categorized, let alone 
transformed, into a legal narrative of suffering.  On these screening interviews, the 
human rights caseworker inquires about reasons for applying for an asylum in the US.  
The questions, if correctly answered, draw on a specific incident of past persecution, 
broadly conceived, and produce detail data and vivid description of when and how 
claimants suffered.  However, discrepancy exists between the range of conceivable 
causes of suffering (some relatively more serious, i.e. capital punishment, torture, and 
imprisonment) and those actually experienced by claimants as well as between the 
assumed consequences of that suffering—fear, anxiety, emotional and psychological 
instability—based on a well-defined distinct and distant place and time and the 
claimants’ everyday suffering based on legal insecurities in the US.  Yet the asylum 
claimants being assisted and represented by human rights workers and pro bono 
lawyers do not usually acknowledge or reflect on this existing gap. 
In my own data, I observed claimants discussing among themselves (as detailed 
in Chapter 1) the realities of their lives and continued hard work of suffering; human 
rights caseworkers and pro bono lawyers, meanwhile, talking among their colleagues, 
often expressed sympathy with claimants’ misery and described their work arising out 
of compassion.  Only occasionally, in moments of personal conversations and intense 
engagements during legal interpretation sessions, human rights workers and lawyers 
admit to claimants that they were aware of the ongoing dilemma of having to recount 
the suffering stories in attempt to establish “rapport” and build “trust” with them.  
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Still the experiences of suffering due to everyday legal uncertainty confronting 
claimants’ lives and realities, while not completely dismissed by those advocating for 
asylum seekers beyond their engagement as lawyer-client (or NHRA advocate and 
asylum seeker), were not publicly acknowledged.  For it would be naïve and erroneous 
to assume that constant fear and anxiety caused by legal uncertainty, limited resources, 
and material inequality among asylum claimants either did not come to the fore or 
were not observable during extensive interpretation sessions and legal documentation 
over a period of 8 months and longer.  Instead, the very visibility of claimants’ 
everyday realities allowed for the asylum lawyers’ articulation of need, evoking local 
idioms and vocabularies of fear and suffering to make asylum claims effective and 
urgent, and generate compassionate responses from judges and asylum officers and 
state interviewers.  This allowed lawyers, like Jessica or Elise, to vouch for and defend 
the presence of “claimant credibility” despite vague reasoning and lack of concrete 
example except in terms of their own time, investment, and continued engagement 
with claimants.  It is also what allowed lawyers like Lisa to admit unequivocally that 
claimants “have to be a good actor” in order for their credibility not to crumble 
during asylum hearing or interview, playing a critical role in gaining sympathy from an 
asylum judge or a officer and ultimately reaching a favorable decision. 
Such patterns of well-intentioned beliefs and gestures displaced, if only 
temporarily, assumptions of truth and objectivity, establishing relations through 
compassion.  More compassionate advocate-suffering claimant relations rather than 
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impartial connections between client-legal representative came to the fore orienting 
and further guiding that relationship.  Claimant preparation, for instance, prior to 
merit hearings and asylum interviews were neither foreseen nor written in the 
standard asylum legal and judicial procedures that eventually guided trial practices.  
Asylum lawyers and human rights workers therefore (and because their own time and 
investment were involved) perceived such preparations as ambivalent yet crucial steps 
during asylum interpretation meetings.  In the words of one of the lawyers, “Even a 
random and seemingly irrelevant past incident to asylum claims can be called upon to 
question claimant credibility.”  
  Claimants’ ambiguous legal status prior to making asylum claims, thus, is not 
something acknowledged during the asylum process, including cross examination and 
witness testimonies.  Instead, it is reluctantly spoken about during informal chats 
among lawyers and human rights experts as they come to sympathize with claimants 
and think about possibilities of providing superior legal assistance or reflect on the 
challenges of doing so, due to their professional positions within the asylum 
institutional spaces.  Human rights case workers and experts are especially familiar, 
from their extensive experiences of screening interviews in diverse settings with 
claimants’ limited resources to legal representation and everyday conditions; they 
insist that claimants can be easily dismissed or sent to deportation proceedings despite 
having “credible” claims, yet this knowledge of legal and economic insecurities of 
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many claimants are not included in the asylum legal narrative of suffering or 
systematically presented as credible and defensible claims. 
The only written records of such experiences are the notes and summaries 
shared among lawyers that are not widely distributed.  At the NHRA, the lengthy 
screening interview notes, detailing individual claimant’s current circumstances, were 
often used as substantial evidence for advising claimants to seek support through local 
medical and psychological counseling in the city.  This knowledge of claimants’ social 
conditions and limited economic resources allowed human rights caseworkers to 
directly put them in touch with a variety of aid organizations and non-profit agencies 
throughout the city.  More concrete entries on the ongoing social conditions of 
asylum claimants were jotted in personal diaries to help them remember details about 
claimants’ personal lives and background that have assisted in the subsequent 
screening interviews and interpretation sessions.  This data, I presume, helped staff 
and human rights lawyers to discuss practical issues concerning specific needs of 
individual participants to refer them to private lawyers in law firms and medical 
practitioners at institutions affiliated with the NHRA’s asylum programs.   
While written notes seemed to have been updated and consulted among staff 
and human rights lawyers at the organization, this knowledge was not included in the 
“fact package” that would be later transferred to law firms.  This was especially 
evident, and often came as a surprise, to me because Nepali asylum claimants for 
whom I interpreted found themselves repeating the minute details of their living and 
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socio-economic conditions in the US for the first several legal interpretation sessions.  
Yet this knowledge was never included as part of the legal narrative of their asylum 
claims, which is not surprising given the emphasis placed on legal formatting of 
asylum narrative, affidavit, and I-589 application form.  What is intriguing is that every 
lawyer assisting with asylum claimants insisted on gathering as detailed information of 
claimants’ current living and working conditions at the beginning of interpretation 
sessions only to categorize this ‘data’ and knowledge as irrelevant details to the asylum 
claims and suffering narrative based on the past persecution (as in the case study of 
Tshering in Chapter 3).  In other words, the exclusion of the irrelevant details was not 
intended to ignore or hide claimants’ everyday conditions or even question claimant 
credibility as such.  Rather, such background information and knowledge was not seen 
as critical component of asylum legal documentation, including I-589 form and the 
content and quality of affidavit.   
Claimants’ precarious legal status was thus detached from the asylum claims, 
documentation practices, and responsibility of human rights workers and lawyers 
deeply engaged with assisting individual asylum seekers.  At the same time, however, 
such background information of claimant’s precarious lives, uncertain working 
conditions, and protracted legal status was obviously essential for the functioning of 
“Asylee Protection Program” at the NHRA: had human rights lawyers and case 
workers not known that claimants’ limited (and no) access to resources and paid-legal 
representation and if they had not shared the background information with other 
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staff, they would not have been able to locate pro bono legal assistance accordingly 
and would not have stayed with claimants’ throughout the asylum judicial procedures.  
Not to mention the human rights staff would not have known where and how to 
screen for potential asylum claimants—detention centers—and proceed with 
screening of those that came independently, like in the majority of Nepali asylum 
claimants.  I would not go as far to assert that limited access to legal representation 
played a determining role for potential and accepted claimants rather than the weight 
of the asylum claims and the issue of “claimant credibility” (in whichever way it was 
measured).  The seemingly irrelevant knowledge of claimants’ economic and social 
background was nonetheless vital to initiating, continuing, and reproducing asylum 
claimant-lawyer relations, without which pro bono asylum culture would be 
nonexistent, and yet it could not be acknowledged, lest it breach professional 
boundaries and potentially rupture collaborative effort among human rights workers, 
and private lawyers and state officials.  This knowledge had to remain opaque, but not 
completely absent, so that the everyday engagement with claimants and the work of 
asylum could continue.  
If one asks human rights workers and pro bono lawyers involved in assisting 
asylum claimants why claimants’ fear and anxiety surrounding economic and legal 
insecurities in not discussed during interpretation sessions, one obtains several 
standard responses, the most significant being that present suffering due to economic 
conditions is the everyday reality and outside the realm of legitimate asylum claim-
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making process—it is what distinguishes an asylum claimant from a regular 
“economic migrant.”  One cannot make asylum claims based on current conditions of 
legal and economic uncertainty in the US.  Underlying non-acknowledgment of this 
reality is paradoxical—the compassionate work around asylum practiced by human 
rights lawyers, human rights experts, and state officials is contingent on recognizing 
suffering caused by current material inequality as much as “past persecution” in a 
distant place and time.   
While precarious socio-economic realities of potential and current claimants are 
not spoken about during interpretation and asylum legal documentation meetings, or 
professional engagements, many lawyers and human rights experts keenly observed 
and often spoke about, quite passionately, during “off the record” and informal 
conversations pre and post-interpretation interviews, outside the legal setting and 
among each other.  Thus, despite exclusion of asylum claimants’ current 
circumstances in the US from the affidavit and asylum narrative of suffering, the 
background ‘data’ very much shape concrete legal practices and intense engagements, 
allowing lawyers and human rights workers to advocate for and uphold the existence 
of “claimant credibility” even in the cases of outright asylum rejection (as extensively 
documented and discussed in Chapter 5).   Here, I want to add that the “irrelevant” 
information that does not become part of either the asylum documentation or the 
judicial hearing procedure, ironically, contributes to the successful production of 
asylum legal culture in the US. 
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Unconnected to asylum legal and judicial procedures and often driven by 
compassionate commitment, pro bono lawyers often provided meals to claimants 
during long interpretation meetings and prep sessions or extend other similar 
hospitality, such as providing car services to and from law firms when available 
and/or reimbursing for public transportation for claimants.  These gestures were 
appreciated by Nepali claimants as a sign of generosity, thoughtfulness, and care but 
not perceived by lawyers as integral part of the asylum seeking experience itself.  
Almost all pro bono lawyers assisting with Nepali asylum claimants were aware of 
irregular nature of their claimants work schedule for they often accommodated 
meetings most convenient for claimants and me as an interpreter and cultural 
mediator.  Many also worked after hours, late into the evening, if and when the need 
arose for making international calls to Nepal to gather or verify corroborative 
information and documentation about claimants’ lives pertaining to experiences of 
violence and “past persecution.”  In many cases, lawyers, instead of relying on verbal 
interpretation from interpreters like me, obtained copies of translated (from English 
to Nepali affidavit), prior submission with the I-589 form to the State Department, to 
ensure claimants had Nepali and English versions of their asylum stories before 
attending merit hearing or asylum interview.  To go beyond such professional ad hoc 
measures and, for example, invest into asylum cases as schedule long distance phone-
interviews and to propose systematic ways to arrange for translated legal documents 
for claimants is about compassion directed toward establishing, if by accident, a 
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deeply personal relationship, contrary to the declared commitment to professional 
duty and legal obligation. 
The everyday needs and non-asylum related “suffering”  
  A similar exclusion of the knowledge of material realities pertains to claimants’ 
everyday health needs.  For the duration of the asylum process, Nepali claimants 
recruited through the “Asylee Protection Program” and receiving pro bono legal 
assistance and representation (usually 1-3 years) provide medical and psychological 
evaluation and regular counseling otherwise unavailable or inaccessible free of charge.  
This health care excludes conditions and referrals beyond visible physical scars and 
psychological trauma (unless declared by claimants to be directly linked with their past 
incidents and experiences of persecution and suffering), and it falls short of regular 
healthcare needs.  It constitutes superior, and otherwise costly, services to evaluate 
pain and suffering of claimants caused by said past events (as explored thoroughly in 
the case of Tshering), and which claimants can rely on to obtain throughout the 
asylum-seeking process.  The claimants receive personal, one-on-one treatment, 
follow-up counseling sessions for as long as it takes medical practitioners and 
professionals to provide a written, medical statement.  This is not without a purpose: 
the witness experts’ reports contribute to the corroboration of the physical and 
psychological state of the claimants.  While Nepali claimants appreciated the medical 
resources available to them free of charge, many saw and described participating in 
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these counseling sessions as part of the asylum “suffering narrative” and work 
(explored in Chapter 2) and not necessarily related to their actual health conditions. 
The argument that asylum claims associated with expert reports on trauma and 
suffering that come out these counseling sessions form an important basis for witness 
testimonies of suffering—central to the functioning of a standard asylum narrative is 
nothing new (Shuman and Bohmer 2004; Willikson 2004; McKinley 2007; Johnson 
2011).  Yet the broader contribution of how contemporary clinical (and therapeutic) 
practices and asylum legal practices intersect, where asylum claimants and asylum 
advocates—medical experts, psychologists, pro bono lawyers and human rights 
experts—can only partially anticipate a favorable decision, increasing claimant 
credibility during asylum interview and judicial procedures.  For pro bono lawyers and 
human rights workers I worked with repeatedly emphasized accounting for “case-by-
case” basis of asylum decisions and it uniqueness because, and not in spite, of 
increasing attention, in recent years, paid to mental health conditions of asylum 
claimants and refugees.  This leads to my earlier point about asylum cultural template: 
just as claimants, upon going through asylum seeking process, gradually learn what 
kind of visible or suppressed pain, trauma, and suffering are deemed recognizable and 
credible for asylum claims, the legal and medical practitioners and human rights 
experts engaged in producing asylum medical documentation—mental health and 
psychological evaluation reports—and providing witness testimonies in the court 
hearings become particularly conversant with asylum legal protocols and patterns.  
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What this means, of course, is the increasing unpredictability of asylum judicial 
decision rests little on physical, mental health conditions of claimants, or even legal 
claims per se —whether directly related to or completely irrelevant to a distant past 
suffering—and more on the discretionary power of asylum officers and immigration 
judges.  The intersection between medical and legal protocols in the making of asylum 
claims is partly due to the institutionalized separation between immigration and 
asylum system, where health concern add an important dimension to the 
compassionate rationale for pro bono lawyers and human rights workers assisting 
potential claimants.  But, above all, it reflects the complexity of real-life physical and 
mental health conditions, which require medical experts’ clinical judgment and written 
reports, which are often modified in the process and transformed to fit into asylum 
legal documentation.  As such, there exists a medical template, so to speak, that 
explicate conditions of suffering related to asylum claims and thereby drawn attention 
to the persistence of pain and suffering due to said events.  Toward these ends, 
possible causes and consequences of suffering—physical or mental—directly 
unrelated to the asylum claims are not inquired or become part of the medical reports 
corroborating asylum documentation.  However, this is not to suggest that supposed 
trauma, pain, and suffering unrelated to experiences of past-persecution do not seep 
into face-to-face encounter with medical practitioners during interpretation interviews 
and counseling sessions. 
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This discrepancy between knowledge about actual physical (and oftentimes 
mental) health conditions of claimants and the reporting of the appropriate suffering 
due to past incidents is not necessarily unknown to medical expert witnesses and 
interviewers engaged extensively in the asylum work in the US.  Despite this, asylum 
medical reports, which usually describe health conditions of claimants as a mere 
complement and collaboration to the specific asylum claims, are submitted with the 
affidavit and free healthcare no longer extends once cases come to a close—resulting 
in either rejection or granting of asylum.  In asylum documentation, the 
inconsistencies regarding suffering of claimants’ health conditions are not detailed.  
The language of collaborative partnership between medical and psychological needs 
and asylum claims insist that the medical and legal institutions, while existing as 
separate entities, engaged with the asylum work and working closely with claimants 
under the guise of achieving the same goal of compassion—not only learning what to 
but also how to practice it in their professional lives.   To mention or put into writing 
the gap that one group, say medical experts, finds is less likely to happen not because 
they are oblivious to inconsistencies; rather, the effort to assist asylum claimants 
through compassionate reason and work seem central in maintaining collaborative 
consensus.  
Having extensively worked with asylum claimants, medical professionals as 
expert witnesses possess informal and in-depth knowledge of asylum legal institution 
and know how and in what particular language to use in asylum medical reports, 
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causing little or no problem: inquiring claimants of specific, traumatic (physical 
and/or psychological) past incidents, looking for physical signs of torture, and guiding 
claimants through medical procedures deemed crucial for generating asylum medical 
report, and ultimately sidelining medical concerns so-called unrelated to the actual 
asylum claims.  The familiarity of medical experts with the US asylum setting and the 
experiential knowledge arising from their involvement in asylum work is reflected in 
their informal conversations with pro bono and human rights lawyers regarding cases 
they have previously worked together and so forth.  And it is because of the medical 
experts’ familiarity with asylum legal culture that they draw on more often than their 
acute awareness of the variety needs and health conditions of claimants in conducting, 
following-through, or recommending certain procedures.  Moreover, asylum claimants 
that may not show familiar medical signs of physical or psychological suffering are not 
dismissed as non-credible claims; rather, as we saw in the case of Tshering and Maya’s 
stories, they may receive better counseling support and attention upon being marked 
as and read through the lens of “cultural being.” 
This practice—much of it is acquired while working with organizations like 
NHRA, assisting asylum claimants in a variety of settings—helps medical practitioners 
and experts bridge the gap between their clinical knowledge about claimants’ 
conditions and the standard asylum protocol, enhancing both retaining claimant 
credibility and the chances of asylum success.  Yet the detailed knowledge that most 
medical experts have of claimant’s everyday health concerns and issues that are not 
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documented in their witness testimonies also reveals the acute problem of sustaining 
asylum legal culture in the US as the primary task, foreclosing any discussions or 
consideration of possibly proposing new or improved ways to continue offering 
substantial healthcare services or counseling.   While many medical experts admit to 
not being entirely sure exactly which psychological counseling and evaluations 
“relevant” for potential claimants waiting their merit hearings or asylum interviews. 
However, no systematic initiative is taken by medical practitioners, as expert witnesses 
advocating for claimants’ health conditions, to challenge the ways of gathering 
medical reports for the asylum process.  Thus, the experience of writing asylum 
medical reports, carefully sifting through relevant information about pain and 
suffering and simultaneously un-documenting (while verbally sharing with 
interpreters, lawyers and human rights workers) everyday health concerns of claimants 
contribute to the compassionate work of asylum. 
The medical experts working closely with pro bono lawyers and NHRA do not 
continue consultation with claimants after their asylum cases are closed regardless of 
the asylum decision.  Their clinical evaluation of and medical advise to claimants are 
then mediated by asylum lawyers and human rights workers.  This type of clinical care 
and compassionate commitment rely on the structure of asylum legal practices already 
in place.  Thus, medical practitioners and experts one-on-one engagements of 
claimants’ everyday health concerns or medical needs remain undocumented for the 
most part; again, crucial knowledge about claimants’ everyday limited material and 
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socio-medical realities are discussed among doctors, lawyers and human rights 
experts, at the heart of NHRA’s “Asylee Protection Program” and free consultancy 
and legal representation, and yet systematically dismissed in upholding compassionate 
work of asylum.  The irony, of course, is that without the very knowledge of claimants 
current situation in the US, medical practitioners would not have able to collect valid 
information regarding traumatic or painful experiences of “past persecution” in order 
to assess, advise, and advocate for appropriate counseling sessions prior merit 
hearings or asylum interviews. 
Among a variety of explanations for this asylum medical un-documentation are, 
apart from professional experience and declared rationale of practicing compassion, to 
avoid complications or contradictions surrounding asylum legal documentation and 
confrontations with fellow legal experts/colleagues.  Arguably, this ensures medical 
practitioners and experts to be active and paid-participants in the asylum collaboration 
with minimal interruptions or critique of the practical aspects of their own work and 
everyday medical practices. 
(Imaginative) discontinuities in the submission of country condition reports  
 Similar parameters apply in the making of country condition report—as 
supporting documents/evidence for asylum claims—upon successful recruitment and 
facilitation of (not to mention monetary compensation for) country condition experts.  
These reports are written after consultation with pro bono lawyers as well as in-depth 
interview with and evaluation of individual asylum seeker.  Such documents form part 
	  292	  
of a wider asylum legal economy to specific merit hearings and interviews through 
involvement as “expert witness,” “country-condition reporters,” and “cultural 
experts,” who are compensated for their time and “expert knowledge.”  Indeed, 
anthropologists acting as/performing the task of expert witnesses in asylum cases are 
not particularly new (see Good 2004 for extensive analysis on the role of expert 
witnesses during asylum hearings).  While this continues to generate interesting debate 
within anthropology—ranging from specific issues of context and competence to the 
broader debates on ethical, political and moral accountability. 
 During legal interpretation sessions and dialogues, the gathering of vital 
information from expert witnesses are persistently referred to as “expert evidence” 
and “country-condition reports,” allowing little or no space for individual claimants to 
draw on their own knowledge of the socio-political contexts of the places they have 
left and are seeking asylum from.  While dwelling on the details of political situation 
by claimants can be seen to delay and impede on the efficiency of asylum 
interpretation and documentation process, the assumed ignorance of claimants’ 
knowledge of their countries political situation is necessary to uphold and ultimately 
retain “claimant credibility.”  Recall, Lisa’s firm assertion (Chapter 4) that many 
claimants will not be using “big words” to speak about their traumatic experiences, or 
Elise’s affirmation (Chapter 3)--“The messier and more complicated the story, the 
better and believable it is.  You see, no one remembers past events (especially the 
traumatic ones) chronologically or in some orderly fashion.”  In sum, there are 
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designated people as “experts” who are called upon to do evaluation and provide 
knowledge of the country’s socio-political conditions that does not distract or divert 
from individual claimants’ experiences, versions, and interpretations of trauma, “past 
persecution,” and suffering.   Thus, there is a selective disconnection between 
claimants’ knowledge of their countries as more personal and, hence, subjective, and 
expert witnesses’ descriptions and written reports as “objective evidence”39 (Good 
2004). 
 Everyone immersed in the asylum assisting process—pro bono lawyers, legal 
interpreters, and human rights workers—is aware of this “overlooking” that takes 
place and yet agrees to abide by it.  If one asks country condition and cultural experts 
about information gathering, documentation, and report-writing process, the answer 
is “there is already a standard template” for submitting “cultural facts” and “generally 
known facts” about political situations in different countries and they simply tailor to 
fit the asylum guidelines.  This acknowledgment of the commonly known “facts” that 
facilitate in the submission of expert reports upon endorsement by expert witnesses 
themselves maintains the oscillation between documented political violence elsewhere 
and undocumented suffering of individual claimants.  It also reveals how knowledge 
and information that expert witnesses provide may or may not be anything new (given 
the fact that a host of international non-governmental and humanitarian organizations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Anthony Good has provided an extensive study on how the asylum system (in the UK) itself and its 
attending assumptions, namely legal criteria of ‘facts’ and ‘objective evidence,’ pose considerable problem for 
social scientists, including anthropologists, engaged in the asylum work as “expert witnesses” in the asylum 
courtroom hearings and providers of country-condition reports.	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located worldwide and their websites publish updated country reports quite 
frequently) but the position that affords them to define what and how specific 
knowledge is included in the “country condition reports” in support of individual 
claims make them collaborators in the asylum assistance process. 
 Further, exclusion of individual claimant’s familiarity of the ongoing political 
and socio-cultural context of their “home countries” largely functions by 
simultaneously disregarding claimant’s experiences caused by uncertain legal status in 
“host countries”—the overlooking of the socio-economic and material realities of 
claimants.  Like medical practitioners and psychologists’ consistent sidelining of health 
needs and concerns ‘irrelevant’ to asylum claims, marginalization of claimants’ 
sustained hardship and experiences of socio-economic violence do not figure in these 
reports.  As in the previous examples, this sidelining of knowledge about claimants 
everyday lives underlies productive professional collaboration in the context of asylum 
assistance process.  Here, again, this collaboration is forged by commonly shared 
knowledge about compassionate reason and action that materialize in their effort to 
assist asylum claimants.  In practicing compassion expert witnesses quietly acquiesce 
to the asylum assisting process that indirectly feeds on the ongoing material suffering 
of many of the claimants they assist.  Thus, it is out of compassionate reasoning that 
the country condition reporters and cultural experts keenly offer their knowledge and 
lend “objective evidence” to assist claimants while at the same time practice oblivion 
to the unequal realities of claimants and their protracted legal statuses.  This 
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agreement helps avoiding conflict among asylum collaborators as much as it 
reinforces openly the fundamental value of asylum cultural system in the US.  Were 
the nature of the country condition reports included claimants’ recounting of detailed, 
individualized experience and interpretation of suffering experienced post migrating 
to the US (as I had documented in Chapter 1 and 2), the asylum system altogether 
would not function the way it currently does.  The ambiguous degree to which 
‘claimant credibility’ is upheld, for example, during merit hearings and asylum 
interviews would be meaningless making the asylum collaborative programs defunct. 
Relat ions among asy lum advocates  and human r ights  experts  
Non-acknowledgment of claimants’ unequal material realities, coupled with 
claimants’ everyday existence and experience contingent on precarious legal statuses, 
is particularly striking with regard to professionals assisting with Nepali claimants.  
The practice of compassionate reason and action apply to initiating and sustaining 
relations among asylum advocates, between pro bono lawyers and human rights 
experts, and between non-profit organizations and private institutions.  These 
professional actors do not directly discuss their knowledge and awareness of the 
claimants’ material and socio-economic conditions, primarily because the link between 
claimants’ precarious lives, economic inequality, and prolonged legal uncertainty is not 
something publicly articulated.  Thus, it is difficult to conclude whether advocates 
with extensive experience assisting claimants “know” and/or at least acknowledge the 
two being interconnected and one affecting the other in concrete ways. 
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 As an interpreter-ethnographer for many Nepali claimants, their material 
inequalities are reflected in observable everyday conditions concerning housing, 
employment, and lack of healthcare access.  Many concrete everyday life concerns of 
Nepali claimants are, indeed, not known, or are only partially known among various 
asylum advocates and groups—a private litigator with minimal or no experience 
working in immigration matters is less likely to know much about the intricacies 
involved in the everyday work or employment conditions of their clients.  Likewise, a 
human rights worker has little idea about housing situations, and healthcare 
needs/concerns of potential claimants during interview and screening process of 
asylum claims and specific suffering narratives.  While this may well be because such 
issues do not figure as asylum-relevant issues or claims, these un-discussed (or at least 
not publicly disclosed) observations, however, does feed into perspectives of potential 
and current claimants.   
Indirectly, these material inequalities figure in casual conversations among 
human rights workers in the same institutional setting rather than those between 
private lawyers and human rights workers engaged in different institutional locations 
and hierarchies.  For instance, Annie said to me in an informal discussion, “Who 
would not want to integrate Nepalis in their countries?  They are so gentle and docile.  
They remind me why this work [asylum] is so important to continue.”  A French 
national herself, Annie let me know that she did not see any point in applying for US 
citizenship herself and that she was looking for consultant positions in the field of 
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human rights agencies and organizations in post-conflict countries.  She further 
reasoned with me, 
You know Nepalis are very humble.  They make me feel comfortable asking 
them personal questions about their lives.  Unlike other refugee applicants, 
Nepalis are composed most of the time and are able to put all of us (the 
NHRA staff) at ease.  It is not in their culture to take advantage of each other 
like other refugee cultures.  And the most rewarding part of the asylum work is 
that you are giving someone a chance to start a new life in this country. 
I had particularly asked to reflect on her experience interviewing Nepali asylum 
claimants and, whether or to what extent she had found that their immediate material 
concerns/needs and precarious employment situations in the US superseded the 
suffering asylum claims that the I-589 Asylum Application form could hardly begin to 
illuminate.  In this context, the indirect acknowledgment of claimants’ social realities 
was immediately substituted by Annie’s personal opinion and views on contemporary 
integration of Nepalis into American society, as it indexed compassionate work 
involved in asylum-assistance process.  First, this type of informal conversations with 
asylum experts and advocates were not necessarily exceptional throughout fieldwork.  
On the contrary, this comment is quite typical and reflective of many of the “non-
asylum” related discussions I had with lawyers and human rights workers about their 
Nepali claimants’ situations in the US.  Here, one could infer not only asylum 
advocates’ awareness but also critical commentary, if unintentional, concerning 
material inequalities of their Nepali claimants—the fact that Annie felt the need to 
	  298	  
describe them as docile and hard-working “migrant workers”—a desirable group of 
people to be integrated in the US.   However, even on these occasions, awkward and 
measured, rather than frank, acknowledgment structured many of the informal 
conversations about Nepali claimants I had with pro bono lawyers and human rights 
workers.  Second, for the most part, any potentially engaging, meaningful, and candid 
conversations about Nepali claimants’ as migrant workers in the US were either 
immediately redirected to or reframed within the discussion of advocates’ own 
professional obligation and job responsibility (as discussed in Chapter 5 through the 
use and overuse of the phrase ‘claimant credibility’) in concrete and a strong sense of 
compassionate commitment toward assisting asylum claimants. 
Interestingly, claimants’ material realties and inequalities are not commonly 
discussed among pro bono lawyers and human rights experts, those in a superior 
positions, such as between a senior associate in a private law firm and a director of 
NHRA organization.  One possible reason for this is diplomatic politeness and 
adherence to the unspoken yet understood criteria for maintaining professional 
relationship and institutional collaborative effort.  Not laying bare the contradictions 
between their awareness of claimants’ realities (and the everyday suffering) and 
professional commitment to compassionate work (for addressing past suffering 
elsewhere) sustains the partnership required for continuation of asylum work in the 
US.  Second, acknowledging to one another the dire material disparities of the 
claimants they assist would also mean unearthing the underlying and deeper, if 
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unavoidable, causes and consequences of the asylum seeking process for claimants: it 
would infringe on the assumed benevolence of state and non-state institutional 
programs such as granting asylum to its credible and, hence, desirable people.  But 
above all, I suggest, just like the work of “making papers” for Nepali claimants 
structure their everyday work-experiences, perception, actions, and motivations 
toward life and “suffering” in the US, pro bono lawyers and human rights experts’ 
“work” of assisting claimants with asylum documentation gradually give in to their 
own heightened sense of compassionate rationale. 
  The emergent asylum institutionalized silence around claimants’ material 
conditions and legal insecurity pre and post-asylum seeking experience is understood 
and compensated by constant articulation of compassionate asylum-work as the data 
above illuminates.  Referring to asylum claimants in this context as “migrant workers” 
and openly acknowledging their claimants’ extra-legal narrative of suffering as 
something remotely related to material disparities and legal uncertainties—a problem 
of “undocumented migrants” and not document-able claimants—made asylum 
practitioners and human rights workers extremely uncomfortable; they even came to 
see any possibility of such comparison as risky, laden with political and politicized 
issue of contemporary immigration debate around undocumented migrants unfolding 
in the country.  Although the collaborative effort, in principle, remains open to 
addressing immigration-related issues (as illuminated in the Asylum officer or the 
Immigration Judge’s candid speech above), this rendering of immigration issue is not 
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typical among human rights experts and private lawyers working with asylum 
claimants.  Not discussing the obvious connection between asylum system and 
increasingly stringent immigration policies surrounding un/documentation and, in 
particular, the observable switch of their client between an “undocumented migrant 
worker” and an “asylum seeker” is a way of actively overlooking them.  This non-
acknowledgment is accompanied, just as in the case study of Tshering (in Chapter 2) 
and examples pertaining to medical practitioners and country-condition reporters as 
expert witnesses, by professional practice of developing peculiar ways of 
communication (“claimant credibility” in Chapter 4).  The known material conditions 
of their claimants and wider disparities are silenced, if provisionally, for the duration 
of the asylum process. 
Misplaced compass ion or  caut ious ly  compass ionate? 
 These specific ways of non-acknowledgment of material disparities seemingly 
irrelevant to asylum claims are complemented by practices and performances of 
compassion, making them visible and conjuring up the vision for solid foundation of 
professional collaboration.  In the asylum law workshop (discussed in the first part of 
this chapter), speakers engaged in contemporary asylum work participate as equals.  
Compassionate action as a driving force for assisting asylum claimants is emphasized 
by all participant-speakers, notwithstanding the different levels of actual personal 
encounters with claimants and degrees of investments into asylum work.  The style of 
presentation are carefully rehearsed, drawing on speakers’ own past experiences of 
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working with and for asylum claimants from various countries, displaying their 
expertise in the field of asylum work.  At the same time, it is a visible act of 
establishing their credibility as speakers and advocates of the US asylum system to 
persuade private lawyers to participate in the asylum-assistance process, ultimately 
reinforcing and expanding the network between state and private actors.  While this 
focus on compassionate action fosters collegiality, concealing institutional 
differences—who provides legal representations and constant support to claimants 
and who are in positions of power making ultimate decisions about which cases are 
granted asylum and what claims rejected on the basis of credibility—it is crucial to 
identify how much this kind of collaborative effort is welcomed and appreciated by all 
parties involved.  For the state officials, like Immigration Judge or Asylum officer, the 
forum allows them to present their work on asylum cases as part of their job 
responsibility within a context of a wider network of asylum law practitioners and 
expertise.  For the private litigators and future pro bono lawyers, this introduces and 
orients them toward a range of asylum-related possible issues, reassuring them of their 
continued commitment and compassion toward doing asylum work. 
 Practicing compassion has a tangible, concrete, outcome for the asylum experts 
and practitioners I interviewed throughout fieldwork—the production and 
documentation of claimants’ “suffering narrative” appropriately inserted in asylum 
affidavit, medical and country condition reports, accompanied by legal brief to be 
submitted to the Immigration court or the Asylum Office.  Even more explicitly, it is 
	  302	  
vital to sustaining asylum professional collaboration and extending social and legal 
networks of experts, scholars, practitioners situated in state and non-state institutions. 
This chapter began, like others in this dissertation, from an awkwardness of 
being an ethnographer-interpreter in the asylum narration, documentation, and 
interpretation processes for Nepali claimants and their pro bono lawyers and human 
rights advocates.  The physical and mental disorientation related to asylum legal 
interpretation has to do with the constant feeling I had when speaking to lawyers and 
human rights staff: what they said of the asylum process was as odds with what I 
repeatedly encountered.  A discomforting situation for all the parties involved yet it 
would never quite burst open because it was not about finding truth or real motivation 
behind their declared commitment to compassion in continuing asylum work.  It is 
not about furthering political agenda through practicing compassion as delineated by 
Fassin’s use of “politicized compassion;” neither is it appropriately captured by a 
phrase like “false consciousness” underlying compassionate rationale and action.  It is 
neither compassionate politics nor false compassion per se.  Such interpretations 
would assume that compassionate action is either a priori or instrument to some 
ulterior motive rather than being in a relation of constant flux, contradiction, and even 
conflict with ever-changing situation at hand my legal interlocutors encountered.   
Working in the world of US asylum system with asylum legal practitioners, 
asylum officers, and human rights experts, I was time and again struck by the ease 
with which I became accustomed to not acknowledging the everyday material 
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inequalities and legal anxieties produced by the asylum-seeking process confronting 
Nepali claimants during legal interpretation sessions.  While this active non-
acknowledgment, as discussed above, facilitated in gathering and documentation of 
relevant information for making credible asylum claims, it never completely 
disappeared from the purview of those actively engaged with assisting asylum 
claimants.  The fact that no pro bono lawyer, medical expert, or a country-condition 
expert I worked with seemed perplexed and/or intrigued by their claimants’ 
consistent insertion of information—whether housing, employment, or health 
concerns—unrelated to asylum claims point toward an interesting paradox.   The 
irrelevant information is as much central in the making of credible asylum claims as 
the suffering narrative related to specific incident or event in the past.   
For the context presented in this chapter, compassionate rationale and practice 
among legal experts and professionals is both motivated and enabled by heightened 
acknowledgment of asylum suffering narrative while simultaneously non-
acknowledging material suffering and legal insecurities of their Nepali and non-Nepali 
claimants they come in contact everyday and ultimately assist.  Maintaining consensus 
over the premise and principal values of compassion, as I have discussed here, 
underlie professionalization and subsequently foster legal collaborative relations, 
which reinforce, if unintentionally, the contemporary asylum culture and legal 
procedures.  The public non-acknowledgment of the everyday suffering of claimants 
is made possible precisely by nurturing a hyper-sensitive environment and legal space 
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for the recognition and production of asylum suffering narrative—an event in a 
distant time and place to be objectified.  This is turn allows for flexibility in the 
narrative of compassionate work rationale—the one closely, although not exclusively, 
tied to socialization in a legal, professional setting.  Perhaps, then, evasions and 
silences of claimants’ everyday, material, suffering provide as solid a ground for 
asylum network and compassionate relations as active participation and advocacy 
around distant (political) violence and asylum suffering narrative.  Practicing 
compassion, even if interpreted as a misplaced one, has a productive place in the 
asylum work in the US: it is what drives advocates and human rights activists to assist 
claimants, and the consensus and stability established through the dual production of 
asylum suffering narrative (of asylum claimants) and practicing compassion (by asylum 
advocates) sustains professional collaboration. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Suf fer ing Lives ,  Compass ionate  Act ions  
 “Bahini, you have been here for two years now,” Nirmala didi said in curious 
tones.  “So tell me if you have found what you were looking for?” We were discussing 
about the difficulties to address all the problems that Nepalis face and continue to 
experience in the U.S.  I hesitated at her request for summing up, what I have 
“found,” pointing out the fact that she and other community leaders and advocates 
had many years of experience in this kind of work.  As part of her job, she provides 
direct services to people, mostly domestic workers, interpreting for them, educating 
them about immigration laws and their legal rights as workers—regardless of their 
legal status—and organizing and mobilizing people to demand their rights.   
During one of the worker’s rights training workshops, she passionately 
declared:  “Saathiharu ho, bolne ko pitho bikcha, nabolne ko chaamal pani bikdaina (Friends, 
one who talks can sell flour and the one who does not cannot even sell his rice).”  
“To talk,” in this context, is most closely understood as ‘speaking up’ (as in sales 
pitch), and self-promoting, literally.  But Nirmala didi was employing this proverb 
metaphorically to explain the importance of ‘voicing’ one’s grievance and ‘demanding’ 
to be heard or fighting for one’s cause (as in worker’s rights).  The shared knowledge 
and cultural understanding is that consuming rice, associated with a privileged social 
status and a symbolic marker of middle-class life-style, is more expensive to buy than 
flour, which is easily sold and is considered staple among poor in Nepal.  Thus, 
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convincing a poor person to buy rice requires much more ‘talking’ than convincing 
them to buy flour.  She offered an interesting analogy, a rather unusual interpretation 
and an inverse relationship between sellers—migrants—and buyers—employers.  For 
this analogy completely dismantles popular understanding of consumer-consumption 
debate where sellers (whether selling artifacts and/or ideas) are often in better socio-
economic situations than buyers.  But based on her own pitch, she was promoting 
migrant workers as sellers and those employing them as buyers. 
I was fascinated and confused by her use of the buying-selling analogy to 
encourage migrant workers to speak of their troubles and hardships.  She then 
explained to me that what ailed Nepalis in this country is their hesitancy in actively 
self-promoting or ‘selling’ their cause.  She offered to enlighten me, offering her own 
experience: 
Bahini, maile bees barsa Nepal ma human rights ra social justice ko kaam garera kapaal 
phulako hun. Human rights ra social justice bhaneko nai aruko dukha bechne pesha ho 
(Sister, my hair has become grey by working in the field of human rights and 
social justice for 20 years in Nepal.  The profession of human rights and social 
justice sustains by selling suffering of others).  Yahaan America ma pani tehi 
huncha; Nepaliharu le afno dukha ra peeda bechera basekaa chan (Here, in America, 
too, it is the same thing; Nepalis are living/surviving here by selling their pain 
and suffering). 
She explained to me her experience of going through asylum process herself in the US 
seven years ago, which entailed, in her own words, “selling suffering.”  She grinned, 
and shrugged.  “You know every Nepali has same dukkha in this country.  But I 
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cannot go around telling people how I made papers because they will criticize me and 
think that I am just like them.  People will not respect my work.”  
Here is an activist, community-organizer, encouraging people to ‘speak up.’  
And one can see, the formulations of Nepali’s dukkha, suffering, she draws on that are 
very similar to the ones shared by Maya, Mina didi or Kumar dai.  She is highly 
perceptive of her own contradictory position about not sharing her suffering with 
others in the community to continue working as a grassroots, community activist.  
However, she would never assert that her attitudes are similar to those seeking 
asylum.  Indeed, she periodically drew a distinction between people currently seeking 
asylum and people, like herself, now a green-card holder and soon to be U.S. citizen, 
and no longer an ‘asylum seeker’ in some tangible sense.  Recognition of this legal 
difference matters although it does not necessarily correlate with one’s socio-
economic or regional background, or social capital.  It is impossible to separate 
exactly someone seeking asylum from that of a green-card holder, or someone with 
U.S. citizenship, for that matter.  It is not like there is some kind of specific 
sensibilities associated with asylum seekers, but Nirmala didi positions herself firmly 
in the camp of a differently suffering individual, posing a rhetorical question, “Ke farak 
parcha ra?  Hami sabai saranarthi bhayera ya asylum garekaharu jastai ta baseka chainau ra 
yahaan kaagaz bhai sake pani, aakhirma? (‘What different does it really make?’  Or, more 
accurately, ‘To whom does it really make a difference? Aren’t we all living like 
refugees or asylum seekers here regardless of having made papers, after all?’)” 
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This intense identification of Nirmala didi with asylum seekers and her earlier 
declaration of people ‘selling suffering’ is an interesting case illuminating what is (and 
can be) acknowledged as public knowledge and what is not recognized as knowledge 
among Nepalis in the migrant community.  While many people ambiguously slide 
from one to another depending on specific context and who they are speaking to, 
Nirmala didi as a community-activist and organizer, who has years of experience 
working with individuals seeking asylum felt that she could not admit her own 
experience of having obtained asylum to people she came in contact everyday, let 
alone share her knowledge about the process with them.  As I have discussed 
throughout the dissertation, what people in the migrant communities understand as 
‘asylum seekers’ vary greatly and so does the discourse on dukkha, suffering, to 
legitimize people seeking asylum.  
For some people, like Nirmala didi, whose early days of migration and 
‘integration’ experience probably resembled that of Maya or Mina didi, but whose 
engagement outside the community center involved human rights activist like Cynthia 
or Jessica, and pro bono lawyers like Lisa or Elise, it is important to establish one’s 
distinction from ‘asylum seekers’ while vocalizing that all Nepalis are living like 
refugees and “selling suffering” to simply exist.  Often when Nepalis saw me 
observing different workshops and trainings in the community center or facilitating 
English classes on weekends, they would approach me and comment, “Hamro desh ko 
haalat ramro bhayeko bhaye Nepalis haru le yeti dukkha paunu pardaina thiyo hola (Had our 
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country’s situation been well Nepalis would not have been suffering like this here).”  
This would be expressed in tones somewhere between regretful and reprehensible, 
making sure I knew that they, as community organizers and activists, recognized the 
suffering of others and, as a result, decided to volunteer and/or assist in different 
capacities.  Although at first I did not know what to make out of their uninvited 
commentary and justification of working in the community, I later realized that these 
speeches and verbalized concerns are not at all random or inconsequential.  Indeed, 
these are voiced all the time in the midst of internal criticism among people discussing 
their issues related to making paper, unfair working conditions, and sending money 
home to families in Nepal.  They are always in dialogue with people, real and 
imagined, with a perspective associated with the dominant point of view that insist 
that Nepalis, like many recently arrived migrants from war-torn countries, experience 
hardships and difficulties because of the unstable socio-political situation “at home,” 
leaving very little room to relate their suffering in terms of their continued, everyday, 
socio-economic and legal insecurity in the U.S.   Paradoxically, it is by voicing the 
collective grievances and employing the ‘suffering’ narrative as a collective Nepali 
people that community activists and organizers I worked with sought to reproduce, 
and simultaneously dismantle, the victimhood-status of suffering Nepalis. 
Even if you do not neatly qualify as either ‘suffering’ Nepali or an asylum 
seeker, you present yourself as someone sympathizing with the general plight of 
Nepalis notwithstanding the knowledge of what or how that ‘suffering’ may be lived, 
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experienced, and interpreted in the daily lives of people who are your neighbors, co-
workers, and acquaintances.  Yet if you live in one of the Nepali neighborhoods in 
Queens and Brooklyn, and if members of your family, relatives, and close associates 
are involved in migrant activities, if indirectly, or are assisting others with 
interpretations, translations, and employment, you are exposed to the ongoing 
contradictory social practices and intense discussions about who is or what counts as 
dukkha, suffering.  It is not so easy to dismiss people seeking asylum as non-suffering 
Nepalis, as Nirmala didi’s perceptive statement--“Nepalis are living here by ‘selling 
suffering’”—indicates what everyone in the Nepali migrant communities already 
knows or gradually learns during early stages of ‘integration’ period in the U.S.  It is 
simply learning to know what not to know to continue living and working, as Mina didi’s 
poignant remark from earlier sums up: “But everyone knows the truth already.”   
In this context, it may be logical why some people attempt to reconcile the 
contradictions by making finer distinctions between what does or does not account 
for suffering of Nepalis.  Nirmala didi offered a further explanation on this: 
In all these years that I have worked with Nepalis, I know who has really 
suffered and who has not.  When people suffer they rarely share with others 
unless they can trust you.  But when you don’t have any choice or your 
suffering is too much people need to share their dukkha, suffering, even with 
strangers.  There is no time to think about what is right and what is not.  So 
some make papers easily and others cannot.  Not everyone has the same luck, 
you know.  There is enough suffering already for many of these people who 
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come to the community center.  They live in someone else’s house, working six 
days a week and finding time to even grieve for their families back home.  They 
should not have to suffer just to live here. 
She was not alone in her theory of suffering Nepalis, but one of the few people 
who, while distinguishing herself from those she closely worked with and provided 
direct services to, was highly perceptive of her own contradictory position as a former 
asylum seeker.  Other volunteers, community organizers, and ESL facilitators, also 
commented: 
Those have to go through asylum process are usually hard-working people who 
cannot afford to go to events and activities because they live and work at 
someone else’s house everyday of the week.  They are not considered 
important people in their own communities, you know.   
 
People who are making papers here have no other options.  Many have been 
brought to the US as live-in maids by South Asian diplomats and wealthy 
businessmen with false hope and promises of legalizing their status and 
sponsoring their families in Nepal and India.  They cannot go back to Nepal 
and they cannot live freely in this country.  They continue to suffer in silence. 
 
The more I do this kind of work, the more I come into contact with people’s 
problems, and the more I realize how Nepalis are suffering.  Many do not 
speak a word of English.  They do not know their own rights as migrant 
workers, how will they know about asylum?  Many just wait for their employers 
to sponsor them after years of working in the same place and possibly being 
exploited.  Few who do know about it spend their lives running after lawyers 
and interpreters who promise to make their papers.  
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By recognizing the general pain and suffering of other Nepalis, people engage 
in and work out their contradictions about what counts as real suffering, what counts 
as legitimate grounds to seek asylum, and who, after all, can make papers.  At the 
same time, identifying people as suffering victims of social and political injustices was 
central to their explanations. 
Identifying whether and which Nepali is a suffering social actor is not a relevant 
question.  Rather, understanding and interpretation of a particular notion of suffering 
is specific to being Nepali and belonging to the Nepali migrant community.  
Consequently, one can be a suffering victim, like the ones that Nirmala didi and her 
fellow volunteers and community organizers speak about.   Asylum seekers, who are 
able to make papers and legalize their status faster than most people are recognized as 
agents--suffering-agents and not suffering-victims.  It is the finer distinction between 
the two that requires some explanation. 
Clearly, people who have either experienced themselves or been affected by 
those who have lived with the contingency of being undocumented, and without 
papers, or have encountered people going through the asylum process construct and 
offer complex explanations of the distinction between suffering-agent and suffering-
victim.  These explanations rest less on actual ability to make the clear distinction but 
actually on the necessary ambiguity with which people try to work out and 
simultaneously articulate the contradictions between suffering Nepalis and allegedly 
suspicious asylum seekers.  Explanations of this type do not need any evidence and 
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everyone in the migrant community in New York City accede.  The community 
organizers, volunteers, and activists are aware of and often also part of the social 
circles where conversations among upwardly mobile people in the community make 
blanket claims about distrustful asylum seekers employing ‘the Maoist story’ or 
misappropriating the ‘real’ suffering of Nepalis.  Participating in the ongoing 
conversation and even defending those seeking asylum as victims of suffering rather 
than agents of suffering establish their knowledge of the suffering Nepali community 
while at the same time indicate the speakers’ distinct socio-legal status, seemingly 
more worldly, than the recipients or targets of their direct services. 
A claim to ‘know the suffering of people’ positions the speaker, paradoxically, 
as a confidant and sympathizer of hardships and difficulties experienced by other 
migrants without proper documentation and/or unemployed in the community.  
However, I would not go as far as to claim that the speakers can necessarily relate to 
or are even aware of the actual situation if they never went through the asylum 
process themselves.  For those who make-up the ‘suffering’ community, the general 
suspicion around seeking asylum indicates not an outright exclusion but a conditional 
inclusion within the larger Nepali migrant-community that depends on rejection of 
their il/legality, on the one hand, but ambiguous recognition and even reverence of 
their particular sociality based on suffering.  One can, thus, acknowledge their own 
existence as asylum seekers and realize that they will be greeted with either outright 
cynicism, at worst, or mild condescension, at best.  Or one can construct oneself as 
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someone who sympathizes and understands why suffering Nepalis’ may seek asylum 
but does not regard another’s asylum-seeking status as necessarily that of a suffering-
victim.  Or, one can simply make a blanket claim of all suffering Nepalis without 
referring specific construction of suffering-victim or suffering-agent.  No one in the 
migrant community, however can consider the erasure of suffering, as a category to 
identity conditions of Nepalis, all together.  Whichever way one participates or 
engages with other Nepalis, everyone who remains connected—socially, economically, 
and politically—to the migrant community notwithstanding the actual physical 
connection, must be skeptical of asylum seekers yet understanding of their suffering. 
 
The idea of su f f er ing  Nepali asylum seeker 
 Intense engagements and discussions about asylum seekers among Nepalis are 
part of the much broader socio-cultural landscape and processes through which 
concerns, individual and collective, intersect with universalizing goals and objectives 
of human rights and social justice underpinning the liberal, democratic U.S. state.   To 
look at the meaning of suffering among Nepalis is to also examine the socio-cultural 
representation of the “suffering asylum seeker,” in its specific manifestations and its 
liberal consequences.  In talking about suffering, my interest has been less posing it as 
a philosophical question or existential crisis, but primarily as a shared social 
experience, if differently articulated or inhabited, and one common to the condition 
of Nepalis in the US.  I am concerned specifically with alleviating the suffering of 
	  315	  
others, espoused by the discourse and practice of human rights and social justice, 
embedded in the narrative of liberal, just, state.  This narrative posits a [alleged] 
distinction between a benevolent, progressive, compassionate state from a state that is 
characterized as failed, undemocratic, and violent.  Tied to the idea of benevolence, 
then, is an idiom of difference, a categorization that places people on either side of 
the divide—people arriving from undemocratic nations to liberal states.  Suffering, in 
this sense, is quite literally a type of identity that become ethnicized through a series 
of bureaucratic practices: a sufferer is positioned and, in turn positions 
himself/herself invariably as a universal subject of compassion whose suffering can 
only be recognized by his/her belonging to a different place, local history, and/or socio-
economic conditions.  
 The configurations of suffering look different depending on the position one 
occupies and/or is expected to occupy in the liberal state.  Whether as migrant 
workers or asylum seekers in the US, Nepalis as recently-arrived people from a war-
torn, impoverished, and politically unstable country, as I have shown, are already 
positioned as sufferers.  Among Nepalis, though, it is through dislocating of one's 
suffering in socio-cultural idioms and practices surrounding kaagaz banaune and dukkha 
as they learn to identify themselves and be identified as asylum seekers in the U.S.  
From the point of view of Nepalis, the question about who is or is not suffering is not 
as relevant and urgent as to the degree one has suffered, who is asked to reveal 
his/her 'real' suffering to whom and under what circumstances.  More importantly, 
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the question for many Nepalis, whether it is even possible not to be identified as a 
suffering asylum seeker in the US, notwithstanding the actual legal status, simply 
because they belong to Nepali migrant 'community' and are from Nepal.  “Ours is a 
growing community (baddho samudaya) in the US; unless we demand to be counted in this 
country no one will recognize our suffering (dukkha) and respect us as people,” 
announced a prominent figure in the Nepali community during one of the initial 
brainstorming meetings, held at Adhikaar, well attended by a number of leaders and 
active members from an ethnically and linguistically diverse Nepali communities.  
Expressing this widely shared sense of being invisible and disrespected as people, the 
ethnic leader emphasized its direct connection to Nepalis' collective experience of 
suffering, that is somehow gone unrecognized.  In urging his fellow ethnic leaders to 
mobilize Nepalis in their different neighborhoods and communities to partake in the 
Census 2010, his message was simple: to be counted, literally, as people was the only way 
for Nepalis and their suffering to be visible.  Or put another, not so farfetched, way: 
becoming visible is inseparable from making one's suffering count.  This message has 
different implications and meanings for people variously positioned in the Nepali 
community in New York City and in the U.S. at large.  Evocation of suffering as a call 
for identity, community-formation, and political recognition—rather than 
conventional categories based on ethnicity, race, gender, class or, say, language and 
religion—needs some explanation.   
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 How, then, are we to comprehend and interpret the use of suffering among 
Nepalis as migrants and asylum claimants?  Suffering as an analytical category, at best, 
runs into a problematic construction of victimhood/agency and sufferer/survivor 
and, at worst, completely evades the fundamental problem the discourse of 
suffering—social, political, medical, economical, and existential phenomenon—poses 
for a nuanced socio-cultural analysis.  The dichotomy between victim-subject and 
agent makes sense only within the narrative of liberal state.  In an effort to move away 
from this dualist framework of victimhood-agency, anthropological inquiries have 
exclusively focused on agency, as “a constrained capacity to act” (Leve 2011); “an 
everyday embodiment and inhabitation of action” (Mahmood 2005), to what is now 
called “neoliberal agency” (Gershon 2011).  While agency as an analytical category 
requires no quotes, we insist on bracketing the term ‘victim' and/as 'sufferer' in order 
to make them objects of analytical inquiry.  As such, victimhood as a potentially useful 
category for analysis has vanished from our purview altogether.  To resurrect 
victimhood for anthropological inquiry seems completely unthinkable today.  This 
avoidance to employ stained adjective, however, threatens to dislocate, invalidate, if 
not completely eradicate the agentive role of people we work with and the worldviews 
they describe to us that rely not exclusively on speech of resistance but 
communicative gestures and grave silences, willful inaction, disengagement and 
everyday performance of victimhood.  In other words, whether or not the dichotomy 
of victimhood/agency offers limited social analysis and discussion, the fact that these 
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terms are flourishing in the everyday language and worldview of people we choose to 
engage with and interpret their social-world (should) question our academic agenda 
and imperative. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have suggested tracking specific terms of the 
discourse of suffering—as people deploy, modify, reproduce, and question it—not in 
a vacuum but always in relation to a parallel discourse on the everyday, concrete 
practice or work or compassion.  Rather than exclusively focusing on the socio-
cultural representation of “suffering” and “making paper” among Nepali claimants, I 
followed its use by people to describe, relate, and interpret their lives shaped by and 
inseparable from politico-legally specific positions as social actors in the U.S. asylum 
contexts.  In doing so, I have illuminated the concrete ways in which “suffering” is 
entangled for asylum claimants engaged with those assisting, interpreting, and 
advocating for their claims.  Put simply, suffering lives of Nepali claimants, if under 
different circumstances and to different effects, is made visible by equally important 
and interconnected practice of compassion.  This dissertation has shown that it is 
quite unproductive to draw and interpret the boundaries of suffering, for they are 
repeatedly (re)drawn not only by those claiming asylum 'victimhood' but also by those 
insisting on suffering narrative through particular legal recognition, narration, and 
documentation.   
The strategy I employed in this dissertation has been to delineate points of view 
from which 'suffering narrative' and 'compassionate practice’ are interconnected, 
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although not always causal of each other, in the U.S. asylum socio-legal context.   One 
of the goals then has been to demonstrate through ethnographic analyses how 
categories of suffering and compassion are mediated by familiar and unfamiliar social 
terrains among Nepali claimants and their legal advocates and human rights activists.  
In doing so, I have documented how Nepalis have gone through a learning curve to 
make certain (familiar) experiences unfamiliar in the process of seeking asylum in the 
U.S.  I am not suggesting that Nepalis simply fit into given categories of 'victimhood' 
and suffering in becoming asylum seekers.  Rather, I have attended to the formation 
of crossroads where it becomes impossible to interpret across socio-cultural contexts 
through various, irreconcilable, versions of suffering victim-claimant dichotomies.  
 The question of suffering Nepalis seeking asylum in the U.S. has been one such 
crossroad.  The suffering victim-agent dichotomies (re)produced in the legal spaces 
illustrate ongoing cultural dynamics, unpredictable encounters, and inherent 
contradictions that can neither be captured in the familiar trope of universalized 
category of “asylum seeker” nor be dissected as culturally specific code of acting and 
being.  When 'asylum seeker,' though contextually dependent, is understood to 
translate into a universal category of either victim-subject or agent, certain [visible] 
behaviors and sensibilities are interpreted as characteristics of a suffering individual.  
In the cases I have discussed in this dissertation, one would end up finding Nepali 
asylum seekers as suffering 'agent' and non-suffering 'victim' of legal process 
simultaneously. 
	  320	  
An unconventional conception begins from the premise that an asylum seeker 
(as in the case of Nepalis) is only allowed to speak from a situated position in the U.S. 
asylum cultural and legal-political space.  He/she is being interpreted into U.S. asylum 
process through relations of wider systems, prior and post migration from Nepal.  For 
instance, asylum seekers claiming to be from the U.S. cannot be identified as a 
suffering agent or victim.  Nepali asylum claimants, like others seeking asylum, is 
constituted in and through particular histories of migration that tell narratives of 
suffering—demonstrating experience of past-persecution and well-founded fear of 
future persecution in Nepal—that is constantly being modified upon encounters with 
pro bono lawyers, human rights workers, and immigration and asylum officers.  Thus, 
asylum claimant is a particular figure —introduced as victim/agent whether of 
political violence not unconnected to “structural violence” or a product of globally 
acknowledged unequal socio-economic processes—whose suffering, above all, must 
not be doubted.   
The other  s ide  o f  su f f er ing :  prac t i c ing compass ion  
Asylum pro bono lawyers and human rights experts’ approaches to alleviating 
suffering of their claimants and practicing are inseparable from the contemporary 
asylum structural process and strategies of their own personal and professional 
choices.  Their generalized understandings and practices that shape compassionate 
outlook while engaging in the asylum work are framed through their own specific 
experiences of job responsibility—ensuring ‘claimant credibility—and satisfaction—
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doing ‘good work’ of assisting claimants.  This compassionate habitus in turn 
influence (and is influenced by) how they approach the everyday asylum assisting 
process and where they see themselves fit into the U.S. asylum system, even as they 
contribute to the ongoing debates and laws.  In this section, I bring together and allow 
the various threads of advocates’—pro bono lawyers and human rights experts—
asylum cultural knowledge accompanied by professional obligation and 
compassionate practice discussed in previous chapters to intersect and converge in 
order to reveal the relationship between the values and significance of ‘claimant 
credibility’ and professional opinions and actions of asylum advocates, the 
corresponding asylum cultural template in the U.S., and the production of asylum 
suffering narrative and compassionate actions.  As such, I try to link the legal 
transformation of asylum suffering narration (chapter 3), legal procedure in asylum 
documentation and unpredictability built into it (chapter 4), the reinforcement of the 
legal discourse of asylum ‘claimant credibility’ (chapter 5) in relation to professional 
investment and inconsistencies therein, and the advocates’ identification with 
claimants’ suffering through their own work of compassion (chapter 6).  I do so not 
so much to demonstrate the contradictions as part of the asylum legal process.  Rather 
it is to juxtapose Nepali claimants’ accounts of seeking asylum--“making paper” and 
“selling suffering” (crux of chapter 2 and 3)— and its manifestation in the form of 
asylum suffering narrative not in spite but because of the sheer inaccessibility of 
advocates and supporters of their claimants’ worldviews, ideas, and experiences.  My 
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central purpose is not to analyze U.S. asylum system’s role is concretely shaping the 
asylum officers, lawyers and the human rights experts’ everyday practices of 
compassion in assisting asylum claimants in the co-production of asylum suffering 
narrative.  By exploring the mutual constitution and interconnection, and not causal 
relationship, between suffering narrative of claimants and compassionate practice of 
lawyers and advocates, the U.S. asylum institutions and the asylum judicial procedure 
through the repetition of asylum legal narration, interpretation, document production, 
and hearings, I attempt to re-imagine the asylum legal space as a contested site of 
intense engagement and perpetual miscommunication of experiences, competing and 
incompatible worldviews and their interpretations, and realignment of socio-legal 
norms and cultural practices.  
Two developments in the studies of compassion provide an important 
framework for this approach to understanding contemporary asylum legal procedures, 
broader appeal to legal and human rights advocates, public debates and/or changes 
surrounding asylum policies and legal culture (such as shifts, expansion, and 
restructuring of the asylum system, say collaboration between state and non-state 
actors, or the transfer of cases from the Asylum Offices to Immigration Courts).  
First, to culturalize asylum legal system, as I have done in this dissertation, and 
counter the dominant approach to studying and representation of asylum system as 
somehow detached from the practices and engagements among differently situated 
social actors—legal advocates, human rights workers, asylum officers, judges, 
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interpreters and claimants—this section re-focuses on the work of compassion and 
demonstrates the interconnection between the compassionate rationales (and actions) 
of lawyers and human rights workers and broader asylum process.  This approach to 
compassion, located at the crossroads of individuals, professional, institutional, and 
global practices, builds extensively on Fassin (2012) and Ticktin (2011) analytical work 
in their exploration of “compassionate politics” and the emergent “apolitical 
humanitarian regime” through which “practices of care and compassion” come to rely 
on recognizing a certain kind of “suffering body”—that of the asylum claimant and 
not of the ‘economic migrants’ as marginalized or disenfranchised groups—for 
establishing moral legitimacy (Ticktin 2011: 2-4).  In particular, Ticktin unpacks the 
compassionate rationale of medical practitioners and healthcare experts corroborating 
the claims of the asylum seekers in France.  She examines the asylum medical 
advocates’ professional practice and political beliefs and ideologies on multiple 
registers: their everyday professional encounter with asylum seekers during 
identification of visible scars and signs of trauma, their recommendation for particular 
care/treatment on case-by-case basis, and the medical documentation of a generic 
“expert report” on claimants’ conditions.  In contrast to Ticktin’s interlocutors, who 
understood their professional roles as strictly providing medical expert reports on the 
medical conditions of the claimants, while acknowledging the constraint and the 
sometimes-contradictory positions they ended up taking either on behalf of or in 
opposition to claimants’ legal claims, my legal and human rights interlocutors often 
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conceive of themselves as asylum legal experts and reason infinitely not only their 
ability to potentially transform individual claimants’ legal status and lives but also their 
contribution in the emergent progression and direction of the asylum system as a 
whole.  I have argued, however, that asylum lawyers and human rights advocates’ 
strong moral inclination and the rationale of everyday compassionate practice in 
relation to asylum work allows these supporters and advocates an anticipation and 
understanding of constantly imminent judicial predicament—either that of a 
successful or unsuccessful asylum verdict.  Factoring unpredictability in the legal and 
judicial process causes them to strengthen the purportedly untenable US asylum 
culture, which activates and leads to legal uncertainty during every stage of the asylum 
seeking process to begin with. Their institutional beliefs, legal practice, and 
professional culture instigate the spread of extra legal-uncertainty (chapter 4) and its 
amplification through materialization in concrete of the phrases like ‘claimant 
credibility’ or underappreciated work of compassion (chapter 5 and 6).  What predicts 
asylum decisions in the end is not directly contingent on the legal advocates and 
human rights workers’ much-invested present orientation toward their claimants’ 
specific conditions, but the deliberate expansion of their legal practical skills as 
“suspension of disbelief” added by their declared compassionate action that fit 
perfectly well with the narrative of alleviating suffering that underpin the US as liberal, 
democratic, and compassionate state.  
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Second, investigating the relationship between dominant asylum 
representations and legal culture and their effects reveals how asylum procedures and 
institutionalized socio-legal culture gets implemented in the asylum system in liberal 
societies.  As such, my approach has been an attempt to bring together the 
anthropology of asylum that inquires into the relationship between asylum 
experts/legal practitioners (Alvarez and Loucky 1992; Daniels 1996; Mahmood 1996; 
Good 2007) and critical humanitarian theories (Fassin 2011; Ticktin 2011; Bornstein 
and Redfield 2011; Feldman 2011) to understand how compassionate actions, in 
particular, may be performed legally.  Anthony Good (2007) has employed an 
anthropological perspective on the study of asylum process through focusing on the 
role of “country condition” experts and how lawyers and judges use the expert reports 
and evidence in assessing asylum claims that actively shape asylum cultural practices: 
these reports are used to legitimize certain key concepts (say, ‘race,’ ‘religion,’ or 
‘social belonging’) and are incorporated into the institutionalization of asylum legal 
decision-making.  Didier Fassin (2011), with a completely different focus on the study 
of asylum practices, has investigated into the relationship between the production of 
asylum suffering and the “compassion protocol” followed by medical expert 
witnesses.  By analyzing how asylum medical narrative and witness testimonies of 
claimant-suffering are mutually constitutive, by examining contrasting criteria of 
‘truth’ and ‘evidence’ are negotiated and ultimately established during asylum 
testimonies, Fassin’s research offers a critical study of humanitarian reasoning 
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underpinning the compassionate actions and performances of medical staff and 
healthcare providers witnessing and corroborating in the asylum claims.  
Pro bono lawyers and human rights advocates and interlocutors’ key legal 
justification for their rethinking of asylum assisting process and job accountability and 
efficiency are the dual notions of ‘claimant credibility’ and compassionate actions, 
which distill their professionalized legal habitus mixed with personal commitment, 
serving as an ideal template for how asylum legal protocol, including their own actions 
and behaviors, materialize on the ground.  I have documented predicated views and 
opinions surrounding asylum claimant credibility that more often than not result in 
unanticipated asylum legal and judicial decision-making, contrary to asylum experts 
and advocates intense emphasis on the phrase and its practicability during asylum 
interpretation sessions and extended interviews and engagements.  Despite being a 
purportedly asylum legal ‘blueprint’ for taking asylum claims, assisting asylum 
claimants and ultimately making claims legitimate, asylum claims once denied based 
on undermining or questioning of claimant credibility, during judicial procedure and 
merit hearing, becomes simply irreversible.  What is more, the legal experts and 
human rights advocates not only have a prior knowledge but also anticipate this 
possible asylum outcome.  As such, asylum legal templates cannot be assumed in 
advance to have desirable, if not unexpected, effects.  Therein lies the central 
question: what other particular yet generalize-able template for functioning of asylum 
legal practice exists with even more explicatory power?   
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Compassionate Actions 
Examining pro bono lawyers and human rights advocates’ exemplary legal 
culture of engagements with individual asylum claimants, emphasis on establishing 
claimant credibility, and the work of compassion offers a crucial window onto the 
ways in which the asylum processes ensure production (or at least reinforcement) of 
compassionate actions among advocates and experts in general.  My own mediating 
position as an ethnographer-interpreter at these private law firms and human rights 
organizations highlighted the intensity of legal interpretation and established for me 
the sheer impracticality, if not incommensurability, of a cross-cultural communication 
and understanding of the asylum process—say through elaborate explanation and 
usage of concepts like “making paper” and “work of suffering” among Nepali 
claimants, which existed in a stark contrast from that of legal experts/advocates’ 
notion of “claimant credibility” and their “work of compassion.”  Moreover, I realized 
that these concerns surrounding compassionate actions could yield into insight into 
the legal culture restructuring the US asylum institution and experts as advocates (in 
both private institutions and non-profit human rights organizations) at large, as both 
were enactments of the same habitus of contemporary asylum culture.  Through the 
examination of key discourses and practices on the ground (Chapter 5 and 6) and how 
they are deployed in specific contexts of asylum configuration within private law firms 
and human rights organizations, I was able to test their template of establishing 
	  328	  
‘claimant credibility’ and think through their alignment of certain beliefs, practices, 
and actions as compassionate was affected both within and without.  
Contrary to my expectation, I learned that pro bono lawyers and human rights 
advocates’ job experiences, investment into asylum procedures, prolonged 
engagement with claimants, do not afford them much empathy or understanding for 
the plight of refugees and asylum seekers, Nepalis or not, of the general asylum 
applicant in the contemporary political climate surrounding immigration debate and 
policies.  Why do asylum legal advocates and human rights workers continue to, and 
even insist on, describing their professional face-to-face encounters with asylum 
claimants as compassionate actions despite strict legal protocol they follow and 
perform notwithstanding the many inconsistencies surrounding actual asylum-
assisting process?  Part of this conundrum has been laid out in previous chapters: the 
extensive period and routinization of the interpretation and documentation sessions, 
during which their role as advocates and supporters are particularly accentuated over 
prolonged engagements with asylum claimants and co-production of asylum suffering 
narrative, which in turn allow them to sharpen not only their legal practical skills but 
also continual self-reflection and critique of the nature of “unpaid” and 
“underappreciated” work of compassion.  Recall my legal interlocutors’ self-
characterizations of job efficiency, hard work, empathy, and “alleviating suffering” in 
implicit contradiction to the present, material inequalities and legal anxieties produced 
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by protracted asylum uncertainty among Nepali claimants that are illegible and 
illegitimate asylum claims. 
As a way to conclude, in this chapter, I revisit the legal and human rights 
interlocutors’ compassionate action as a central component of the asylum legal and 
institutional culture.  The centrality of compassion not only solidifies legal 
practitioners and human rights experts’ professional outlooks, habitus, and 
performances, which in turn inform the US asylum system.  This engenders a 
persistent practice of compassion among asylum lawyers and supporters advocating 
for asylum claimants because, and not in spite, of the uncertain future of asylum 
judicial decision-making, which in turn sets in motion the prolonged legal 
representation: I-589 asylum documentation, suffering narration and interpretation, 
and merit hearings in the courtrooms.  Further, it also sets the transfer and continued 
imposition of asylum cultural template of suffering onto individualized claimants’ 
suffering narrative.  Along with the claimant credibility notion being highlighted in 
assisting asylum claimants, what is actualized in concrete is the legal practitioners and 
human rights advocates’ rationale of compassion—establishing institutional model of 
(legal) compassion and themselves as benefactors of that model.  In other words, pro 
bono lawyers and human rights advocates and supporters’ compassionate action both 
produces and is produced by their professional justification as very embodiments of 
the asylum assisting process, as the ultimate “compassionate” professionals.  Thus, it 
is precisely this compassionate action as cultural template, often obscured and 
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interpreted in abstract (whether seen as a universalized or a particularized fact), which 
not only describes and analyzes but also performs the asylum legal system.  Given the 
limited reach of pro bono lawyers and human rights advocates, their personal 
investment into and institutional culture inherent to asylum assisting process are 
dramatized in the production of compassionate work. 
Sel l ing compass ion? 
I began this dissertation with Nirmala didi’s poignant reflection on the plight of 
Nepali asylum seekers and their experiences of “making paper” as “selling suffering” 
and her sharp, if indirect, critique of the asylum-seeking process in the US.  I end this 
discussion by sharing another equally moving ethnographic account—a case of what I 
call selling compassion.  I recount at length a conversation I had with Amanda, a 
former asylum lawyer and current legal advocate at one of the human rights 
organizations assisting private lawyers on pro bono asylum cases.  She was a wealth of 
information about the contemporary asylum culture and institutional intricacies of 
asylum process.  As a person in charge of recruiting lawyers from private law firms for 
pro bono asylum representation, she was gathering video testimonies of successful 
asylum cases—interviewing both asylum lawyers in participating private firms and 
their former asylum claimants.  In this conversation, she discussed with me both the 
long-term potential of the video project and the immediate, short-term use of 
collecting live testimonies as a powerful approach for recruiting private lawyers for 
future “asylum work.”  Amanda described how the professional collaboration 
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between non-profit human rights organizations, like the ones she worked for, and 
private law firms would result in actualization of the work of compassion central to 
asylum legal representation.  Her interview questions for pro bono lawyers and their 
claimants highlighted materialization of compassionate actions in two different but 
interconnected ways: a) the role of non-profit human rights organizations in 
introducing and recruiting private lawyers to take up asylum cases; and b) and the life-
changing experience for successful claimants and rewarding professional experience 
for the pro bono lawyers.  
A:  Asylum legal work is different from other legal work that most lawyers are 
used to, you see.  Because it is pro bono work that requires lot of unpaid hours, 
which means pro bon lawyers willing to take up asylum cases are not making 
any money for their firms although those who have been engaged in this work 
know the value and satisfaction one obtains after assisting asylum claimants.  
But it is difficult to retain lawyers to volunteer their time and energy.  So we are 
making this video for highlighting the importance of this kind of work.  And 
what better way to convince others to get involved that by showing live 
testimonies of the successful asylum cases, where lawyers and their respective 
asylum claimants describe their experience of working together?  So the issue is 
two fold.  Our program depends as much on compassionate lawyers taking up 
pro bono asylum work and as asylum claimants coming forward with their 
suffering.  In other words, we have to appeal to human side of potential lawyers 
who may be ambivalent in representing asylum claimants because of the long 
hours and personal investment into it.  As for the claimants, as you have seen 
with Nepalis, they do not always feel comfortable to come forward and give 
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testimonies because of the lack of resources and awareness about free legal 
assistance.   
 
TS:  So how do you think the video testimonies would help raise awareness 
about the organizations’ program for potential asylum seekers and pro bono 
lawyers? 
 
A: Because asylum work is as much about compassion as it is about sharpening 
professional legal skills that lawyers are rarely aware of.  So highlighting the 
connection between personal and professional experiences of asylum pro bono 
lawyers, we can appeal to lawyers to take up asylum work.  The claimants, on 
the other hand, are fearful about their legal status but the video testimonies of 
successful claimants would also allow them to come forward and share their 
stories to potentially transform their suffering lives. 
 
TS: So you hope that the successful asylum cases—stories of claimants’ 
suffering and experiences of compassionate pro bono lawyers—turned into 
video testimonies would eventually help sustain the refugee protection 
program? 
 
 A: Yes, precisely.  But I think it can also help highlight the humanity and 
compassion that this country in built upon, you know.  Some of the cultural 
aspects of compassion, the ideals we have in this country are quite unique if 
you think about it.  It is a country where immigrants’ dreams come true.  For 
example, my grandparents were refugees from Eastern Europe, who settled in 
this country long time ago.  My own family’s history motivated me to do this 
work.  And now, there are so many refugees and asylum seekers who are not 
	  333	  
adequately represented.  So I want the asylum lawyers to talk about their personal 
histories and compassionate reasons for assisting asylum claimants and the rewarding 
experiences thereafter and the successful claimants to highlight their journey of seeking asylum 
and finally living in this country with free of suffering (my emphasis). 
 
 Amanda’s detailed explanation gave me a window to the current configuration 
of compassionate practices in the US asylum legal process and into the institutional 
environment of pro bono lawyers and human rights advocates—the worldviews and 
ethical practices they are encouraged to nurture, along with anticipation of their 
actions and values.  The asylum legal practice initiated and sustained by pro bono 
lawyers and human rights advocates and their creative responses to professional 
collaboration and their declared compassionate approaches to asylum work, are both 
constitutive of, and constructed by, their relationship with asylum claimants and their 
particularly compartmentalized suffering lives.  As Amanda hints, there exists an 
intimate relationship between successful asylum claimants’ experience of seeking 
asylum and lawyers’ compassionate action drawn not only from their professional 
commitment but also from their assumed “personal histories.”  Strikingly, her 
comment about appealing to the “human side” of potential pro bono lawyers that the 
video testimonies of successful asylum cases are assumed to tap on is perhaps the 
ultimate effect of compassion: it is not the question of it being ‘genuine,’ ‘intentional,’ 
‘political,’ ‘temporary,’ or even the central to creation of an ideal-type society, but 
simply to allow socially privileged actors to act on their ideological, professional, and 
	  334	  
personal interests unopposed and unseen.  In sum, compassionate actions of social 
actors and private citizens, like asylum lawyers and human rights advocates to assist 
asylum claimants, exist along side suffering lives (however broadly or narrowly 
defined) of potential asylum claimants.  The latter is as much a mediating object for 
professional and personal commitments of asylum advocates, as it is central to the 
current configuration of asylum legal culture in the U.S. 
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